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ABSTRACT
J. Gregory Brister
Department of English, December 2010
University of Kansas
The Mainstream of Consciousness: James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, William 
Faulkner and Mass Modernism argues that the “stream of consciousness” 
method which has become synonymous with “high” modernism was, in 
actuality, a widely accepted and employed trope within interwar popular 
culture.  Instead of considering the ways writers like Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner 
resisted consumer culture, this project argues that their work both informed and 
was informed by advertising and best-selling fiction.  
This project establishes that the modernist “stream of consciousness” 
method was a “popular” form that was prevalent and widely embraced by the 
interwar public, that the method appealed to a large audience because it invited 
identification with a variety of subjective perspectives (or “consciousnesses”) 
which correlate with what film critics have called the “system of suture,” and that 
its dramatization of the instability of the split self (between the “preverbal” or 
“subconscious” and consciousness) helped create the interwar psychological 
subject.  Each chapter works to historicize the emergence of the “stream of 
consciousness” as a method and, with Julia Kristeva’s conceptualization of the 
semiotic, to theorize the way these texts informed interwar subjectivity as a 
dialectic between the rational and communicative and the irrational or 
“prespeech” level of the “subconscious.”
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Preface
According to Frederick R. Karl, the stream of consciousness “is the 
epitome of Modernism” (239).  As the stylistic method of Joyce, Woolf, and 
Faulkner, the “stream of consciousness” has become synonomous with textual 
“difficulty,” with a “high” modernism separate from mass or popular culture.  
The purpose of this study is not merely to contribute to the ongoing 
reconsideration of literary modernism as socially relevant and interested in 
consumer culture, but to take, as a point of focus, the “epitome” of 
modernism—the “stream of consciousness” or the textual representation of 
interiority—and chart its appearance in and widespread acceptance by the 
interwar public.  
When I began this study, I intended to read the bestsellers of the 1920s 
and 1930s (labeled “middlebrow moderns” by critics Lisa Botshon and 
Meredith Goldsmith) against the fiction of Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner in order 
to deconstruct the categories of the “modern” novel.  With the presumption that 
“modernism” could be read as a period, not a category, in the same way we  
speak of Victorian fiction, I started working my way through Alice Payne 
Hackett’s top-ten lists in her Seventy Years of Best Sellers and expected to find 
the conventional, plot-driven, “realist” narratives that decades of postmodern 
criticism has established as the “other” to the stylistic experimentalism of literary 
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modernism.  Instead, I discovered passages—some brief, some sustained—of 
the “stream of consciousness” in much of the “popular” fiction I read.  From 
there, my research led me to reviews and periodical literature, where I 
discovered the “stream of consciousness” in shorter fiction, fragments, and 
parodies.  Perhaps most surprising, I found examples of the “epitome of 
Modernism” in advertising handbooks and in actual advertising copy.  My first 
impulse, since I had been informed by Adorno and the Frankfurt School’s 
argument that modernism served as a form of critique against the “culture 
industry,” was to assume I had encountered a few anomalies.  When I began 
encountering more “anomalies,” I realized that modernist techniques were 
present at all levels of textual production, and the only way the “great divide” 
argument could be maintained was if mass-mediated texts were 
ignored—which is indeed what the specious “divide” argument has depended 
upon to last as long as it has.
The argument advanced here is based on three premises: first, that the 
modernist stream of consciousness method (or “trope” as I suggest it be called) 
was a “popular” form that was prevalent and widely embraced by the interwar 
public; second, that the method appealed to a large audience because it invited 
identification with a variety of subjective perspectives (or “consciousnesses”) 
which correlate with what film critics have called the “system of suture”; and 
third, that its dramatization of the instability of the split self (between the 
“preverbal” or “subconscious” and consciousness) helped create the interwar 
psychological subject.
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In the chapters that follow, I address the historical context as well as the 
content of the stream of consciousness as it appears in a variety of texts—from a 
Gillette advertisement to Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.  I have avoided the 
move to establish the stream of consciousness as simply a form of “interior 
monologue” traceable throughout literary history in an effort to contain and 
periodize a style of writing interwar readers recognized as “modern”; while it 
may have served Joyce’s publishers to establish Ulysses as part of the “classical” 
or Homeric tradition and rescue it from its charges of novelty and obscenity, 
there is no longer much need to legitimize Joyce, but there is still a need to 
better understand why his method became as accepted (and adapted) as it did.
In chapter one, “The Stream of Consciousness as Mass Modernism,” I 
discuss the way advertising textbooks—and advertisements—tried to appeal to 
the interwar consumer by understanding the “stream” of thought.  I trace the 
widespread appeal of the trope by examining its appearance in widely-
circulated newspapers and magazines, as well as in best-selling fiction by 
writers like J. P. McEvoy and Fannie Hurst.  I conclude the chapter with a 
discussion of Eugene O’Neill’s sensational stream-of-consciousness play, 
Strange Interlude.    
In chapter two, “Joyce’s Ulysses as Self-Help,” I focus primarily on the 
reception of the novel and the way contemporary readers responded to Joyce’s 
method.  Borrowing the notion of “suture” from film studies, I suggest that 
readers felt forced into accepting subject-positions within Ulysses and that the 
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novel dramatizes (and asks readers to participate) in the experience of split 
subjectivity.
In chapter three, “Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway and Sutured Consciousness,”
I consider the way Woolf’s readers also approached her texts as “cinematic” 
and apply the concept of “suture” to a close reading of her novel.  Like Ulysses, 
Mrs. Dalloway presents the modernist rational/irrational dialectic through 
specific consciousnesses and sutures the reader into entertaining multiple, 
sometimes radical, subject-positions.  Drawing upon Woolf’s letters, diaries, 
and essays, as well as reviews from her friends and critics, I contextualize her 
understanding of the “stream of consciousness” (a term she didn’t ascribe to her 
own work) and the way it was received.
Finally, in chapter four, “Addie’s Coffin and the Narrative I/Eyecon: 
Faulkner’s Typographic Semiotics,” I consider As I Lay Dying and The Sound 
and the Fury as late examples of the stream of consciousness, less for the way 
they were received (since readers were becoming familiar with the method) than 
for the way they challenge the very notion of language and subjectivity.  Each of 
the chapters are informed by the semiotic theories of Julia Kristeva and consider 
the ways the rational or “symbolic” order of communication and convention are 
challenged by the “semiotic” or “preverbal” stream of consciousness.  
Implicit throughout this study is the contention that consciousness is the 
product of culture and ideology.  When interwar readers were asked to enter 
into different consciousnesses, they were interpellated into a subject-position: 
one divided between rationality and communication and the irrational 
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“subconscious,” and in this act of identification, they learned to become a 
“split” psychological subject.
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One                      
Introduction:  The Stream of Consciousness and Mass Modernism
“. . . she has strange devious intuitions that tap the hidden currents of life . . . 
dark intermingling currents that become the one stream of desire . . . ”
— Marsden, Strange Interlude (193; act 6)
In 1931, memoirist and decorator Muriel Draper ventured from New 
York to begin a lecture tour of the American Midwest.  In her article  for 
Harper’s magazine, “Standing and Talking,” she reports, with no little 
astonishment, that the audiences she spoke to
are perplexed by problems in decoration and want to know if it is 
really wrong to put blue in a north room if blue is their favorite 
color [. . .].  Are Boston ferns legitimate in a room with a
“moderne” (horrid word!) note in it, or must it be cactus?  Does 
stream of consciousness in literature mean you tell all, and if 
so—well . . . ?  Is Gertrude Stein prose or poetry and how many 
times must one read her before giving up?  Is Virginia Woolf as 
great a novelist as Jane Austen, and if you have never read 
Norman Douglas, what book had you better begin with?  Was 
Marcel Proust influenced by James Joyce, and if you want to write, 
should you take a course in writing or just write?  (199-200)
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Draper follows her illustration of midwestern philistines with a confession: “they 
do not ask these questions idly.  They want answers, and answers that mean 
something to them.  It is part of their life” (200).  What is suggestive about this 
anecdote is not just that modernism is revealed as anything but an exclusive, 
“highbrow” concern (Draper says the  enthusiastic reactions she encountered 
were representative or “collective” [200]), but also that, any anxiety its supposed 
impenetrability elicited was secondary to the anxiety the reading public felt 
about being perceived as unfashionable, of not being “moderne.”  Of particular 
note is the inquiry into the “stream of consciousness”—one of the defining 
stylistic indexes of “high” modernism—which here seems to offer at once a 
sense of culture and the pleasure of salacious disclosures.  Without making too 
much of Draper’s portrait of middle-American intellectual curiosity, it does offer 
a glimpse of the reading public’s interest in the development of literary 
modernism that has passed without enough acknowledgment—even by the 
more recent reappraisals of the interrelationship between modernism and the 
mass market.
The movement to consider modernism from the perspective of cultural 
studies, to reconsider, as Rita Felski urges, “more expansive maps of the modern 
that can locate texts squarely in the political fault lines and fissures of culture” 
(502), has done much to discredit any historical evidence for Andreas 
Huyssen’s assumption that there was ever a “great divide” between modernist 
“high art” which opposed itself to “mass culture and the culture of everyday life” 
(47)—an assumption that perhaps followed naturally from decades of New 
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Criticism, which presented modernist texts as disinterested, universal,  and 
ahistorical (an argument suited for the practice of New Criticism, but not for a 
consideration of the modernist movement) which has been sustained (if from a 
Marxist perspective) by Fredric Jameson, who believes that in the modern 
period, “culture withdrew from [the] real world into an autonomous space of 
art” (“Culture and Finance Capital” 273).  Even Lawrence Rainey, in his 
Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture, who admits that 
“modernism’s interchanges with the emerging world of consumerism, fashion, 
and display were far more complicated and ambiguous than often assumed” (7) 
essentially reinforces the “great divide” argument with some equivocation.  
Modernism, he argues, “did indeed entail a certain retreat from the domain of 
public culture, but one that also continued to overlap and intersect with the 
public realm in a variety of contradictory ways” and that modernism 
is a strategy whereby the work of art invites or solicits its 
commodification, but does so in such a way that it becomes a 
commodity of a special sort, one that is temporarily exempted 
from the exigencies of immediate consumption prevalent within 
the larger cultural economy, and instead is integrated into a
different economic circuit of patronage, collecting, speculation, 
and investment.  (3)
For Rainey, modernism was part of consumer culture, but only insofar as it 
represented a niche market for the culturally elite.  As he writes in his essay, 
“The Cultural Economy of Modernism,” “literary modernism constitutes a 
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strange and perhaps unprecedented withdrawal from the public sphere of 
cultural production and debate, a retreat into a divided world of patronage, 
investment, and collecting” (61).  While there is no doubt that there is a market 
for rare and first editions of modern literature (as there is for rare and first 
editions from all periods of literary history), it must also be noted that modernists 
like James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, William Faulkner (not to mention Sherwood 
Anderson, Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, and Willa Cather) wrote best 
sellers that became so because they clearly appealed to interwar consumers.  To 
codify the entirety of “literary modernism” as estranged from the “public sphere” 
is to dismiss the way modernist literary techniques—like the stream of 
consciousness—emerged in mass-marketed fiction, magazines, and even 
advertisements.  The only way to support the claim that modernism was a 
“withdrawal from the public sphere” is to ignore the reality of the interwar 
reading public.
Richer, more inclusive and historically situated approaches to 
modernism and consumer culture are presented by Catherine Turner, Michael 
North, and Karen Leick.  In her Marketing Modernisms Between the World 
Wars, Turner includes several advertisements for modernist literature like Joyce’s 
Ulysses, Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, and Stein’s The Making of 
Americans, and discusses the way publishers presented their modern authors to 
the public.  Turner is willing to see the interrelationship between modernism 
and the marketplace, but she is careful to preserve the idea that the relationship 
was uneasy: “without embracing consumer culture whole-heartedly, the 
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modernists saw that they had much to gain by reaching a détente with 
commerce,” she writes; “their art remained sacred products of their own 
inspiration, but they also saw that if they really wanted to ‘make it new,’—in the 
broad sense of changing human perception and experience in the world—they 
would have to reach an audience” (4).  According to Turner, modernism 
“intergrat[ed] a fascination with and opposition to mass culture” (7).  
Michael North, in his remarkable Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene 
of the Modern, addresses film, fashion, radio, and the emergence of public 
relations in order to establish an historical context for the production and 
reception of modern literature.  As he points out, modernist writers not only 
referenced and incorporated aspects of popular culture in their work, but that 
these writers, too, were consumers who “lived in the same world of film, music, 
advertising, and promotion that is still around us, and that, like most denizens of 
the twentieth century, they had various and not entirely negative reactions to it” 
(29).  North convincingly argues that to maintain the pretense of a modernism 
adversarial to its historical moment effectively works to decontextualize it and 
render it even more difficult and less accessible to readers at present.  He notes, 
“In their own context, when the contemporary materials, at least, did not require 
so much explanation, the works of Eliot and Joyce were likely to strike 
conservative readers as ugly and scandalous in much the same way that 
contemporary music did” (211).  North notes that by deracinating modernism 
from its historical context, it becomes easier to repudiate it as elitist and 
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exclusionary, as the reactionary precursor to a more culturally engaged 
postmodernism:   
Since postmodernism defined itself in large part by its greater 
eclecticism and stylistic openness, it required as a foil a 
modernism as exclusive as possible.  Thus, the rivalry between 
postmodernism and modernism was read back into history, quite 
openly, as an antipathy between modernism and mass culture, 
one whose existence has always seemed more a matter of
theoretical necessity than empirical fact.  (10)
North goes on, in his book, to present a series of “empirical facts”—a memoir 
by Charlie Chaplin, fashion and phonograph advertisements, former Dial editor 
Gilbert Seldes’ promotion of popular culture in The Seven Lively Arts (to name a 
few examples)—to substantiate the interrelationship between modernism and 
consumer culture and to contextualize 1922, the date of the publication of 
Ulysses and The Waste Land.  
Karen Leick, in her recent PMLA article, “Popular Modernism: Little 
Magazines and the American Daily Press,” makes an important contribution to 
modernist historicism with her assertion that modernism was much more 
publicized and disseminated to the reading public than has been presumed.  
“Mainstream readers had not only heard of” the modernist movement, “they 
were familiar with many of the writers who were published there.  In fact,” she 
claims, “it would have been difficult for any literate American to remain unaware 
of modernists like Joyce and Stein in the 1920s since their publications in little 
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magazines were discussed so frequently in daily newspapers and in popular 
magazines” (126).  Thanks to magazines like Vanity Fair, under the editorial 
leadership of Edmund Wilson, Leick points out, a substantial audience was 
introduced to modernist writers like Aldous Huxley (who had a semi-regular 
column), T. S. Eliot, Stein and Joyce, to name a few.  Her research into the way 
the popular press received modernism dispels any illusion of a modernist 
“high” culture removed from the public and “reveals that there was an 
increasingly intimate exchange between literary modernism and mainstream 
culture in this period” (126).  Furthermore, Leick writes,
An individual did not need to go to college, cultivate highbrow 
friendships in literary circles, or otherwise go out of the way to 
understand the debates about modernist writing in this period.  
One simply needed to subscribe to a newspaper and one or more 
periodicals, as virtually all Americans did.  (132)
Leick’s argument is not only illuminating in its assertion that modernist 
experimental writing was part of the public sphere, the “cultural scene” of the 
interwar years, but also because it calls into question the notion that the reading 
public was divided between those who consumed “highbrow” (or modernist) 
and “middlebrow” (“best selling”) fiction.  That the latter has been ignored by 
scholarship until recently because, as Nicola Humble writes, “it was largely 
written and consumed by women” (2) and, as Lisa Botshon and Meredith 
Goldsmith explain in the introduction to their collection, Middlebrow Moderns: 
Popular Women Writers of the 1920s, the popular, “feminine” (labeled such 
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because it describes the writers, readers, and marginalization of these texts) 
middlebrow authors “negotiated a delicate balance of commercial success and 
(albeit grudging) critical respect.  Neither ‘high’ literary producers not ‘low’ 
dime-novel creators [. . .] they made best-seller lists and bridged gaps in an 
audience increasingly fragmented by economic, racial, ethnic, and regional 
differences” (6).  Finally, Janice Radway argues that “middlebrow 
culture”—made up of readers of the “middlebrow” fiction popularized by the 
Book-of-the-Month Club,—“constituted itself implicitly, and sometimes quite 
explicitly, in opposition to both emerging literary modernism and the avant-
garde and to the growth of an institutionalized, more thoroughly 
professionalized group of literary specialists, some employed by highbrow 
magazines, others in the fast-developing university English departments” (15).  
As valuable as these studies are in widening the realm of modernist 
studies to include neglected authors and texts, the drive to stratify fiction (or 
readers) into “high,” “middle,” and “low” taste groups is a way to effectively 
uphold and perpetuate the “great divide” myth while seemingly offering a 
culturally attuned and historicized re-estimation of the modern period.  There is 
no doubt that writers like Fannie Hurst, Anita Loos, and Edna Ferber have been 
(until recently) unfairly excluded from academic discussion of the interwar 
years; but to reclaim them as conservative “middlebrow” writers at odds with 
“highbrow” “experimental” fiction is to ignore their own innovations in 
narrative technique and to exclude them from their rightful place in the 
development of literary modernism.
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In fact, literary modernism not only developed alongside and became (as 
Leick puts it) “increasingly intimate” with “middlebrow” mass culture: it was 
mass culture.  To argue that modernism was inseparable from mass culture is 
not just to point out that innovative fiction by authors like Joyce, Stein, Woolf, 
and Faulkner was heavily promoted in the popular press and made widely 
available (and affordable) to the public by publishing houses like Boni & 
Liveright and the Modern Library (though it certainly was); it is also to 
acknowledge the way modernist techniques and concerns appeared in and 
appealed to consumer culture—to what Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
call the “culture industry” of the mass media.
Rather than generalize about “modernism” as if it were a monolithic 
movement with shared aesthetic assumptions, the focus here will be on a 
specific aspect of what has been regarded as a signifier of modernist writing: the 
“stream of consciousness” style.  To concentrate on this stylistic technique for 
presenting subjective, unspoken ideas, impressions and sensations  (or what 
Robert Humphrey handily calls the “prespeech level” of consciousness [3]) as it 
was developed by writers like Dorothy Richardson, James Joyce, and Virginia 
Woolf is a way to localize and identify moments of mass/modernist dialogism.  
The “stream of consciousness” style or trope (as it will be referred to here in 
order to describe its syntagmatic features and to suggest it was a “fashionable” 
kind of writing that was employed for rhetorical effect), as Muriel Draper’s 
anecdote indicates, was a topic of interest and discussion for the reading public; 
it was not considered a narrative “technique” exclusive to “literary” fiction: it 
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was defined and described in advertising manuals and in the most popular self-
help and self-education books of the interwar period; it appeared in 
advertisements, in the movies, and in bestselling fiction.  The public fascination 
with the “stream of consciousness” was part of the widespread interest in 
psychology—particularly the psychology of self-control.
The Main “Stream”: Advertising the 
Stream of Consciousness
“The mind is a stream,” Harry Dexter Kitson explains in the opening 
chapter of his 1921 monograph.  The stream, he continues, consists “of the 
sum-total of mental processes going on within the individual: ideas, sensations, 
feelings, volitions and actions,” and his “task” in this book is “to describe this 
stream; to slow it up and examine its contents” (4).  One might assume to find 
such a definition of the “stream of consciousness” in a book about Jamesian 
philosophy or in a psychology text—perhaps even an early discussion of 
emerging narrative forms—but Kitson’s purpose in The Mind 
of the Buyer: A Psychology of Selling is to inform advertisers how to appeal to 
the consumer’s “mental stream” to increase sales.  He writes:
The mind never stands still.  It is in constant motion.  The 
thoughts of one moment are quickly replaced by others.  The 
mind of the buyer in a sale consists of a procession of sensations, 
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feelings, and willings.  From the  beginning to the conclusion of 
the sale these flow along like a stream.  (Kitson 4)
The benefit of understanding the “buyer’s” mind as complex and associative is 
that the seller can appeal to specific stages of the buyer’s mental process 
(“attention,” “interest,” “desire,” “confidence,” “decision and action,” to 
“satisfaction” [Kitson 5]).  To get the buyer’s attention, for example, the seller 
needs to find a way to make an advertisement enter the consumer’s 
consciousness:
He must thrust it, as it were, completely into the middle of the 
stream.  Only thus can he secure for it a high degree of attention. 
The ease with which the seller may do this depends partly upon 
the rate of flow of the stream and partly upon the contents of it.  
Sometime the current flows sluggishly, as when the buyer sits 
without occupation in a street-car and casts his eyes carelessly 
from one advertising card to another.  On such occasions it is 
easy for the seller to enter the stream.  (Kitson 30)
The ultimate goal of entering the buyer’s consciousness is to “inject an idea “ to 
promote the “desired response”—creating an association with the advertised 
product which will lead to a sale: “the task of the seller is to encourage those 
ideas which are favorable to his pet-idea and to suppress those which are 
contrary to it” (Kitson 156).  To this end, the seller must hold the buyer’s 
attention, not “merely [to] endeavor to keep out of his mind any distracting 
ideas; but [to] go further and divert his attention from even his own mental 
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processes”; above all, Kitson stresses, “keep him from being introspective.  He 
should be oblivious to the fact that he is being suggested to” (157).   The 
“stream,” as Kitson presents it, is not an inchoate murmur of impulsional drives; 
it is the locus of consumer desire and can be directed and exploited by 
channeling the buyer’s thoughts away from self-relexivity and towards the 
objective product.
Kitson’s book is not unique in its focus on the stream of consciousness of 
the consumer.  John H. Cover’s Advertising: Its Problems and Methods (1926) 
includes the following passage on “The Mind in Operation” (and also employs 
the conceit of the inattentive passenger in a street car):
our minds are constantly active, are never at rest.  Sensations from 
the outside world, if only of a cold draft or a hot breeze, are 
crowding upon us: ideas, feelings, and emotions seem to be 
striving to direct our will and energy elsewhere [. . .].  Let us recall 
our state of mind in [a] street-car.   We are probably intent at first 
upon the most effective way to reach our destination [. . .].
[perhaps] we have noticed some of our fellow passengers and 
have begun an analysis of their features and other interesting 
facts.  Possibly we have unconsciously become attentive to 
certain individuals and we suddenly realize that we have been 
staring.  Quickly turning away, our attention is attracted by 
another object and perhaps this is an advertisement.  If there are 
two dozen cards in the car, what were the qualities in this 
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particular advertisement which forced itself upon our 
consciousness?  (86)
To gain the buyer’s attention, of course, the advertiser “must switch the reader’s 
consciousness from the thought track his mind has been following to the route 
of our particular appeal [. . .] we must break in upon his consciousness quickly 
and strongly—almost with a jolt” (86).  Again, the goal is to redirect 
consciousness away from random contemplative interiority towards a specific, 
public market signifier.
Similarly, Walter Dill Scott, in his The Psychology of Advertising in 
Theory and Practice (1921), emphasizes the importance of understanding and 
appealing to the associative mind of the consumer.  It is indicative of the cultural 
“inward turn” that Scott urges, “at the present time [. . .] the successful advertiser 
must study psychology and that he must do it at once” (5).  Scott’s focus is the 
(free) associative mind and how to guide it towards habitual response to brands 
and products.  In his illustration of how “mental images” are based on 
associations, he presents a series of stream of consciousness descriptions, 
written by his psychology students, of the impressions words like “breakfast 
table” and “railroad train” call forth in order to highlight the importance of 
understanding  and describing “mental imagery” for “the young man who 
expects to make a profession of writing advertisements” (84):
When the word [sic] ‘railroad train’ was given, I saw the train very 
plainly just stopping in front of the depot.  I saw the people 
getting on the train; these people were very indistinct.  It is their 
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motions rather than the people themselves which I see.  I can feel 
myself getting on the train, finding a seat, and sitting down.  I 
cannot hear the noises of the train, but can hear rather indistinctly 
the conductor calling the stations.  I believe my mental imagery
is more motile (of movement) than anything else.  Although I can 
see some things quite plainly, I seem to feel movements most 
distinctly.  (Scott 63)
According to Scott, the purpose of advertisements are to set the stream of 
consciousness of the buyer in motion toward the purchase of the product.  
“Advertisements are sometimes spoken of as the nervous system of the business 
world,” he explains; and “as our nervous system is arranged to give us all the 
possible sensations from every object, so the advertisement which is 
comparable to the nervous system must awaken in the reader as many different 
kinds of images as the object itself can excite” (84), so that the advertisement 
produces a kind of synesthetic response in the consumer.  For the purpose of 
reading the idea of the mental “stream” as it was understood by advertising 
theorists against the “stream of consciousness” as it was conceptualized by 
contemporaneous novelists, a final example from Scott’s text about the 
workings of the associative mind will serve.  “As I walk down a busy street,” 
Scott begins, “unless I am oblivious to my surroundings my thought is 
determined for me by the objects which surround me.  My eye is caught by an 
artistically decorated window in which sporting goods are displayed.  My mind 
is fully occupied for the time with the perception of these articles” (87).  For 
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Scott, the objective correlative of a product is past associations with similar 
products: “It happens,” he writes, “that as I see a sweater I think of the sweater 
which I used to wear, and then of the circumstances which attended its 
destruction [. . .] at the sight of shoes I am reminded of my need for a new pair; 
then of the particular make of shoes which I ordinarily wear; then of a pair 
which I purchased a few months ago” and “so I may go on for hours, and in a 
large part my thoughts will be limited to the perception of objects and events 
which surround me, but in certain cases (e.g. sweater and shoes) the perception 
suggests a previous experience” (87).  Scott concludes that mental activity 
follows a general “law”:
Whenever there is in consciousness one element of a previous 
experience, this one element tends to bring back the entire 
experience.  Things thought together or in immediate succession 
become “associated,” or welded together so that when one 
returns it tends to recall the others.  The sight of a shoe suggested 
the entire “shoe experience,” in which I had entered a store,
purchased a pair of shoes, carried on a conversation with the 
proprietor, etc. (89)
In Scott’s semiotic paradigm, signifiers produce predictable signifieds; it is 
therefore necessary for the advertiser to understand the consumer’s associative 
mental process works in order to reinforce or “weld” together associations.  
“The advertiser must know his customers,” Scott asserts;  “he must know their 
habits of thought, for it is too difficult to attempt to get them to think along new 
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lines.  He must present his commodity in such a way that the readers can 
understand it without being compelled to think a new thought”; ultimately,  “the 
advertisement should conform to their habitual modes of thought, and then the 
customers can read it and understand it with ease” (219).
While the advertising texts are informed, primarily, by William James’s 
empiricist philosophy and not by the concomitant emergence of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, it is worthwhile, in this context, to remember that when May 
Sinclair introduced the phrase “stream of consciousness” in her 1918 Egoist 
review of Dorothy Richardson’s first Pilgrimage books (“In this series there is no 
drama, no situation, no set scene.  Nothing happens.  It is just life going on and 
on.  It is Miriam Henderson’s stream of consciousness going on and on.  And in 
neither is there any grossly discernible beginning or middle or end” [444]), she, 
too was referring to James.  As Diane F. Gillespie explains, Sinclair “borrowed” 
the metaphor of the stream of consciousness from William James but, as “a 
student of philosophy who published two books on the subject [Sinclair] 
recognized the imprecision of the term.  Stream, on one hand, connotes unity 
and continuity and suggests an active, creative self; on the other hand, it evokes 
multiplicity and change and a view of the self as a passive receiver of 
impressions” (437).  Unlike the  the desired effect of the successful 
advertisement (according to the advertising psychologists), which directs the 
subjective towards the objective, in Richardson’s style, “the intense rapidity of 
the seizures,” Sinclair writes, “defies you to distinguish between what is 
objective and what is subjective either in the reality presented or the art that 
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presents” (446).  The stream of consciousness in fiction, then, was initially 
recognized for the way it blended or collapsed the subjective and objective or 
the “inner” and “outer.”  Richardson’s reader, Sinclair imparts, is denied the 
ability of habitual associations.
As a suggestive contrast to the advertising text’s presentation of the mind 
of the buyer while enjoying public transport, Virginia Woolf uses the following 
illustration of considering another passenger on a train as a way to explain 
(appropriately enough) the modernist’s “movement” away from Georgian 
“materialist” fiction towards a fiction of subjective consciousness.  “One night 
some weeks ago,” Woolf begins, “I was late for the train and jumped into the 
first carriage I came to” and sits across from an older woman she 
calls Mrs. Brown:
Mrs. Brown and I were left alone together.  She sat in her corner 
opposite, very clean, very small, rather queer, and suffering 
intensely.  The impression she made was overwhelming.  It came 
pouring out like a draught, like a smell of burning.  What was it 
composed of—that overwhelming and peculiar impression?  
Myriads of irrelevant and incongruous ideas crowd into one’s 
head on such occasions; one sees the person, one sees Mrs. 
Brown, in the centre of all sorts of different scenes.  I thought of 
her in a seaside house, among queer ornaments: sea-urchins, 
models of ships in glass cases.  Her husband’s medals were on 
the mantelpiece.  (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” 324)
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The purpose of this description, Woolf explains, “is character imposing itself 
upon another person.  Here is Mrs. Brown making someone begin almost 
automatically  to write a novel about her.  I believe all novels begin with an old 
lady in the corner opposite” (354).  Woolf, tellingly, inverts the dialectic 
between the subjective and objective as the advertising texts would have it.  
Whereas a Georgian writer might describe the physical body of Mrs. Brown in 
order to pretend to some objective realism, Woolf sees Mrs. Brown as a floating 
signifier that suggests “myriads of irrelevant and incongruous ideas.”  Woolf 
calls into question the “shoe experience” Scott describes—and she goes further.  
She invites readers to engage in their own rejection of habitual associations.  
“May I end,” she asks, “by venturing to remind you of the duties and 
responsibilities that are yours as partners in this business of writing books, as 
companions in the railway carriage, as fellow travellers with Mrs. Brown?”: 
For she is just as visible to you who remain silent as to us who tell 
stories about her.  In the course of your daily life this past week 
you have had far stranger and more interesting experiences than 
the one I have tried to describe.  You have overheard scraps of 
talk that filled you with amazement [. .].  In one day, thousands of 
ideas have coursed through your brain; thousands of emotions 
have met, collided, and disappeared in astonishing disorder.  
Nevertheless, you allow the writers to palm off upon you a version 
of all this[. . .].   Never was there a more fatal mistake.  It is this 
division between reader and writer, this humility on your part, 
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these professional airs and graces on ours, that corrupt and 
emasculate the books which should be the healthy offspring of a 
close and equal alliance between us.  (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. 
Brown” 336) 
In this remarkable passage, Woolf not only emphasizes that the “disorder” of 
subjective consciousness is not merely a literary technique, but a shared 
experience.  She emphasizes the value of interiority and speculation over an 
outward “version” of the self (or Mrs. Brown).  Additionally, she asserts what has 
become one of defining features of the modern novel: the importance of the 
relationship between reader and writer in the creation of meaning.  While Scott 
urges the importance of understanding the stream of consciousness so that, 
when confronted with an advertisement, “readers can understand it without 
being compelled to think a new thought,” Woolf invites readers to collaborate 
in the construction of the text by reading the presentation of character against 
their own experiences of subjective consciousness.  In other words, her readers 
are “compelled to think a new thought.”
To Woolf’s subversion of the “shoe experience” of habitual association 
could be added Clarissa Dalloway’s walk down Bond Street.  As she looks into 
store windows, her thoughts move away from the object of sale back in to her 
own interiority.  She stops before 
the window of a glove shop where, before the War, you could 
buy almost perfect gloves.  And her old Uncle William used to say 
a lady is known by her shoes and her gloves.  He had turned on 
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his bed one morning in the middle of the War.  He had said, “I 
have had enough.”  Gloves and shoes; she had a passion for 
gloves; but her one daughter, her Elizabeth, cared not a straw for 
either of them.  (MD 11)
It is clear that Clarissa’s apprehension of the glove shop has not conjured up 
what Scott might call the “glove experience”—an association tied to the 
displayed product.  Gloves lead to thoughts of class, Uncle William, the War, 
death, and Clarissa’s feeling of estrangement from her daughter.  This form of 
“shopping,” wherein an item for purchase (be it a book, jewelry, a new car) is 
viewed, not as the ends to a purchase but a means for introspection and 
remembrance, is recurrent throughout Mrs. Dalloway.  Advertisements, like the 
unreadable sky-written brand name become, for the reading public of the 
novel, signs that multiply meanings and associations instead of fixing them.  
Woolf’s evident refusal to conform to the notion that “whenever there is in 
consciousness one element of a previous experience, this one element tends to 
bring back the entire experience” is pushed to the limit in her essay “Street 
Haunting,” where she uses the excuse of going out to buy a pencil as an 
occasion to leave behind the “objects which perpetually express the oddity of 
our own temperaments” (155) and to ponder the lives of those in drawing 
rooms she passes, women’s fashion, venders in Soho, antique necklaces, the 
memory of a party,  the lives of used books, the river from Waterloo bridge, and 
“what, then, is it like to be a dwarf?” (157).  In other words, everything else but 
the “pencil experience” is given precedence over going to a stationary store to 
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buy a pencil.  Instead, Woolf’s “shopping” trip is an occasion to imagine the 
experiences of other Londoners, of all the “Mrs. Brown’s” she sees, to 
“penetrate a little way, far enough to give oneself the illusion that one is not 
tethered to a single mind, but can put on briefly for a few minutes the bodies 
and minds of others” (“Street Haunting” 165).  
While Scott and the other writers of the advertising texts worked to define 
and understand the stream of consciousness to “weld” desirable associations to 
products, to draw the consumer away from thought and introspection, writers 
like Richardson and Woolf were presenting consciousness as irreducible and 
unpredictably erratic.  The outer or “material” world of objects, in Pilgrimage 
and Mrs. Dalloway, is of interest only insofar as it provides occasions for 
subjective interiority.  This is not to say, however, that the stream of 
consciousness, as it is presented in fiction, is opposed to the “public sphere” 
and is engaged (as Adorno would have it) in a critique of the “culture industry”; 
what is important to notice is that the increased interest in understanding and 
exploring the subjective “stream” of consciousness took hold in advertising and 
in fiction at the same time, and both spoke to the postwar conceptualization of 
subjectivity as becoming more and more interiorized, of what Joel Pfister has 
called the rethinking of subjects as “psychological identities” (167).
Indeed, advertising itself began to evince and promote the same kinds of 
textual practices which are usually assumed to belong exclusively to “high” 
modernist narratives.  John B. Opdycke, in The Language of Advertising (1925) 
claims that advertising copy is “literature,” that “the copywriter is a poet and 
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painter and musician and historian all in one” (219) and, in an almost 
postmodern deconstruction of “high” and “low” culture, writes that the 
copywriter
must appear to our cultural instincts and traditions.  And 
incidentally, by all this revolutionary evolution, or evolutionary 
revolution, he is making it increasingly difficult for us to say 
whether we buy magazines to read the good literature of the 
copymen or peruse the bad copy of the literary men.  Only time 
can tell what’s going to happen, but we prophesy that before long
certain periodicals will advertise their advertising in their 
advertising quite as vigorously as they now announce their 
“reading smatter” that doesn’t get itself read.  Even now the 
cultural values of the former are in many cases dominant.  (220)
The goal of advertising, as Opdycke sees it, is to “culturize” the public (219).  
Opdycke follows this observation of the blurring boundaries between literature 
and copy with a peculiar paragraph, presumably meant to demonstrate his own 
literary skills:
Tennyrate, the Marathon moves amain—the contest, that is, 
between the old accepted masters of culture, gracing graphically 
and paragraphically the absorbing advertising pages, and the 
new would-be masters, yawping barbarically and even tonsorially 
and, of course, nervously thru the dryasdust columns.  (220)
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Opdycke here seems to be contrasting the “old accepted masters” of 
conventional literature with the new, cutting-edge “art” of copywriting, which, 
with its wordplay and Joycean portmanteau word (“dryasdust”) is fresh and 
modern.  
It must be noted that Jennifer Wicke, in her discussion of advertising in 
Ulysses, suggests that the “stream of consciousness” as practiced by Joyce is a 
corollary of the  “flow of advertising experience” that impresses upon us daily 
(140-1); and while this may be so, she does not acknowledge that the 
advertising of 1904 (the year in which Ulysses is set, and the actualities of which 
Joyce has famously preserved) was primarily discursive and grammatical, and 
was yet to be influenced by the style of Richardson or Joyce.  Because Wicke 
confines herself to the advertisements mentioned in the novel, she can 
comment on the way Joyce incorporates “the energies of advertising language” 
(168), but because she does not look at advertising after Ulysses, she does not 
notice that advertising was looking to the energies of modernist writers like 
Joyce for a newer language.
Specifically, graphic design began to exhibit the same impulse toward 
defamiliarization, toward foregrounding language, toward experiments with 
textual materialism that are similar to those found in the novels of Joyce, 
Faulkner, and other novelists who employ the “stream” trope.  In an article 
entitled “Doing the Unusual in Newspaper Typography” (1926), for the trade 
publication Printer’s Ink, W. Livingston Larned advocates the use of “acrobatic 
set-ups” and “unconventional style” to attract the reader’s attention (69).  Noting 
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that “the typography of most advertising in newspapers does not attempt the 
unusual,” that “it is set quietly and without tumult,” he instructs, “make words 
acrobatic in the face of sameness and you have character, distinctiveness, a  
program of your own” (70).  As an example, he describes a Cunard Lines 
advertisement that displayed text in collage form: words “placed at angles.  
They danced and cavorted.  They ran down-hill and upward.  Sometimes a 
name was partly cut away by the outer margin.  It was much as if someone had 
taken a handful of white type and thrown it upon a black surface” (69).  Larned 
could as well be describing a dadaist poem.  His urging to make the advertising 
text “unusual” is not distinct from the “high” modernist impulse to “make it 
new”—and that is another shared characteristic of modernism and mass media.  
It is indeed surprising that not more attention has been paid to the 
change from discursive to increasingly pictographic advertising appeals that 
followed Pound’s famous imagist manifesto.  If “an ‘image’ is that which 
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time” (Pound 
130), this advice seems to have been taken up by none so enthusiastically as 
the advertising industry in the interwar years.  The “modern style” of imagist 
advertisements had become so ubiquitous that Punch caricatured it in a cartoon 
(fig 1.) that juxtaposed the new with the former style of advertising, the kind 
which used to provide “a certain amount of information concerning the 
produce advertised.”  The old method is represented by two “pictorial 
advertisements”: one depicts a stern doctor in pince-nez instructing a nurse to 
give his patient “nothing but” “Tonoid” for “colouring the corpuscles,” (with the 
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assurance that “5,000,000 doctors recommend Tonoid”), in the other, a family 
is gathered around for dinner with a box of “Bovo” on the table, against which 
is a paragraph of closely printed copy about the product.  Below these panels 
are the “modern” advertisements for the same products, which simply feature 
Fig. 1.  “The modern style.”  Punch 10 April (1929): 403.
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vibrant slogans, and ebullient, bob-haired women.  “The modern style, though 
undoubtedly more arresting,” the caption reads, “leaves a good deal to the 
imagination.”  The images are intended to suggest feelings, to produce an 
“emotional complex in an instant of time.”  Although Pound doesn’t specify 
what he means by “emotional complex,” he writes, “I use the term ‘complex’ 
rather in the technical sense employed by the newer psychologists, such as 
Hart” (130).  Peter Jones, in the introduction to his anthology of imagist poetry, 
writes that Hart , in his essay “The Conception of the Subconscious,” “describes 
Freud’s dream image as being conceived as constellated by a large number of 
unconscious complexes.  As a result of the combination and interaction of these 
complexes a single image emerges into consciousness” (39).  It seems fitting, 
then, that the advertising psychologists, who stressed the importance of 
“welding” an image to the stream of consciousness would favor advertisements 
that produced more immediate, less rational associative responses (the 
advertiser “must present his commodity in such a way that the readers can 
understand it without being compelled to think a new thought” [Scott 219]).  
Advertisements of the interwar period did not only appeal to the buyer’s 
stream of consciousness.  Surprisingly, many widely circulated advertisements 
tried to represent it.  In a series of advertisements that appeared in magazines 
like The Mentor and newspapers like the New York Times throughout the 
1920s,  the Pelman Institute of America promoted the self-help booklet 
“Scientific Mind Training” as a way to suppress and focus the erratic 
“Grasshopper Mind” (fig. 2.) for personal and financial success.  The Pelman
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Fig. 2. “The Man with the 
‘Grasshopper Mind.’”  
Advertisement.  New York Times 2 
Sept. 1928: 66.
Fig. 3.  “The Gambler.” 
Advertisement.  New York Times 9 
June 1929: SM 13.
Fig. 4. “What Does Your Wife Think 
of  You, Now?”  Advertisement.                                                   
New York Times 11 Mar. 1928: 83.
Institute promised that the book would “tell you the secret of self-confidence, of 
a strong will, of a powerful memory, of unflagging concentration [. . .].  It tells 
you how to banish the negative qualities like forgetfulness, brain fag, inertion, 
indecision, self-consciousness, lack of ideas, mind wandering, lack of system, 
procrastination, timidity.”  The illustration accompanying the copy (which for 
these advertisements is copious) shows a man with his “grasshopper” thoughts 
floating around him: “Think I’ll try to make my Evenings worth Something,” and 
“I guess I’ll take up $elling.”  In another advertisement in the series, “The 
Gambler” (fig. 3), the copy warns that living in “hope” of a “lucky break” is akin 
to gambling, and “Scientific Mind Training” is offered as the anodyne.  “Make 
your brain just a little bit more effective and you will MULTIPLY your 
earning power,” the advertisement insists.  As with the “Man with the 
Grasshopper Mind,” an illustration of a man with his thoughts hovering over 
him appears at the top of the page.  In “The Gambler,” however, only one of his 
“thoughts” appears in quotation marks (“things will be BETTER next 
year—they’re $ure to give me a rai$e”); phrases like “WAIT till I get my 
chance!” and “$omething’s BOUND to happen!” appear to suggest the 
unarticulated.  The phrases curve and almost overlap each other and, in both 
advertisements, drawings accompany each phrase.  While a drawing of an 
open book and a rooster at sunrise correlate with the thoughts of the 
“Grasshopper mind” figure, “The Gambler” includes faint, seemingly half-
formed sketches of figures and faces, which suggest representations of non-
linguistic consciousness (or the “pre-speech level”).  Finally, “What Does You 
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Wife Think of You, Now?” (fig. 4) plays upon anxieties of masculinity by asking 
if the reader’s “wife is still hoping, dreaming, wishing?” because “YOU know 
that you have failed thus far to make her dreams come true.”  In the 
accompanying illustration, a woman sits looking at her pipe-smoking, 
newspaper reading husband, and her unspoken thoughts, presented in a 
variety of typefaces and half-formed images, rise above her: “P-o-o-r JIM,” “All 
his friends earn more money,” “He’s getting older.”  The Pelman Institute 
advertisements contrast the unspoken stream of consciousnesses, rendered 
typographically as a combination of words and images, as the irrational that 
impedes “success,” but which can be brought to logical order with the aid of 
the booklet.  
In perhaps the most explicit example of an American advertisement that 
foregrounds the stream of consciousness trope, a Gillette promotion that 
appeared in magazines like World’s Work and The Golden Book  (fig 5.) 
starting in 1928 features a photograph of a man, in pajamas and slippers, sitting 
on the side of his bed, in a pose reminiscent of The Thinker.  At the top of the 
page, in lower-case italics, appear his dyspeptic stream of consciousness: “ . . . 
and so to bed . . . late . . . too much supper . . . wish I could get to sleep . . . bad 
dreams . . . business worries . . . dog barks . . . baby cries . . . time to get up . . . 
jangled nerves . . . irritable skin.”  The selling point is that a new Gillette blade is 
a “pick-me-up” for “mornings when your beard is as tough as your state of 
mind.”  While the use of the ellipsis here is similar to Richardson’s use in 
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Fig. 5.  “. . . and so to bed . . .” Gillette.  Advertisement.  The Golden Book 
Magazine May 1929: 2.
Pilgrimage to indicate the fragmentary movement of consciousness, the 
audience for the advertisement would have most likely recognized the elliptical 
breaks as a reference to Eugene O’Neill’s method of presenting the unspoken in 
his enormously successful Strange Interlude which debuted in 1928.  As with 
the Pelman advertisements, the Gillette advertisement contrasts the stream of 
thought, which consists of largely unwelcome associations—“irritable skin,” 
“jangled nerves,” “worries,” “bad dreams”—with the reasoned, orderly text of 
the advertising copy.  If, in the composition of the advertisement, the stream of 
consciousness is aligned with anxiety and discomfort, with restlessness, the 
product is presented as the “reasonable” solution.  Unlike the random, chaotic 
stream of the modern mind, “the Gillette blade doesn’t change,” the consumer 
is assured: “It is the one constant factor in your daily shave.” 
In contrast to the Gillette advertisement, which juxtaposes the broken, 
elliptical thoughts of fragmented consciousness with traditional copy and a 
representational image (the thinking man, unable to sleep), the advertising 
campaign for Worthington’s beer, which also began in 1928, presents a 
remarkable convergence of advertising and literary modernism (fig. 6).  The 
pictorial part of the advertisement is a collage of overlapping images: a 
cautionary cross-roads traffic sign, a section of a road map, direction marker 
indicating the distance ahead to “Beer” and “Stout,” a “BP” station globe, a 
Tudor-style inn with a modern automobile passing before it, a view of the 
countryside from a road, two gloved hands on a steering wheel, and a pleased-
 
          42
          43
Fig. 6.  Worthington’s Beer.  Advertisement. 1928; rpt. in: Cathy Ross, 
Twenties London: A City in the Jazz Age.  London: Philip Wilson, 2003.  49.
looking gentleman driving a large sedan is pictured in the middle of the 
advertisement, next to a bottle of Worthington’s and a sandwich on a plate.  As 
if the collage of images alone do not clearly signify a pictorial analog to the 
narrative stream of consciousness, the accompanying copy, with its fragments, 
unconventional use of upper-case words and—again—the employment of 
ellipses, approximate the disjointed, first-person thoughts typically assumed to 
be considered exclusive to the textual practice of “high” modernism: “. . . pretty 
village . . . SCHOOL . . . change down . . . George & Dragon . . .  nice old pub . 
. . Lunch here?  Brakes . . . switch off . . . TWO WORTHINGTONS, please” (qtd. 
in Ross 49).   
While it is simple enough to construct the narrative of a long car trip with 
the promise of a cold pint ahead from the images, without what might be called 
the “interiorized” language of the copy, the fact that the viewer must construct a
narrative at all from a series of overlapping, associative word and image 
fragments evokes the long-standing arguments that modernist texts require 
participatory interaction in the construction of textual meaning.  It is perhaps 
important to note that the Worthington’s advertisement, produced by the W. S. 
Crawford agency, had Edward McKnight Kauffer—a friend of Virginia Woolf 
and the designer of the wolf-head colophon for the Hogarth press—under 
employment at the time (cf. Willis 377).  Early critics of the stream-of-
consciousness novel observed—like John W. Crawford, writing about the debut 
of Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway for the New York Times—these texts present “a 
challenge to the reader’s own experience, and cal[l] for a sort of creative 
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collaboration” (BR10) and Roland Barthes has famously opposed the “readerly” 
texts of realism against the innovative, modernist “writerly” work which 
“make[s] the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text”  (S/Z 4).  
What the Worthington’s advertisement in particular suggests is no less than that 
the “producer” of the text is made into a consumer.  To argue that these 
advertising texts may also be considered as representations of modernist 
technique is not to simply deconstruct the “high” and “low” culture binaries put 
forth by postmodernist apologists like Huyssen and Jameson; it is also to call 
into question the Adornoean claims about modernism’s resistance to 
commodification—its autonomous “asociality” which “is the determinate 
negation of a determinate society” (Aesthetic Theory 226)—and Astradur 
Eysteinsson’s contention that
by interrupting the “realistic” processes of habitualized 
communication, modernism holds forth strategies of creative 
reading that can be used to unveil the discrepancies of a meaning 
production tending toward hegemony and to carry on a semiotic 
warfare against the homogenizing forces of mass communication.  
(The Concept of Modernism 238)
While the movement in modernist studies to consider the “increasingly intimate 
exchange between literary modernism and mainstream culture” (Leick 126) has 
done much to help blur the distinction between “high” and “low” (or 
“middlebrow”) culture, most of the discussion has been from a “top-down” 
approach—taking into consideration, for example, that writers like Joyce, Woolf, 
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and Faulkner “lived in the same world of film, music, advertising, and 
promotion that is still around us, and that, like most denizens of the twentieth 
century, they had various and not entirely negative reactions to it” (North 
29)—rather than from a “bottom-up” view of the way consumer culture also 
developed in the same world of novels like Joyce’s Ulysses, Woolf’s Mrs. 
Dalloway, and Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.  Instead of trying to 
consider the ways “modernism” worked either against—or even within—mass 
culture, advertisements like those for Gillette and Worthington’s suggest that, 
not only is this “dialectic” difficult to maintain, it may have never existed.
The Semiotic as Modernism
A more useful way to discuss the interconnectivity (if not the 
interdependence) of an “experimental” modernist literary trope like the stream 
of consciousness and mass culture might be found, with some modification, in 
Julia Kristeva’s elucidation of the semiotic and the symbolic.  According to 
Kristeva, language (and the speaking subject who is posited by language) is 
comprised of oppositional elements: sound and sense, rhythm and meaning, 
intonation and communication—the “semiotic” and the “symbolic” (Revolution 
13-106).  The latter term is Lacan’s and, as Leon S. Roudiez explains, it “refers to 
the establishment of sign and syntax, paternal function, grammatical and social 
constraints, [and] symbolic law” (6-7); the former term, the “semiotic” or lé 
sémiotique (as opposed to la sémiotique, the science of signs proper), 
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designates the repressed, the pre-Oedipal instinctual drives that underlie and 
transgress the symbolic, linguistic order:
The kinetic functional stage of the semiotic precedes the 
establishment of the sign; it is not, therefore cognitive in the sense 
of being assumed by a  knowing, already constituted subject[. . .].  
The semiotic is articulated by flow and marks: facilitation, energy 
transfers, the cutting up of the corporeal and social continuum as 
well as that of signifying material, the establishment of a 
distinctiveness and its ordering in a pulsating [. . .] rhythmic but 
nonexpressive totality.  (Revolution 27, 40)
In her essay “From One Identity to an Other,” Kristeva further defines her theory 
of the semiotic and explains its textual manifestations:
[T]his heterogeneousness to signification operates through, 
despite, and in excess of it and produces in poetic language 
“musical” but also nonsense effects that destroy not only accepted 
beliefs and significations, but, in radical experiments, syntax itself 
[. . . ].  The notion of heterogeneity is indispensable, for though 
articulate, precise, organized, and complying with constraints and 
rules [. . .] this signifying disposition is not that of meaning or
signification: no sign, no prediction, no signified object [. . .].  We 
shall call his disposition semiotic.  (133)
For Kristeva, “poetic language” (a type of discourse less concerned with 
communication than with experimentation) evidences this presubjective, 
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presymbolic functioning.  Through rhythms and nonsense, poetic language 
reveals the workings of the chora, of the drives, of the unconscious (Revolution 
25-30).  The semiotic—which is associated with the pre- (or trans-) linguistic, 
with the maternal space anterior to the paternal law of symbolic signification, 
with repressed drives—is ever present in both the text and the speaking subject, 
putting each “in process/on trial” (Revolution 22; 58); the repressed drives that 
underlie and effectuate signification also threaten to return, to destabilize the 
linguistic and social order—and the individuated subject.  But despite the way 
“the semiotic” has been oversimplified by some critics (cf. Eagleton 187-91; 
Murfin 297-98), it is not “women’s language” or even “l’écriture féminine”; it 
may be like the “feminine” in the same way that Lacan’s unconscious is like a 
language (both are suppressed by the ordering of the symbolic); however, the 
semiotic, because it represents a time before Oedipalization and hence before 
gendered subjectivity, undermines all fixed positions, definitions, and identities.   
Importantly, the semiotic, however transgressive or disruptive to the 
symbolic, is nevertheless intertwined with it.  Indeed, “language as social 
practice,” Kristeva explains, “necessarily presupposes these two dispositions, 
though combined in different ways [. . .].  Scientific discourse, for example, 
aspiring to the status of metalanguage, tends to reduce as much as possible the 
semiotic component” while in poetic language, the semiotic “tends to gain the 
upper hand”; yet “however elided, attacked, or corrupted the symbolic function 
might be in poetic language, due to the impact of the semiotic process, the 
symbolic function nonetheless maintains its presence” (“From One Identity to 
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an Other 134).  In other words, while the semiotic underlies and challenges 
communicative discourse, it is inseparable from the symbolic.  “The distinction 
that I [have] established between the semiotic and the symbolic,” Kristeva writes, 
is an attempt to think of meaning not as structure but as process 
or procedure, by distinguishing between signs and their syntactic 
and logical concatenation, on the one hand, and things having to 
do with the transverbal, for to say preverbal leads to confusion: 
the semiotic is not independent of language; it interferes with 
language and, under its domination, articulates other 
arrangements of meaning, which are not significations, but 
rhythmic, melodic articulations.  (“Elements for Research” 446)
Since Kristeva’s conceptualization of the semiotic and the symbolic initially 
appeared in her study of Joyce, Mallarmé, Lautréamont, and Céline, it has 
significantly informed poststructural reconsiderations of modernist art and 
literature; it has not, however, been fully considered as a way of historicizing 
modernism and modernist subjectivity.  If the semiotic is aligned with nonsense, 
with the irrational, with the unsayable—and the symbolic is equated with the 
linguistic and the existing social order and its constraints—it is reasonable to 
consider the “semiotic” as the signifier for what has been accepted as “high” 
modernism: textual and stylistic experimentalism, “incomprehensibility” and 
fragmentation, the stream of consciousness “technique”; and to consider the 
“symbolic” as the signified of modernity: “bourgeois,” conventional values, 
realism, rationality, “mass” communication.  If the semiotic and symbolic are 
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heterogeneous but inseparable, then this offers a way to see the the signifiers of 
“modernism” working both within and against the signifieds of mass culture 
and eliminates the need to use the value-laden language of “high” and “low” 
(or “middlebrow”) as it negates the idea of a binary between an adversarial 
(reactionary or revolutionary) modernism and the consuming public, yet offers 
a way to distinguish and discuss the reception and transformations of a 
modernist trope (like the stream of consciousness) within the popular culture of 
the period.  Although Kristeva has spoken in interviews against the “leveling, 
the uniformation and elision of all differences” in a “mediatic society” and that 
“one has to outwit this mechanism, this logic” (qtd. in Guberman 216, 218), and 
while she seems to be closer to Adorno and the Frankfurt School in her 
resistance to the culture industry, if the subject is “always both semiotic and 
symbolic” and “no signifying system [the subject] produces can be either 
‘exclusively’ semiotic or ‘exclusively’ symbolic, [but] is instead necessarily 
marked by an indebtedness to both” (Revolution 24), then any text produced 
within “mediatic society” must also  “necessarily” evidence the heterogeneity of 
the semiotic within the symbolic.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to unequivocally accept Kristeva’s claims that 
the semiotic is a “revolutionary” force, a “negativity” that challenges the 
authority of the social order.  As the Punch cartoon—as well as the Gillette and 
Worthington’s advertisements—illustrates, the “mediatic” has already begun to 
privilege the “transverbal” evocation over the discursive appeal to the buyer’s 
reason.  To reconsider Kristeva’s claim about scientific discourse in light of 
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present-day advertising, it seems that it is much more like her idea of poetic 
language insofar as it subsumes communicative discourse as much as possible 
to the semiotic: to music, gesture, image; to appeals to the “repressed, 
instinctual” drives (“From One Identity to an Other” 136).  Indeed, it is difficult, 
in the Internet age, to read Kristeva’s description of fantasy as a semiotic 
“irruption of drives within the realm of the signifier [that] disrupt[s] the signifier 
and shift[s] the metonymy of desire” and not think of advertisements which 
break in and disrupt so frequently in order to “shift the metonymy of desire” into 
a monotony of desire.  Moreover, in her discussion of the work of Barthes (and 
in the title of her collection of essays, Desire in Language), “desire” becomes 
synonymous with the semiotic: 
Desire causes the signifier to appear as heterogeneous and, 
inversely, indicates heterogeneity through and across the 
signifier[. . . ].  Perhaps one can posit that, for Barthes, “desire” 
seems to signify the recognition of heterogeneous element in 
relation to the symbolic—the space of material contradiction.  
(“How Does One Speak to Literature?” 116)
As the examples from Kitson and Scott’s advertising texts indicate, the emerging 
field of psychological marketing wanted to understand the stream of 
consciousness as a way to direct it to desire and purchase.  In his essay, 
“Understanding the Consumer’s Mind,” Kitson traces the “stages in the act of 
buying” from getting the consumer’s attention—which is difficult because “the 
mind is such an active thing that it cannot remain still[:] like a stream is is ever in 
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motion” (132)—to “the state of mind that is best designated by the term desire” 
which he describes as 
a complex state of mind consisting of first: A play of the 
imagination in which the consumer imagines himself in relation 
to the commodity; a feeling of pleasantness accompanies this; 
then comes movements, either actual or incipient, toward the 
commodity[. . . ].  [Until] the consumer acquires the commodity, 
experiences a feeling of pleasantness and thus fulfills the desire.  
(133)
While far from Lacan’s notion of the “objet petit a,” Kitson’s summation that “in 
the case of the purchase, if the main idea is to grow in strength, its brain system 
must draw off from the other symptoms the brain energy resident within them, 
until the energy of the brain is all drained off into the one system, which means 
the triumph of the idea” (134) appears to advocate the excitation of drives as 
integral to shaping consumer behavior. 
To consider the semiotic as an aspect of advertising and mass culture 
and to call its “revolutionary” potential into question is not to deny its ability to 
undermine and distort the hegemony of the symbolic (indeed, consumer 
culture could be dependent upon these distortions—one need think only of the 
fashion industry, for example—for its perpetuation), nor is to imply that 
commercial texts, which employ aspects of “poetic language,” should be 
elevated and given the same respect as literary works, for to do so would be to 
elide the facts of the media’s role in the manipulation and reification of 
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subjectivity, but rather to suggest that all texts produced during the period are 
“modern” and that the literary and the commercial were inseparable and 
similarly engaged in exploring (and exploiting) the stream of consciousness.  
Before Clarissa Dalloway departs for her morning shopping trip, where she will 
look into store windows on Bond Street and allow her thoughts to wander back 
to the time she threw a shilling into the Serpentine, advertisers had already 
begun trying to understand her consciousness in order to get her to throw her 
shillings their way.
The Trend of Consciousness
 
The stream of consciousness, in its literary form, was as ubiquitous as 
any advertising campaign of the period.  The idea that the trope was exclusively 
employed by canonical modernists like Joyce and Woolf is untrue—as it 
appeared in magazine writing, newspapers, and best-selling fiction.  While 
Janice Radway, in her study of the Book-of-the Month Club, writes that “literary 
modernism is conspicuously absent from the list of books the judges 
recommended as appropriate to a large general audience” (179), she seems to 
assume that the judge’s opinions reflected those of consumer culture, and 
appears to base her claims about the absence of “literary modernism” in the list 
because it did not include “William Faulkner, Gertrude Stein, Virginia Woolf, 
[or] James Joyce” (179).  Despite the fact that each of these writers did produce 
bestsellers and (as Karen Leick reminds us) garnered a great deal of public 
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attention, the lack of inclusion of their names is not proof that “literary 
modernism,” as it is signified by textual experimentalism, the stream of 
consciousness, and the semiotic (not to mention what might be called the 
“thematic” elements of literary modernism: disillusionment, uncertainty, the 
rejection of “bourgeois” values) was not popular with “a large, general 
audience.”  
Indeed, a 1931 New York Times article entitled “How Long, O Author?” 
lamented the seemingly endless rush of stream-of-consciousness fiction.  These 
books, often marked by sentences “doubtless full of hidden meaning, [that] 
contained two words” with the rest “left to asterisks and the imagination of the 
reader” not only “won laurels from the critics, awards from the prize givers,” but 
also had “buyers enough to put them in the front rank of best sellers” (21).  
Contemporary authors, the article concludes, have taken “the more popular 
road into the subconscious” where “there is no end to what can be written 
when the hero is allowed to drift down the stream of consciousness” (21).  An 
earlier New York Times article, “Vogue in Novels,” points out that, while “all 
sorts of novels are written during any given period,”
The genre of the moment is what, for lack of a shorter term, must 
be called the stream-of-consciousness novel, the psychological 
novel of earlier decades driven to the extreme[. . . ].  Any one 
looking back over his reading will recall the novels of the type 
discussed.  Some have appeared in the lists of “best sellers”; more 
than one has incurred the displeasure of the censor.  (E4) 
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However fashionable the trend, “Freud must eventually lose power” and the 
“stream of consciousness” fad will pass, the writer argues (E4).  By 1934, Joseph 
Warren Beach could write of “the stream-of-consciousness epidemic” that was 
spreading like “an infection to which any one is liable” and that “almost anyone 
may sooner or later manifest mild symptoms of this disease” (517).
Surprisingly, these novels had so saturated the literary marketplace that 
Houghton Mifflin introduced “red star” novels: novels with a band around the 
dust jacket  “on which red stars are displayed” to indicate “a good, rip-snorting 
adventure yarn” in order “to save the book buyer the trouble of pawing over a 
lot of problem novels and psychological studies” (“Books and Authors” BR14).  
The “Current Magazines” column in the April 7, 1929 issue of the New York 
Times singled out Marjorie Nicolson’s article “The Professor and the Detective,” 
which answers the question, “what do college professors read?”  According to 
Nicolson, they read detective novels because they want plot and a rest from “the 
‘stream of consciousness’ which threatens to engulf us in Lethean monotony”; 
they prefer 
analyses of purpose, controlled and directed by a thinking mind; 
from formlessness to form; from the sophomoric to the mature; 
most of all, from a smart and easy pessimism which interprets men 
and the universe in terms of unmoral purposelessness to a re-
belief in a universe governed by cause and effect.  (BR 11)
In their “revolt against the ‘psychological novel’” (BR 11), the professors in the 
Smith College English Department do not appear to be anticipating the 
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postmodern by privileging the “low” form of genre fiction over “Literature”; their 
antipathy is steeped in a reactionary conservatism against the pervasive appeal 
of modernism.  
Similarly, Paul Shorey, in his 1928 Atlantic Monthly article, “Literature 
and Modern Life,” argues against teaching modernist works at the expense of 
the classics.  For Shorey, the modern stream-of-consciousness novel is 
ubiquitous and even threatening.  While the “literary artist,” Shorey writes, “may 
prefer to read new books to learn the latest tricks of technique [and] an 
inquisitive elderly or middle-aged mind may indulge its discursive curiosity with 
no great harm” and “the scholar, stabilized by the ballast of better reading, may 
safely explore these waters to prove himself an adventurous spirit,” these 
popular fictions are anything but ennobling to the general reading public and 
the young:
[W]hy should the mass of educated men and women, of those 
students whose reading will still exercise a formative influence on 
intelligence and character, feed their minds exclusively or mainly 
on the innutritious, if sometimes stimulating, confections of 
contemporaneous literature?  Of any contemporaneous literature, 
but especially that of an age of jazz or transition and 
disintegration?  Why, above all, should we encourage or allow 
such literature to preoccupy the attention and the memory of 
high-school and collegiate youth?  (617)     
          56
Shorey blames the “tyranny of present fashion” for student’s lack of interest in 
“good older literature that has survived” (618).  The “wholesome” classics are 
being forgotten, he claims, “and so it comes to pass that the loan library of a 
great American university hands out to young girls the unspeakable soliloquies 
of the nastiest of Irish novels that blasphemes the name of Homer” (614-15).  
While it would be easy to dismiss Shorey as an old crank trying to defend the 
canon (and young women’s virtue) against  the radically new “modernist” 
literature, his argument offers an interesting historical insight: for Shorey, 
modern fiction is associated with “the output of best sellers” and jazz; “there is 
not the slightest danger,” he claims, “that any of us will close his mind to the 
modern ideas that blow upon us from every quarter of the wind” because “the 
commonplaces of modernism are thundered with interminable iteration from 
every speaker’s platform [and] [e]very teacher knows that there is no danger of 
his students missing these” (621).  Rather than casting popular culture as the 
“other” to modernism, here modernism is the popular culture that threatens the 
preserve of “the classics.”  
To consider modernism in general and the stream of consciousness in 
particular as a popular culture form offers a way to understand some of the 
animosity it engendered.  It is surprising that, instead of classifying it as a 
“highbrow” form, many of the earliest critical responses to the literary stream of 
consciousness found it too facile and accessible.  As the editor for the “Turns 
with a Bookworm” column in the Oakland Tribune explained in 1928, the 
“method,” gives beginning writers “the notion that all they’ve got to do is sit 
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down and tell their souls, and it will make a book”; that all one must do is report 
“absolutely every important action and circumstance of his life, within the space 
of 24 hours or less” (6S).  Similarly, in her article for the Saturday Review of 
Literature, “’Stream of Consciousness,’” Katherine Fullerton Gerould decries the 
trope as “the fictional fashion of the moment”; “this famous ‘stream,’” she notes, 
is a disturbance, not a flow” and 
the reason, doubtless, for this popularity [ . . . ] is the extreme ease 
of it.  Any clever sophomore can do it[:] you can do it, I can do it.  
It is construction, narrative flow, selection, massing, the vivid 
conceiving of human figures and human fates, that are hard.  
Asterisks, and loose images, and no syntax, are easy.  (234)
Gerould makes clear what is only suggested by Shorey: that these novels, 
informed by the new psychology, border on the pornographic.  When “heroes 
and heroines have only to let themselves drift,” she writes, “sex enters with 
almost more insidious ease.  The American public, like any other public one 
has ever heard of, has a predilection . . . for salacity” (234).  Writers “’do’ the 
stream of consciousness,” Gerould claims, because “it offers the peculiar 
opportunity for exploiting two universal human tastes—the taste for sentiment 
and the taste for salacity [ . . .].  Sex and sqush [sic] [. . .] properly proportioned, 
will make a best-seller and day, and do make most bestsellers” (234).  As a 
“fictional fashion,” these novels were discussed in ways that echo critiques of 
mass culture.  Herbert J. Gans, in his Popular Culture and High Culture 
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summarizes the arguments about the “harmful effects” of popular culture as 
follows:
popular culture is emotionally destructive because it provides 
spurious gratification and is brutalizing in its emphasis on 
violence and sex; that it is intellectually destructive because it 
offers meretricious and escapist content which inhibits people’s 
ability to cope with reality; and that it is culturally destructive, 
impairing people’s ability to partake of high culture.  (41)
As much as the modernist text may now be considered “traditional” or 
canonical literature with its own institutionalized authority, to consider its 
reception is to see how the stream of consciousness not only posed a challenge 
to realist narrative conventions, but also to notions of “high culture.”  There is a 
particular anxiety about the maintenance of publication standards expressed by 
Wilson Follett in his essay for Harper’s, “Literature and Bad Nerves.”  According 
to Follett, the practice of the new writers who attempt to present “a sensation . . . 
a drop in the stream of consciousness” will “logically demand a world in which 
every man shall be his own poet-laureate” (112).  Follett blames the advertising 
jingle and the jazzified age for the rise of stream-of-consciousness fiction:
Who would then have supposed that this idiom [. . .] was to 
become the language of the future?  Yet so it has become; one 
only has to thumb over the pages of an armful of respectable 
novels to find the rows of dots which prove it.  The fashionable 
style of this decade runs to verbless sentences and inarticulate 
          59
gaspings after the inexpressible, with files of dots to label its 
innuendoes, tangential meanings, and overtones—the things
which can be felt but not said.  The dotted style, as I take the 
liberty of naming it, is based on the idea that an elision is as good 
as a meaning any day, if not rather better.  If you can’t utter it, or 
haven’t the patience, hint that it is unutterable [and] call it a 
perfectly subjective and naïve expression of your inner 
consciousness.  (115)  
Follett blames this style of writing for contributing to the “nervous” cultural 
climate and the denigration of prose—and he might have seen the culmination 
of his argument in the Gillette advertisement’s mention and elliptical depiction 
of  “. . . jangled nerves . . . “ in its advertising copy.  Indeed, this “dotted style” 
had even begun to be parodied in newspapers and widely-circulated 
magazines.  The page-long “’I Converse With My Criminal Subconscious’ by 
One of the Criminally Insane,” which appeared in Life Magazine in 1928, 
lampooned the stylistic appearance and the glorification of the irrational, 
intrusive interior monologue.  It begins, 
Let me alone, can’t you? . . . Aw, please, you big bully! . . . I just 
want to sit here peacefully and count the bars on my window— 
they’re all the bars I’ve got now . . . . Prisoner Pales as Judge Flails 
Ales Sales. . . .Brilliant Boy Scout Bugler Blames Bad Booze on 
Beer Ban. . . . . Local Lay Leader Lauds Liquor Law, Says Salvation 
Sure. . . . . . . . I can make a poem on that: Some of the boys are 
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wet-wet-wet; Some of the boys are dry; Some of the boys have 
got nobody home (dum dee dum) And so am I!. . . .I wonder if I 
can stand on my head?. . . Oh goody, it makes all my ideas run 
down my ears! [sic] (10).
As a stylistic caricature, this “conversation” is revealing in its exaggeration in a 
way that most New Critically inspired definitions of the stream of consciousness 
as a formal “technique” are not.  The image of a prisoner ranting to himself in a 
padded cell evokes the idea of a restraining, repressing conscious rationality 
over an uncontainable, expressive “subconscious” irrationality—an irrationality 
marked by elliptical gaps, word play, and the bric-a-brac of alliterative 
newspaper headlines.  Here, the “criminal’s” obsession with prohibition is 
interchangeable with “inhibition,” and the tension between the prohibitive and 
the disruptive illustrates the heterogeneity of the symbolic and the semiotic that 
distinguishes stream of consciousness narratives.
“’I Converse with my Criminal Subconscious’” was among many 
parodies of the trope in Life, which ran sidebar columns like Lafayette Lyre’s 
“Food for Thought,” wherein phrases like “ham sandwiches” and “hors 
d’Œuvres” were taken as an occasion for free-associative prose (the heading 
“pickled eggs,” for example, is followed by: “a jangling slot machine in full 
crash . . . linoleum, and spittoons where some one had missed . . . ‘See what the 
boys in the back room want’ . . . ‘Two more here, please’ . . . a greasy deck of 
‘Steamboat’ playing cards . . . a copy of the New York American scandal sheet, 
damp with beer . . . . “ [32]).  In 1927, Henry William Hanemann’s “Let Us Re-
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Joyce” presented an unpunctuated paragraph for Life readers that both defined 
and ridiculed the stream of consciousness:
And then there’s this way of writing and a fine sap anybody is to 
read it you just put down whatever comes into your head and 
that’s art yes it is like fun you can’t be blamed for what comes into 
your head but you certainly ought to use your judgment about 
what comes out still nature abhors a vacuum my mother abhorred 
vacuum cleaners she said they made a horrible noise brr brr brr 
shut that damn thing up how can I ever become a great writer
well if you think this is the way to become a great writer you had 
better start right in peddling bonds[. . .].  ([sic] 5)
Because parodies of Joyce and Stein were not infrequent in newspapers and 
magazines of the period—as Karen Leick notes in her “Popular Modernism: 
Little Magazines and the American Daily Press”—it is not surprising that the 
reading public could be expected to have some familiarity with modern writers; 
what is surprising is that these parodies presume a general understanding of a 
particular modernist stylistic technique.  Indeed, Tupper Greenwald had a 
reappearing column in Life called “Stream of Consciousness,” that eschewed 
punctuation for humor.  In one of these segments, subtitled “During a Reading 
of Original Poetry at a Middlewestern Literary Club,” the reader is dropped into 
the wandering mind of an audience member who is ready to make her exit.  
The article concludes with the following:
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I’m through through do you understand good-by good-by 
forever good-by good-by good-by good-by good-by I’ll just say 
good-by good-by Mrs. Apthorpe it’s been a charming evening 
and I wish I could stay for the discussion but I really have to go 
out and get some horseradish that’s what I’ll say I’ll say that I am 
going a-gypsying I’ll say that may love is a fountain of 
horseradish Mrs. Apthorpe I am going to say Mrs. Apthorpe  my 
dear Mrs. Apthorpe I am going to say my God what am I going to 
say my GOD [. . . ].  (28)
While it is clear that the pretension of “original poetry” and modernist prose are 
being satorized here, that the literary club is “middlewestern” makes it clear that 
the barb is meant, not for the “highbrows,” but for the average or “middlebrow” 
reader who has embraced and conventionalized contemporary literature and 
“fashions” like the stream of consciousness.  Greenwald’s parody seems 
pointed at the crowds who came to ask Muriel Draper about Stein and Joyce 
and who enthusiastically attended lectures like “How We Reach Our Sub-
Conscious Minds” (which, as Robert and Helen Merrell Lynd in their 
sociological study of 1920s America, Middletown, explain, enjoyed enormous 
success [298])—as well at the readers of Life Magazine who may or may not 
have recognized themselves.
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Defining The Stream of
Consciousness
However valuable the most frequently cited critical studies of the literary 
stream of consciousness may have been, it is unfortunate that the zenith of their 
appearance in the decades following the Second World War coincided with the 
rise of New Criticism, which necessitated “close reading” and formalist 
discussions of aesthetic technique at the expense of historical considerations.  
Indeed, it is due to the institution and former hegemony of New 
Criticism—which developed in no small part as a response to the “difficulty” of 
modernist texts—that, as Astradur Eysteinsson contends, modernism came to be 
characterized as “autonomous” and apolitical: “by securing the autonomy of 
literature,” he writes, by “preventing it from being overly ‘polluted’ or even 
swallowed up by ‘other’ modes of social discourse,” New Criticism “protect[ed] 
its vulnerable specificity and justif[ied] its existence” as an important 
methodology (77).  It is not surprising, then, that texts like Robert Humphrey’s 
Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel (1954), Melvin Friedman’s 
Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method (1955), Leon Edel’s The 
Modern Psychological Novel (1955), Shiv K. Kumar’s Bergson and the Stream 
of Consciousness Novel (1963), along with Frederick J. Hoffman’s more oblique 
(but no less important) discussion of the stream of consciousness in Freudianism 
and the Literary Mind (1945) and Dorrit Cohn’s Transparent Minds: Narrative 
Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978), each have in common a 
          64
formal approach to the narrative styles of Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner and little 
concern (save, perhaps, Hoffman) for the cultural context in which these 
narratives emerged—without which, the stream of consciousness novel 
appears, falsely, to be the exclusive product of a few independent canonical 
authors.
Robert Humphrey begins his study by claiming his book “is a kind of 
manual of how to write stream-of-consciousness fiction” (v) and echoes 
Lawrence R. Bowling’s distinction between the “stream of consciousness 
technique” (which for Bowling is stylistic device for presenting an unmediated 
“direct quotation of the mind” [345]) and the “interior monologue” which is 
limited to a character’s first-person consciousness (345).  Humphrey goes 
further, however, by considering the “stream-of-consciousness novel” as a 
genre which is concerned with the “exploration of the prespeech levels of 
consciousness for the purpose, primarily, of revealing the psychic being of the 
characters” (4), as opposed to the “techniques” or methods used to present 
consciousness, like “direct interior monologue, indirect interior monologue, 
omniscient description, and soliloquy” which indicate various levels of 
authorial interference (23).  Humphrey is most compelling when he turns away 
from the parsing of narrative forms and suggests contexts for considering the 
trope, like psychoanalysis (“the chief technique in controlling the movement of 
stream of consciousness in fiction has been an application of the principals of 
psychological free association” [43]) and cinematic devices (terms like 
“’montage’ [. . . ] ’multiple-view,’ ‘slow-ups,’ ‘fade-outs,’ ‘cutting,’ ‘close-ups,’ 
          65
‘panorama,’ and ‘flash-backs’” are briefly mentioned by Humphrey as 
corollaries for the way novels employ free-association [49]).  Ultimately, 
Humphrey writes, “the stream-of-consciousness writer has to do two things: (1) 
he has to represent the actual texture of consciousness, and (2) he has to distill 
some meaning from it for the reader” (63).  
While Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel aimed to clarify the 
technical aspects of narrative form, it is also responsible for some obfuscation.  
Humphrey does not just ignore the way the “technique” appeared in a variety of 
fiction of the period—he asserts that the stream of consciousness novel rose 
with Woolf and Joyce and faded, only to become “main stream” in recent (at the 
time of Humphrey’s writing) fiction like Warren’s “relatively popular” All the 
King’s Men (113-14).  It is no doubt that the terministic screen of New Criticism 
limited his ability to consider authors like Fannie Hurst, who wrote best-selling 
stream of consciousness novels, and his own classification of the stream of 
consciousness as a genre with its own techniques does not lend itself to an 
acknowledgment of the way ostensibly realist novels like Warwick Deeping’s 
Sorrell and Son employed and adapted signifiers of “prespeech levels of 
consciousness” (for example, when the gentlemanly Mr. Roland walks into his 
shabby hotel room, we are told, “His mental comments followed immediately 
upon his visual perceptions” which consist of  “‘No wardrobe.  Now—where 
the devil—?  Faded green paint,—dirty paper—strings of pink roses between 
black and white lines.  One hook off door.  Carpet—h’m—, I wonder what a 
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vacuum cleaner would fetch out of it.  Brass bed, one knob missing.  Yellow 
chest of drawers, one handle missing’” [45]).  
Melvin Friedman, in his Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary 
Method, builds upon Humphrey’s distinction between genre (“’stream of 
consciousness designates a type of novel in the same way as ‘ode’ or ‘sonnet’ 
designates a type of poem” [3]) and the interior monologue, to which he adds 
the importance of “sensory impression” which is “concerned with the region 
furthest from the focus of attention”: it is “the writer’s nearest attempt at 
recording pure sensations and images” (Friedman 6).  Friedman is particularly 
interested in what he sees are musical elements (like the “leitmotiv” and “fugue” 
[14-16]) in the narratives which approximate the extra- or non-linguistic aspects 
of consciousness.  While a claim like “the mere presence [. . .] of interior 
monologue and sensory impression in the stream of consciousness novel 
marks immediately the intrusion of poetry in the midst of prose” (19) seems like 
a promising antecedent to Kristeva’s notion of signifiance, Friedman is careful to 
point out that writers like Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner (unlike Gertrude Stein) 
were in control of their techniques and employed them to achieve “the 
contemplative stasis one had come to expect in stream of consciousness fiction” 
(52). 
The Modern Psychological Novel, by Leon Edel, is remarkable for its 
blend of progressive, almost poststructural arguments against the codification of 
meaning in modern novels, and its embarrassingly conservative treatment of  
gender and narrative subjectivity.  Edel departs from the move to embed and 
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traditionalize the modern psychological novel within literary history, because 
“to do so is perhaps to dismiss too airily the deeper meaning for the novel of 
our time of this ‘inward-turning’ of a whole group of twentieth-century artists” 
(18) and he is disapproving of critics like Humphrey and Friedman whose 
concern is with imposing order on these experimental fictions: “we must not 
lose ourselves,” he insists, “in a search for label-definitions; nor should we 
attempt to make them tightly fit certain works that can better be described than 
labelled” (58); nor should we try “to impose conventional order” upon them, 
because at times, “our obligation is rather to perceive [the text] in its 
disorder”(164).  The way Edel allows for textual uncertainty and a consideration 
of the role of the reader who is placed “within” a character’s stream of 
consciousness and “involved with its discontinuity or scrambled state” (199) 
sounds as if he might be anticipating Kristeva’s notion of textual heterogeneity; 
however, the examples of subjective reading he provides suggest that he is 
unable—if not unwilling—to identify with any but a stable male position.  In his 
dismissive discussion of Dorothy Richardson’s Pilgrimage, he writes that he 
found it “tedious” to have to be confined to the primary character, Miriam 
Henderson’s, subjective perspective:
I could not adopt the one “point of view” she offered me, an angle 
of vision that required more identification than I—as indeed many 
of her male readers—could achieve [. . .].   We can sometimes feel 
ourselves to be trapped spectators in the mind of a woman 
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possessing no marked personality, often sentimental and 
belligerently feminine and rather unimaginative.  (73)
Even if Edel’s gender bias is set aside, it is difficult to accept his claims for the 
importance of accepting uncertainty and disorder if he is only willing to accept 
the text on his terms and identify with perspectives that reflect and reinscribe his 
own.  
Shiv K. Kumar, in Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel, 
argues that Henri Bergson’s ideas of “duration” (“la durée”) and “flux” offer a 
fuller reading of the novels of Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner, because it is in 
keeping with James’s idea of a “continuity of consciousness without which it 
could not be called a stream” (15).  According to Kumar, the idea of “flux” is 
what “Bergson designates as la durée, a process of creative evolution which 
does not lend itself to any logical or intellectual analysis.  La durée or 
psychological time thus becomes the distinguishing feature of the stream of 
consciousness novel”;  “The new novelist,” Kumar claims, “accepts with full 
awareness inner duration against chronological time as the only true mode of 
apprehending aesthetic experience” (7).   While it is common to encounter 
phrases like the “flux of consciousness” and a character “in the process of 
becoming” in critical discussions of stream of consciousness texts, Kumar’s 
argument for a Bergsonian reconsideration of the trope did not lead to any 
paradigmatic changes in the scholarship.  One reason for this might be his 
insistence that a Bergsonian perspective is more suitable than a psychoanalytic 
approach, “since the stream of consciousness novelists are essentially 
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concerned with presenting individual personality and experience in terms of 
artistic sensibility” and “a psycho-analytical interpretation of the stream of 
consciousness novel would hardly illuminate its treatment and presentation of 
la durée, mémoire involuntaire and intuition, nor would it bring out the 
significance of the various protagonists’ preoccupation with the ultimate nature 
of reality” (3).  
The problem with Kumar’s argument is that, regardless of his attempt to 
replace the epistemological intentions of the modern novelists, their texts, even 
when they were dismissed, were understood as “Freudian”: an early critical 
description that might be considered representative comes from N. P. Dawson, 
who writes that “the authors of the new style of writing are not so much writing 
at all as expressing themselves; expressing their sub-conscious as well as their 
conscious selves; sticking at nothing . . . but telling ‘everything—everything’” 
(1179).   As Frederick J. Hoffman writes in Freudianism and the Literary Mind, 
though the psychological novel “existed long before Freud’s work on the 
dream or his subsequent statements about the unconscious, it is his ‘depth 
psychology’ which has been responsible for the variations upon [the stream of 
consciousness] form” (130).  In his excellent cultural study, The Twenties: 
American Writing in the Postwar Decade, Hoffman states that “the most 
important single formal result of the Freudian influence was not surrealism but 
the ‘stream of consciousness’ technique” (246); and, despite the objections to 
Freudian psychoanalysis by writers like Joyce, it was no doubt due to the 
popularity of Freud that the stream of consciousness novel entered into the 
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cultural vocabulary.  As Hoffman notes, “by 1920 there were hundreds of 
popular summaries, expositions, and distortions of Freud’s original works” (232) 
and in particular, Freud’s notion of repression gained a wide audience.  
Hoffman writes that “for the young men and women of the period,” “repression”
served as a convenient label for all their grievances against 
society.  It was their feeling that the absurd, exorbitant moral 
demands society had made upon its victims had culminated in a 
national neurosis.  Repression became an American illness.  With 
little or no thought of personal responsibility—that is, the ever-
present conflict between ego and id, which, Freud insists,
antedates any precise formulation of conventions—they decided 
that any force was evil that stood in the way of a full, wholesome, 
primitive expression of natural impulses.  Repression stood for all 
the social formulas that prevented the natural expression of life 
impulses.  (The Twenties 357)
Unique as Kumar’s contribution to the scholarly literature on the subject may 
be, any study of the stream of consciousness novel that attempts to deny the 
relevance of psychoanalysis as a reading heuristic also rejects the significant 
role psychoanalysis played in the shaping of the culture that received (and 
popularized) these texts.  As Hoffman makes clear, “the overwhelming 
popularity of psychoanalysis [. . . ] affected not only the matter of sexual 
morality but the entire range of human activity and consciousness” (230).  If the 
general readership of the interwar period understood Freudianism as a conflict 
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between repression and impulses, that may be one way to account for the 
popularity of stream of consciousness narratives that foreground the dialectic 
between the symbolic and the semiotic.
As an indication of how matter-of-factly it was assumed that “stream of 
consciousness” was inseparable from Freudian psychoanalysis (regardless of 
how much influence it actually exerted on writers like Joyce or Woolf), the 1934 
edition of the creative writing handbook Narrative Technique, by Thomas and 
Camelia Uzzell, aimed at “college students of English composition” as well as 
“the free lance fiction writer working out his artistic salvation alone” (i) includes 
a section on “The Technique of the Stream of Consciousness Story” which 
addresses the “’craze’ for this type of writing” (460).  The Uzzell’s introduce the 
“technique” by pointing out that it is a product of “the new psychology” and 
that “the essentials of Freudian psychology were announced to the world over a 
generation ago . . . and [we] suppose all cultivated people possessed an 
equivalent understanding by 1920.  Today most people who can read are 
familiar with the terms ‘complex’ and ‘suppressed desires’ and ‘wish 
fulfillments’” (460).  As for the nuts and bolts of presentation, 
the two ways in which the stream-of-consciousness story differs 
from the conventional story of the past are: (1) A picture of the 
subconscious life of the character is added to the picture of his 
conscious behavior and (2) The portions of the narrative in which 
the subconscious life is conveyed are written in the free-
association manner.  (461)
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“Quite simply,” the Uzzell’s conclude, “it is a struggle between a conscious, 
rationalizing mind and an unconscious, irrational and all-powerful impulse” 
(464).  They call this type of writing the “Freudian style” and point  out that 
“even the popular new literature of today is producing its effect by an emphasis 
on the subconscious” (462).  If it is apparent that the general reader (and the 
general writer) considered the stream of consciousness synonymous with 
“Freudian style,” and if critics like Humphrey, Friedman, and Edel all 
acknowledge the operation of the levels of consciousness Freud defined, it must 
be pointed out that the phrase “stream of consciousness” is misleading, if it is 
not a  misconception.  Each of the studies of the trope, without exception, begin 
with a mention of William James and a quoted definition from his Principles of 
Psychology, like the following:
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits.  
Such words as “chain” or “train” do not describe it fitly as it 
presents itself in the first instance.  It is nothing jointed: it flows.  A 
“river” or “stream” are the metaphors by which it is most naturally 
described.  In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of 
thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.  (55)     
Steinberg declares that this “is a figure of considerable vividness and admirably 
characterizes the meanderings of the mind on the verge of dissolution into the 
unconscious” (2).  None of the critics, even if they hedge over the imprecision 
of the definition, point out, as Dorothy Richardson did after the idea was applied 
for the first time to her writing, “its perfect imbecility” (qtd. in Steinberg 76).  As a 
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metaphor, it is inconsistent with the way thought is presented in modernist texts: 
to take Clarissa Dalloway as an example, her thoughts do, at times, “flow,” but 
more often, they turn back to scenes from her past.  If it is a commonplace in 
modernist studies to point out the remembrance of lost time in the narratives, it 
is awkward that no one has pointed out that streams flow in only one direction.  
More importantly, when May Sinclair applied the phrase to describe 
Richardson’s style, she was using a concept from empiricist philosophy which 
had already begun to feel outdated as Freud’s ideas entered the culture-at-large.  
To use, then, a concept based on a pre-Freudian model of the mind to describe 
a technique that illustrates Freud’s idea of an ego “on the verge of dissolution 
into the unconscious,” is indeed problematic.  Despite its “perfect imbecility” 
and the incongruity of its epistemological assumptions with the psychoanalytic 
view of the divided mind, to propose a new term now would only serve to deny 
the historical use of “stream of consciousness” as a popular interwar description 
of a wide variety of textual practices.
Dorrit Cohn tries to do just that, however, in Transparent Minds: 
Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction.  Cohn essentially 
presents new labels for Humphrey’s “techniques.”  She proposes “psycho-
narration,” “quoted monologue,” and “narrated monologue,” in place of the 
less precise categories of indirect interior monologue, direct interior 
monologue, and soliloquy.  While “psycho-narration” may be a superior term 
because it “identifies both the subject-matter and the activity it denotes” (11), 
and while Cohn’s other designations may more agilely identify the ways, for 
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example, omniscient narration appears in the midst of Dorothy Richardson’s 
first-person descriptions (12), or the way the “sub-verbal depth of the mind” is 
presented through the language of interior monologue (56-7), Cohn’s 
narratological study is engaged in the search for a revised grammar of form, not 
with interpretation or historical contextualization.  In fact, Cohn criticizes both 
Edel and Humphrey for oversimplifying “the formal problem by reducing all 
techniques to a single and vague ‘stream-of-consciousness technique,’” and “at 
the same time overcomplicat[ing] it by association with broad psychological 
and aesthetic issues” (10).  Cohn’s critical perspective manages to reinforce the 
idea of modernist autonomy by concentrating exclusively on “the formal 
problem.”  What is particularly disappointing about Transparent Minds—but 
the same might be said of each of the aforementioned critical studies of the 
stream of consciousness—is that for all its detailed discussion of shifting verb 
tenses that signify narrative modulations of interiority, it pays little attention to 
textual and typographical variants which signify the appearance of a subjective 
consciousness.  It might be helpful to know that “all interior monologues 
transform colloquial language along essentially similar lines [and that] to a 
greater or lesser degree they all conform to two principal tendencies: syntactical 
abbreviation and lexical opaqueness” (Cohn 94), but Cohn’s analysis lacks a 
semiotic (in the traditional, not Kristevan sense) system that can fully account for 
diacritical or iconic (insofar as images or other graphical symbols break through 
the narration) indexes that a reader would recognize as a characterizing feature 
of the stream of consciousness in texts.
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Although Frederick R. Karl only devotes a chapter of his Modern and 
Modernism to the stream of consciousness (which he calls “the epitome of 
modernism” [239]), his argument for a loosening of the restrictive definitions in 
order to “seek how the stream can be used as both technique and content, as 
both form and matter [. . .] as situation and scene” (232), offers a much more 
inclusive and intuitive way to approach texts of the interwar period.  Karl’s 
concise definition of the stream of consciousness as “that area of expression 
which blurs boundaries between rational and irrational, logical and illogical” 
(232) echoes comments made by the first reviewers of the novels of Joyce and 
Woolf who recognized the trope when they saw it—with no need to consider 
levels of interior monologue or the difference between type and technique.  
While Karl does goes on to refine Humphrey’s labels, he acknowledges that 
“the stream is rarely consistent,” and that his revision “suggests that the stream, 
like nearly every other mode of communication, is capable of such variations 
that in several of its aspects it bleeds over into other forms of narration: first and 
third person, for example, or narrated memory or pastness.  The stream is not 
easily identified” (234).  It should be noted that Karl’s focus is limited to writers 
who represent, for him, “the full flower of modernism” like Proust, Joyce, Woolf, 
and Faulkner—not on popular manifestations of the stream of 
consciousness—which is why he can dismissively conclude that the trope 
represents “enclosure” and “retreat” from “the larger world” (232, 241); but his 
insistence on its variability and complexity opens up the possibility of 
approaching texts of the period without a priori formal expectations.  Accepting 
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Karl’s more ambiguous definition of the stream of consciousness may seem 
evasive—as if it provides a convenient way to locate it anywhere and 
everywhere—but it is actually more authentic to the experience of readers who 
initially encountered modernist texts and had to learn the codes and signifiers of 
interiority as they first appeared in advertisements, the popular press and, of 
course, the latest fiction.
“Dot and Dash” Literature: The Stream 
of Consciousness Best-Seller
The best-selling novel of 1923 was Gertrude Atherton’s tale of youth 
regained through endrocrinal surgery, Black Oxen (Hackett 127), and this is 
how it begins:
“Talk.  Talk.  Talk. . . .  Good lines and no action . . . said all . . not 
even promising first act . . . eighth failure and season more than 
half over . . . rather be a playwright and fail than a critic compelled 
to listen to has-beens and would-bes trying to put over bad plays . 
. . Oh, for just one more great first-night . . . if there’s a spirit world 
why don’t the ghosts of dead artists get together and inhibit bad 
playwrights from tormenting first-nighters? . . . Astral board of 
Immortals sitting in Unconscious tweaking strings until gobbets 
and sclerotics become gibbering idiots every time they put pen to
paper? . . . Fewer first-nights but more joy . . . also joy of sending 
          77
producers back to cigar stands . . . Thank God, no longer a critic . 
. . don’t need to come to first-nights unless I want . . . can’t keep 
away . . . habit too strong . . . poor devil of a colyumnist [sic] must 
forage . . . why did I become a columnist?  More money.  Money!  
And I once a rubescent socialist . . . best parlor type . . . Lord!  I 
wish some one would die and leave me a million!”
     Clavering opened his weary eyes and glanced over the 
darkened auditorium [. . .].  (1)
While we come to learn who Lee Clavering is, where he comes from, and the 
kind of women he likes in the exposition that follows, it is nevertheless 
disarming to encounter such a “modernist” passage in a novel of such marked 
popular appeal.  Not only was the contemporary consumer of mass-market 
fiction expected to recognize the codes of consciousness without any prefatory 
explanation, but also to do that which has come to define modernist reading 
practice: defer understanding and work through defamiliarization in order to 
construct the meaning of the text.  
Without making too much of the opening of Atherton’s novel, it must be 
noted that it not only calls into question the assumption that literary modernism 
hovered above the most popular fiction, but also the presumption that the 
bestselling fiction of the interwar period was so because it offered a palliative 
realism to a public resistant to stylistic experimentalism.  Clive Bloom, in his 
study of twentieth-century popular fiction, argues that the bestseller “is the 
fiction that most becomes its period and which is most caught in its own age” 
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(15); unlike “art fiction,” which “highlights its style, delights in it and makes of 
style a fetish,” the bestseller “neutralises style, seems only interested in narrative, 
content and convention, and delights in making language invisible in order to 
tell a tale” (21).  However privileged “content” is in Black Oxen, it is clear that is 
does not make language “invisible”; indeed, if it exemplifies “convention,” then 
it might be presumed that modernist techniques were, by 1923, becoming 
“conventional.”  Atherton’s use of sentence fragments, spaced apart by ellipses, 
was already becoming a common stylistic feature in literature, as well as the 
language of advertising.  In the interwar years, the ellipsis was as frequently 
employed in advertising copy to connote the “modern” and the stylish.  In 
addition to the Gillette and Worthington’s advertisements, a less “monologic,” 
but sill typical example is an advertisement for the Dunhill Vanity (fig. 7.), which 
appeared in Vanity Fair, with its coupling of a illustration of a “modern,” 
sleek, angular woman with willowy fingers applying make-up above copy that 
reads: 
No more need one fumble about for rouge, powder, or the 
elusive lipstick . . . For here is a tiny vanity which ingeniously 
combines these three prime requisites to make-up . . . Simulating 
in appearance the well-know briquet it offers the same fascinating 
ease of use.  A quick flip of the cap reveals a lipstick which may 
either be withdrawn orused in its stationary form . . .  [. . .] . . . The 
cosmetics are of surpassing quality and may be obtained in the 
shades now in favor.  Available at all smart stores. (19)
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Fig. 7.  “Presenting the Dunhill Vanity.”  Advertisement.  Vanity Fair Feb. 1928: 
19.
Even advertisements for fabrics presented typographical advertising copy that 
promoted  “Modern clothes for modern men . . . comfortable, colorful, correct . 
. . no hint of the bizarre . . . but nevertheless modern . . . .” (Strong-Hewat 106).  
Atherton’s textual representation of the “psychological,” however, follows 
Dorothy Richardson’s use of elliptical breaks in Pilgrimage to suggest the stream 
of Miriam Henderson’s reporting (and what for Edel is her  “belligerently 
feminine”) consciousness:
The West End street . . . grey buildings rising on either side, 
angles sharp against the sky . . . softened angles of buildings 
against other buildings . . . high moulded angles soft as crumb, 
with deep undershadows . . . creepers fraying from balconies . . . 
[. . . ] Sounds of visible near things streaked and scored with 
broken light as they moved, led off into untraced distant sounds . 
. . chiming together . . . [. . . .].  
     Flags of pavement flowing—smooth clean grey squares and 
oblongs, faintly polished, shaping and drawing away—sliding 
into each other . . . I am part of the dense smooth clean paving 
stone. . . .  (416)
Richardson, in her essay “On Punctuation,” credits H. G. Wells with adapting 
the “rows and rows of dots” from Sterne and Rabelais, who used them to signify 
hints and imply excisions, into a new form of punctuation that “became pauses 
for reflection, by the reader” and allowed for “the responsive beat of the reader’s 
own consciousness” (416).  If Richardson’s defense of Wells’ method can be 
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taken as a defense of her own elliptical style, then the “pauses” on the page are 
intended to replicate not only Miriam’s consciousness—but the reader’s as well.  
The ellipses are not indicative of omissions (or repressions) but function like a 
poetic caesura to approximate breaks in the rhythm of thought and the 
reception of impressions.  
Though Richardson’s novels never became bestsellers, her stylistic 
device inspired many imitations and became “fashionable” (it should be 
remembered that the Interim portion of Richardson’s Pilgrimage was serialized 
in the same issues of the Little Review that published the first chapters of 
Ulysses.  As competing stream of consciousness narratives, Joyce’s novel 
emerged—thanks to the controversy it created—as the more popular title, but 
Richardson’s technique had already begun to be assimilated into and 
appropriated by the texts of mass culture).  Cecil Headlam wrote of the ubiquity 
of the elliptical style in an amusingly curmudgeonly essay in 1925 entitled “Dot 
and Dash.”  Blaming everything from the “alphabet of telegraphese” and Morse 
code for the stylistic trend, Headlam considers ellipses little more than 
interjectional fillers used by lazy writers 
who strive most earnestly to express the inexpressible; who aim at 
putting in all the tones and half-tones of a portrait, and at 
suggesting, not only the spoken word, but the hesitance of 
speech, the barely formed thought, the half-suppressed utterance 
of an idea, the growth of an impulse of emotion.  These are they 
who fall back most frequently upon the use of dots, just as an 
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ordinary Englishman in his armchair at the club subsides upon 
grunts and “ers” . . . and “ahs”. . . .  (372-73)
Headlam wryly notes that “for some years after the war there was an invasion of 
dots into the pages of fiction so overpowering that it gave the impression that 
modern prose was suffering from chronic asthma” (376).  However sarcastic his 
tone, Headlam’s essay offers more compelling insights into the dialogism of 
modernist literary style and cultural change than any of the New Critically-
influenced studies of the stream of consciousness (or, for that matter, Marxist 
critics like Lukács and Adorno).  “Roused by the competition of the films,” 
Headlam suggests, “modern authors called upon dots to provide them with an 
equivalent of the cinema fade-out”; it is a bobbed style,” he concludes, 
that came in with bobbed hair.  Some have attributed this way of 
writing to the excessive use of cigarettes promoted by the war.  Or 
was it due to the impression made upon minds none too stable by 
the electric advertisement signs which dot and dash the heights of 
Trafalgar Square and dazzle and depths of Piccadilly?  There is, 
perhaps, something closely analogous in the style of the very 
modern novelist and that of the electric sign-writer.  They are both 
so fussy, jerky, breathless, and over-emphatic.  (376-77)
Headlam’s droll examples may be hard to accept without skepticism, but he is 
nevertheless pointing out the interrelationship between “very modern” style and 
mass culture, well before Fredric Jameson called for an investigation of the 
literary text as a “cultural artifact” made up of “a field of force in which the 
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dynamics of sign systems of several distinct modes of production can be 
registered and apprehended” as an “ideology of form” (The Political 
Unconscious 98).  Moreover, to consider how a modernist trope like the stream 
of consciousness (however it may be typographically presented—dotted, 
dashed, italicized or altogether unpunctuated) both influenced and was 
influenced by advertising and the mass media—to see it as a  variegated and 
culturally determined “ideology of form”—offers more historical insight than 
Jameson’s own reading of Joyce’s materialized, “autonom[ized]” language that 
he claims is “abstracted from the normal operations of human expression and 
communication [and] human meaning” (“Joyce or Proust?” 191).  As Headlam 
observed in 1925, the “inexpressible,” elliptically represented in modernist 
works was anything but “autonomous” or “abstracted” from the realm of 
popular discourse: like the semiotic within the symbolic, it was inseparably 
intertwined with it. 
Irrespective of its stylistic origins or variations, the stream of 
consciousness was not only a “type” or genre—it was also a stylistic or tropic 
device that appeared in ostensibly “realist” interwar narratives as well—and it 
may be due to Humphrey’s distinction of interior monologues from the “stream 
of consciousness novel” proper that surprising instances of “prespeech” 
subjectivity in popular fiction have passed with little or no critical recognition.  
Contemporary readers, however, seemed to recognize it when they saw it.  If, to 
use Richard Johnson’s succinct formulation, “narratives or images always imply 
or construct a position or positions from which they are to be read or viewed” 
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(66), the constructed reader of Atherton’s fiction, if not familiar with the novels 
of Dorothy Richardson, was able to recognize the narrative stream of 
consciousness as fragmentary, elliptical (in its typographical presentation but 
also in the sense that it suggests what it omitted or inaccessible to 
consciousness), and informed by Freudian psychoanalysis (“Astral board of 
Immortals sitting in Unconscious tweaking strings”).  The popular success of 
Black Oxen—a fiction that evidently did “most becom[e] its period”—suggests 
that the general reader Atherton helped construct not only accepted a 
modernist technique like the stream of consciousness, but enjoyed it.
Although Black Oxen, which foregrounds the semiotic on its first page, is 
notable for the enormity of its success, it is by no means a singular example of 
the convergence of “high” modernism and bestselling “mass” fiction.  J. P. 
McEvoy’s novel Show Girl is an interesting example of how even a comedic 
narrative written to appeal to the widest audience, free of any “highbrow” 
pretensions, incorporated modernist literary form and style.  The popularity of 
Show Girl—which sold out over forty thousand copies and went through six 
printings in 1928—is undoubtedly the reason it has received no scholarly 
attention (or any attention at all, since its initial publication), but it deserves to be 
rediscovered and given the same kind of consideration Anita Loos’s Gentlemen 
Prefer Blondes has merited.  Indeed, Show Girl, which was hailed in a one-page 
promotional advertisement for The New York Herald Tribune Sunday books 
section as “playing fast and Anita Loos with all best seller records” and 
described as “the most uproarious entertainment since gentleman began 
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preferring blondes” (“Why is Show Girl Making Whoopee Among the Best 
Sellers?” 20), is similar in its ironic treatment of its female protagonist, but it is the 
form of the novel which sets it apart.  The narrative is, essentially, a collage: “the 
tale is told,” the Herald advertisement explains, “through the medium of letters, 
telegrams, cables, dialogue-sketches, extracts from newspapers, telephone 
conversations.  The thing carries itself forward with a breathless momentum”;  
the concluding copy notes that “Show Girl is listed on the best-seller lists as a 
novel.  But it is really a revue, in book form, conceived, composed and directed 
by J. P. McEvoy” (“Why is Show Girl Making Whoopee Among the Best 
Sellers?” 20).  The publisher’s reluctance to classify this “novelty of form” is 
telling: in a move usually associated with discussions of postmodernist texts, the 
novel is presented as a cross-genre work the blurs the boundaries between the 
literary and the popular.
Show Girl marks the first appearance of Dixie Dugan (who would later 
appear in a sequel, two films, and a syndicated comic strip) and follows her 
through a failed attempt to become a Zigfeld Follies dancer, to her stint as a 
nightclub performer,where she gets involved with a counterrevolutionary tango 
dancer and a Wall Street millionaire, gains notoriety in the scandalous 
attempted-murder plot that results, fakes her own kidnapping, and, finally, rises 
to fame as the star of a hit musical-comedy, Get Your Girl.  For the most part, 
Show Girl might be considered a modern epistolary novel, but it is unique for its 
inclusion of images and typographical variations to signal changes in genre 
and narrative perspective.  A series of pages, for example, present alternating 
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telegram communications between the characters, each with a reproduction of 
the postal or Western Union cablegram header, followed by unpunctuated 
upper-case typewriter font (fig. 8).  When newspaper articles enter the narrative, 
they are presented in parallel columns of close, small print under upper-case 
headlines.  Additionally, McEvoy presents some sections in the dialogic 
structure of dramatic form, others as screenplay “scenes”; at times, he depends 
on greeting cards, critical notices, and playbills to further the story.  At one 
point—just before the opening of Get Your Girl—Dixie experiences a moment 
of “hysterical excitement” in her room (where her sister is sleeping) and McEvoy 
          87
Fig. 8.  Pages from J. P. McEvoy’s Show Girl.  New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1928.  212-13.
uses the convention of the staggered ellipses to indicate her stream of 
consciousness:
Do you really think it’s going to be all right? . . . Do you really? . . .  
I’m so frightened. . . .  Gee, I’m dead . . . If I could only sleep. . . .  
Seven o’clock in the morning and rehearsing since eight last 
night and there’s a call for eleven o’clock. . . .  Four hours sleep, if 
I can sleep . . . [. . .]  What’s the use of my going to bed? . . . I can’t 
sleep. . . .  If I only had a drink. . . .  (132-33)
She continues, in this manner, to worry about the production and its challenges 
as she gets into bed.  There, she thinks about Jimmy (the writer of Get Your Girl) 
until she falls asleep, and it is seems that McEvoy is referencing (however 
flippantly) Molly Bloom’s soliloquy at the end of Ulysses:
Gee, I’m dead. . . .  Oh, boy, what a bed. . . .  I’ll just sleep like this. 
. . .  Take  my slippers off . . . [. . .]  Gee, the sun is shining in the 
window . . .  [. . .]  What time is it anyway? . . . Can’t you stop that 
darn ocean outside? . . . I think I’ll get up and go for a swim . . . .  
Gee, I’m dead. . . .  And I got to be at that theatre in a couple of 
hours. . . .  Jimmy’s going to take me down there. . . .  Said I 
could eat breakfast with him at Childs. . . .  I could eat a horse with 
Jimmy. . . .  Gee, he’s a sweet kid. . . .   Gee, I’m tired. . . .  Jimmy . . 
. Sweet boy . . . Sweet . . .  (135)        
However frivolous the plot of Show Girl, it is nevertheless a compelling example 
of the way modernist textual experimentalism informed even the most 
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accessible and widely-read literature.  Arguably, any novel produced within the 
modern period lays claim to be called “modern” literature—and, since even the 
most realistic or genre-specific texts emerged in dialogic and intertextual 
relationship with “high” modernism and bear the traces of modernist influence 
(in varying degrees, to be sure)—but it is important to reconsider and test 
definitions of the modern at the level of the individual text to better understand 
the way this “subversive” or semiotic challenge to literary conventions was 
encoded in, and helped shape, popular discourse.  
If “a key formal characteristic of the modernist work” is, as the most 
recent edition of The Norton Anthology of American Literature explains, “its 
construction out of fragments,” if it is an “assemblage” that is “notable for what it 
omits—the explanations, interpretations, connections, summaries, and 
distancing that provide continuity, perspective, and security in traditional 
literature” it would be difficult not to see Show Girl as a “typical modernist work” 
(Baym 1078).  “Compared with earlier writing,” the modern novel
will seem to begin arbitrarily, to advance without explanation, and 
to end without resolution, consisting of vivid segments 
juxtaposed without cushioning or integrating transitions.  There 
will be shifts in perspective, voice, and tone.  Its rhetoric will be 
understated, ironic.  It will suggest rather than assert, making use 
of symbols and images instead of statements.  Fragments will be 
drawn from the diverse areas of experience.   (Baym 1079)
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It is up to the reader to sort through the fragments and “this is why the reader of 
a modernist work is often said to participate in the actual work of making the 
poem or story” (Baym 1079).  While the editors of the Norton Anthology 
clearly have novels like As I Lay Dying (which is included in the volume) and 
The Sound and the Fury in mind, they could just as well be describing Show 
Girl.  Admittedly, navigating the series of telegrams, letters, telephone 
conversations, newspaper articles, and dramatic scenes which make up the 
novel is easier than piecing together the fragmented consciousnesses Faulkner 
presents in As I Lay Dying, but it is an “assemblage” nonetheless, and it does 
require the reader to participate in constructing the narrative.  It may be too 
much to insist that Show Girl should be anthologized as an exemplary modern 
novel, but to read it against a novel like As I Lay Dying would certainly help 
demystify modernism and to discredit the “great divide” conceit.  
Indeed, rather than deflate students with the promise that the “experience 
of reading [modernist literature] will be challenging and difficult” (1079), Show 
Girl could be given as evidence that not all modern texts are “difficult,” that 
engaging with fragments and constructing textual meaning was immensely 
appealing to the same interwar audience that had a mania for crossword 
puzzles, detective fiction, and deduction narratives like The Baffle Book (which, 
unfortunately, deserves more comment than can be provided here)—a parlor 
game/short story hybrid that offered crime stories like “The Mystery of the 
Murdered Physician” and “The Case of the Stolen Van Dyck,” along with maps 
and drawings that asked the reader to “consider all the circumstances of the 
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crime or mystery as stated in the text or as given in the chart or diagram or 
illustration, if one accompanies the problem,” and to “observe, deduce, [and] 
reason it out” (Wren and McKay 3).  The editors of The Norton Anthology, 
however, by not acknowledging bestsellers like Black Oxen and Show Girl, 
incorrectly maintain that 
serious literature between the two world wars found itself in a 
curious relationship with the culture at large.  For if it was 
attacking the old-style idea of traditional literature, it felt itself 
attacked in turn by the ever-growing industry of popular literature.  
The reading audience in America was vast, but it preferred a kind 
of book quite different from that turned out by literary modernists.  
(Baym 1080)
This kind of claim not only serves to reinscribe the “autonomy” of modernism, 
but it also ignores modernist texts like Sherwood Anderson’s Dark  Laughter, 
Dos Passos’ Manhattan Transfer and U.S.A.—even F. Scott Fitzgerald’s This Side 
of Paradise, each of which use the stream of consciousness trope and each of 
which became bestsellers that turned their authors into celebrities.
“Fannie Hurst, best seller, making 
her own contribution to the Stein 
tradition”: Lummox 
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There may be no better challenge to the notion of the “curious 
relationship” of experimental literary modernism and the “industry of popular 
literature” than the stream of consciousness novels of Fannie Hurst—a 
bestselling author who has become synonymous with “middlebrow” popular 
fiction.  Hurst’s career is a remarkable example of the way enormous popularity 
can conflict with canonicity: while now none of her novels are currently in print 
and she has been eclipsed by her one time secretary, Zora Neale Hurston, in the 
1920s, Hurst was considered one of the most important “modernist” writers in 
America.  In novels like Appassionata, Mannequin and, most of all, Lummox, 
Hurst developed her own stream of consciousness method which Heywood 
Broun, in his review for the New York Herald, noted was indebted to both 
Gertrude Stein and Dorothy Richardson, “and now we have Fannie Hurst,” he 
declared, “best seller, making her own contribution to the Stein tradition” (30).   
If she was, for a time, the most popular of modernists, she is certainly one of the 
least remembered.  Virginia Woolf, in her essay, “American Fiction,” considered 
Hurst as important as Cather and intimates that Hurst, “whose aim it is to write a 
book off [her] own bat and no one else’s” (120) was a kindred modernist spirit; 
Vanity Fair included Hurst in its November, 1923 “Hall of Fame”—a running 
feature that also included Woolf, Carl Sandburg, Stein, and other exemplars of 
the modern “smart set”— “chiefly because, in Lummox, her new novel, she has 
transcended, in her portrayal of the American scene, anything she has before 
achieved” (77); and in a full-page promotion in the New York Times, Harper 
and Brothers, to underscore that Lummox was a critical, as well as a commercial 
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success, reproduced effusive English reviews like the following, from the 
Observer—which not only praises her stream of consciousness method, but 
actually places her above Richardson and Joyce:
This is not only the best novel we have had from America for at 
least a decade; it is one of the best novels in English we have read 
for years, and may easily, in the future, mark an epoch in our 
fiction as distinctively as did Esther Waters.  Miss Hurst has taken 
the modern method, invented by Miss Richardson and developed 
since by many writers, some of far greater talent than the 
originator, and has made of it a beauty and wonder.  Her
great advantages over such authors as Mr. Lawrence or Mr. James 
Joyce are that she has an affection, a zest for life; and that we 
never suspect her of dramatizing herself.  (“Fannie Hurst and the 
English Critics” BR19)
A less sanguine American reviewer for the New York Times criticized the 
“grammatical sins” of Hurst’s writing and blamed “advertising manners” for the 
lack of punctuation in modern novels—however, he does admit that she has 
“still done much that is fine; portrayed a notable character, etched in verbal 
mezzotint several types of New York people, tinged the commonplace with 
beauty and touched the deepest wells of human emotion” (BR5).      
Stephanie Lewis Thompson, in one of the few academic studies of 
Hurst’s fiction—Influencing America’s Tastes: Realism in the Works of Wharton, 
Cather, and Hurst—contemplates the reason for Hurst’s “erasure from the 
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canon of American literature,” and notes that, what little critical attention Hurst 
has received “are in relation to ‘women’s issues,’ her place within the canon of 
Jewish writers, and her relationship with Zora Neale Hurston [. . .].  [S]he is 
[now] remembered as a writer of stories and novels that were turned into 
‘women’s films’” (155).  While she does point out that Hurst “did not denigrate 
the emerging narrative techniques we now deem modernist; in fact, she praised 
narrative experimentation and used a stream-of-conciousness technique in 
several of her fictions” (155), Thompson is much more interested in examining 
why Hurst turned to realism as her career developed—or, as she writes, why 
Hurst “rejected modernist aesthetics as a viable model for writing” (87).  Since 
Thompson’s focus is on the realist texts produced by the authors in her study, 
she is not interested “in trying to redefine modernism so that I can classify 
Wharton, Cather, and Hurst as modernists” (87).  This move to deny Hurst’s 
contribution to literary modernism, however, serves only to reinscribe the false 
binary between bestselling writers and “serious” experimental literature—and to 
further secure Hurst’s reputation as a “sob sister,” a  writer known only  for 
producing melodramatic “middlebrow” fiction.  
Although little has been written about Lummox (and what has is usually a 
brief mention before a discussion of Hurst’s later fiction, like Back Street), it is an 
important example of the popular appeal of modernist technique.  As Hurst’s 
biographer, Brooke Kroeger writes, Lummox “was a sensation, and reviewers 
gave Fannie the literary reception of her dreams for the emphatic survey of the 
life of a domestic servant” (92).  The plot of the novel follows Bertha, a New 
          94
York born orphan who (inexplicably) speaks with a thick accent and, since no 
one knows “just what Baltic bloods flowed in sullen and alien rivers through 
Bertha’s veins” (1), she comes to represent the migration of the “old world” into 
the new.  Raised in a sailor’s boarding house, without any education, Bertha 
seeks employment as a maid and the narrative follows her through a series of 
jobs where she faultlessly and selflessly serves wealthy families until she is either 
forced to leave or she is unjustly fired.  Lummox is compelling, not only for its 
exposure of class conflict, but also for the way Hurst forces the reader to assume 
the perspective of Bertha—the inarticulate “other,” with her “alien rivers” of 
blood, who signifies the emergence of the semiotic into the symbolic. 
Bertha’s first extended employment is with the Farley’s, wealthy residents 
of Gramercy Park, and, despite their condescending treatment, she perseveres 
because, we learn, she has a
horror of employment agencies.  Shambles of sullen stock 
awaiting inspection.  The lorgnette fusillade.  The bitter shameless 
questionings, like an apple corer plunging down into the heart.
     “What is that on your face?  I hope it isn’t a rash.  Do you 
expect every Thursday out?  You bathe regularly, of course?  You 
understand that my cook always helps with the housework on the 
maid’s day out.  I’ve a half-grown daughter and cannot permit my 
help to entertain men in the kitchen.  Newspapers are full of such 
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dreadful things.  Would you mind having your things fumigated 
before you bring them to the house?  Can’t be too careful. . . . “  
(Lummox 7).
The dehumanizing process of being selected for work carries with it the 
implication that servants like Bertha pose the threat of introducing the 
abject—disease, lewdness, vermin—into the tightly regulated domestic sphere.  
In this example of how working women are “othered” by those who hire them, 
Hurst manages to expose the forces of reification as she begins to allow the 
reader to enter into Bertha’s subjective consciousness.
Near the end of her time working for the Farley’s, she begins to take an 
interest in their poet son, Rollo.  As she dusts his study one day, the barely 
literate Bertha reads one of the poems he has left on his desk and falls into a 
kind of rapture:
Short lines leaving much of the paper white.  Lines that rocked 
softly like a boat with a lateen sail.  Rhythm.  “Love.  Rove.”  
“Pagan.  Raven.”  “Lyre.  Desire.”  
   Flash.  Flash.  Flash.  A plunging opal horse and a jade terrific 
lion and a lapis lazuli centaur, riding round and round again into 
alternate view on the merry-go-round.
   She has dusted the wide-margined paper with the click of flame 
color through the words.  (Lummox 9)
Throughout the novel, Bertha is overcome by rhythm and music: although she 
cannot express her own “locked up gargoyles of thoughts [. . .] for which she 
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had no words” (Lummox 8), when she encounters the semiotic that underlies 
communication, the sense of freedom she feels is replicated on the page in the 
form of repetitions, fragment and single-word sentences.  Bertha’s sensitivity to 
the materiality of language (as evidenced here by her almost synesthesiatic 
reaction to poetic sound over sense, and her attention to textuality: she notices 
the appearance of the words on the page, as well as the way her feather duster 
flickers “through” them as if they are palpable objects) is replicated through 
Hurst’s peculiar adaptation of the stream of consciousness trope.  
Bertha, as Hurst has created her, is hardly communicative (the New York 
Times review observed that “through more than three hundred pages [. . .] 
Bertha scarcely opens her mouth save for a clumsy “yah” [“Fannie Hurst 
Portrays a New York ‘Lummox’” BR5]).  She is much more aligned with what 
Kristeva calls the chora, or the semiotic position anterior to the acquisition of 
speech.  According to Kristeva, 
The chora is not yet a position that represents something for 
someone (i.e., it is not a sign) [. . . ].  Neither model or copy, the 
chora precedes and underlies figuration and this specularization, 
and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm [. . .].  The chora 
is a modality of signifiance in which the linguistic sign is not yet 
articulated as the absence of an object and as the disposition 
between real and symbolic.  (Revolution 26)      
The chora, then, is literally “prespeech” consciousness, formed in utero and 
privileged before the Oedipalization, before the mirror-stage that inaugurates 
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the subject into language.  “The mother’s body,” Kristeva writes, “is therefore 
what mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the 
ordering principle of the semiotic chora” (Revolution 27).  That the chora is 
associated with the maternal is significant, because shortly after Bertha’s poetry-
dusting episode, a drunken Rollo forces himself on her, she becomes pregnant 
and, before she can confront him with the news, she learns that he is engaged 
to be married.  
Despite the fact that his night with Bertha inspired him to write his best 
poem—the book-length The Cathedral Under the Sea—he pays her no further 
attention and she leaves the Farley’s rather than create a scandal, but not before 
she hears him read the poem to his fiancée:
Slow oxen words plowing up secrets of the soil.  Gleaming 
submarine words.  Words out of jeweled sands.  Heavy words 
that thundered into wisdom.  The strange wisdom of the silence 
that stood stock still.  The hexameter of the wide, white feet that 
the earth sucked unto herself in fond little marshes, as they ran 
through the forests surrounding the Cathedral Under the Sea.  
The song that was locked in a heart and hurt there.  Rhythm.
The fandango of sound.  The saga of the silence of Bertha—there 
behind the swinging doors, hearing herself bleed into words.  
(Lummox 20)
Again, Bertha’s reaction to poetic language is to be carried away by its sound 
and rhythm—there is no real indication of the literal content of poem, only the 
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sensory impressions the “submarine words” evoke in her.  In her stream of 
consciousness, Bertha translates the “hexameter” into actual “feet” she feels 
pressing into mud (an activity she enjoys).  She recognizes that the poem is 
about her, and its mournful beauty, it seems, creates in her the sensation that 
her blood has both created the words and that she feels the words in her blood.  
In these moments, Hurst seems to anticipate Kristeva’s arguments about the 
semiotic.  In “Stabat Mater,” Kristeva writes that the Mother’s bodily 
fluids—blood, milk and tears 
are metaphors of non-speech, of a “semiotics” that linguistic 
communication does not account for.  The Mother and her 
attributes, evoking sorrowful humanity, thus become 
representatives of a “return of the repressed.”   They re-establish 
what is non-verbal and show up as the receptacle of a signifying 
disposition that is closer to so-called primary processes.  (174)
Bertha works as a charwoman through her pregnancy and, soon after she gives 
birth to a son, she places him up for adoption.  When she hears the word 
“mother,” afterward, it “could twist her and make her want to bite at the cove of 
her arm” because that is where “the small head had lain” (Lummox 71, 62).  
Bertha, who never knew her own mother, and who never meets her own child 
(she watches him from afar), is nevertheless presented as a maternal archetype.  
As a contemporary critic noted, Lummox is “an epic of the mother instinct” 
(“Fannie Hurst’s Greatest Book” BR23), and Abe C. Rabitz, in one of the only 
book-length critical studies of Hurst, calls the novel “the chronicle of eternal or 
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Earth Mother” (107).  To use Kristeva’s argument, Bertha (a name which 
combines both “birth” and “earth”) is not placed “in process/on trial” by the 
semiotic—she represents it.  In one of the clearest examples of Bertha as “Earth 
Mother,” she attends a picnic where she sits and removes her shoes to sink her 
feet in the wet ground:
Squnch.  Squnch.  Squirm of the pouring soil up between her 
churning, spatulate toes.  She could feel it with the very pit of her.  
Warm.  Black.  Close.  Her mysterious friend, the soil, whispering 
to her with those tight eager lips—it was difficult not to throw out 
her arms and shout—tear open her bulk of blouse where if 
cluttered her breast and shout—the curling, winding, whispering, 
kissing soil hugging her with its eager lips—she wanted to 
run—to run back barefoot along the plushy fields.  (73)
In this ecstatic, sexualized moment, she penetrates and is embraced by the 
earth; her jouissance materialized on the page as the movement from 
fragmented sentences to a dashed breathlessness (As an indication of Lummox’s 
popularity, its style was parodied by Christopher Ward.  This passage, in 
particular, is singled out in “Stummox by Fannie Wurst”: “Piggly wiggly.  
Rhythmically rippling toes.  And talk.  Deaf and dumb toe alphabet.  She had no 
other words.  Dumb Dora.  Tongue-tied—but tongue-toed.  With her toes she 
made letters.  Words [. . .].  Phalangean poetry.  Iambic pintoemeter” [1-2]).  
The scene suggests, not only merging, but also a return to the archaic or 
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primordial which, according to Kristeva, is the time before speech and the 
individuation that language produces.
After Bertha gains and loses more jobs—she is forced out of one 
couple’s home because she is made to mediate between them, another because 
the kind old woman who hires her dies (with Bertha’s aid), and Bertha leaves 
rather than to have to endure working for the old woman’s hateful daughter-in-
law, and yet another, after years of selfless devotion, when she is wrongfully 
accused of stealing from the family.  Aging and forced to return to the 
employment agency, she accepts random jobs and daily charwoman work. At 
one point, she works as a coatroom attendant in a jazz club and, as she has 
before when she hears rhythm, she experiences an ecstatic moment—which 
Hurst presents by foregrounding the text.  What is surprising, however, is that 
the pronoun shifts at this moment:
You leaped!  It was the first crash of flesh-shuddering music [. . .]  
A contortion ran along the cloakroom, as if everyone had moved 
on little running muscles and yet not advanced.  You shivered 
almost ecstatically at that.  Eyelids.  The white flash of them 
lowering.  Sudden slitted eyes.  Insouciance of the docked heads.  
A tree shake through the cloakroom.  Only it did not begin at the 
heart.  It lay in the flesh.  The shivering, shimmering flesh [. . .]. 
   That gelatinous room.  It nauseated [. . . ].  It made you a little 
sick, the motionless motion.  (Lummox 297)
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A similar semiotic moment occurs later in the novel.  After Bertha learns that her 
ticket and watches him, pridefully.  As soon as he starts playing, Bertha swoons 
and the paragraphs give way to bars of music (fig. 9).  
“You could feel the floor of sand moving out subtly from under your feet,” Hurst 
writes, and “the tears came out in a dew along your eyes” (Lummox 309).  
When he reaches the crescendo, Bertha feels herself fully expressed for the first 
time:
It stepped down the keys in heartbeats.  You could scarcely keep 
back.  You knew that cry.  It had lain in your heart for so long.  
There is was on the outside of yourself, strewn along the keys [. . 
.].  The bleeding out of all the little inner turmoils.  The dammed-
up ecstasies.  The music of the chimes goldily.  The glad releases.  
The rilling beauty [. . .].  To be pinioned there against the wall of 
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Fig. 9.  Musical bars in Fannie Hurst’s Lummox.  New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1923.  308.
that afternoon with your hands caught up against your breast and 
the arteries of your heart uncocked and flowing [. . .].  (309)
Thompson reads this pronoun slippage as a narrative intrusion: “this shift 
joltingly reminds us,” she argues, “that Bertha is being ‘written’ in this novel not 
only be her poet-lover but also by Hurst herself.  There is a narrator shaping her 
thoughts for her and us, the ‘you’ a reminder that undercuts the realism of 
Bertha’s situation and emphasizes that her plight is an artistic creation, not a 
social problem needing a practical remedy” (170).  
Because her focus is on Hurst’s later socialist realist texts, Thompson 
needs to fault Hurst’s modernist experimentalism in order to dismiss the way 
Lummox does indeed expose the “social problem” of working class women.  
Arguably, Hurst intends the pronoun shifts to be “jolting”: if we read with the 
grain of the text, it is clear that Hurst does not want to assert narrative 
omniscience, but to force the reader into Bertha’s subject position.  The 
rhetorical turn from “Bertha” to “you” suggests that Hurst want to blur the 
boundaries between the reader and the character’s consciousness.  If 
Thompson finds Hurst’s use of “you” ineffective or alienating, it is nevertheless 
an attempt to make the reader empathize with Bertha—to suture us into the 
narrative.
In Hurst’s autobiography, Anatomy of Me, she notes that 
Lummox—which she names as the favorite of her novels—was inspired by 
witnessing immigrant working women and she claims this inspired her to write 
with a “new social consciousness” (277).  She explains that
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One day, while Lummox was only a faint prick against my mind, I 
wandered into a dark basement of very east Fourteenth Street 
where two women, obviously Slavic, sat in the open doorway 
around a large carton filled with buttons of multifarious shapes 
and colours.  Picked up by the handful, the were just a mass.  But 
selected separately, each one claimed its identity [. . .].   In like 
manner, I had learned—subconsciously, I suppose—to sort faces.  
Faces in the crowd were no longer just faces melting like wax into 
one another.  They had separateness.  
    It was out of this milling world of people with no faces in 
particular, no identity in particular, that my Lummox began to take 
heavy shape [. . .].   She became a composite of many soils, of 
many climates, of many lineages [. . .].  In a way, Lummox 
symbolized my complete breakthrough [. . .] from the 
circumscribed world in which I had been reared into a new social 
consciousness.  (Anatomy of Me 277)
Hurst’s story of the inspiration for Lummox is, like the novel itself, a story about 
learning to acknowledge the “other”: the ethnic “other” who Hurst uses to 
define her project and her “breakthrough,” as well as the “Other”: the 
unconscious, the semiotic, which threatens identity and signification.  The 
metaphor mass of buttons and melting wax, which here stand for merging and 
the lack of identity are contrasted with the notion of separateness or 
individuation.  Interestingly, Bertha evolves from having “no identity in 
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particular” to being a “composite,” like the carton of buttons she is “just a 
mass”—a “heavy shape”—that represents the repressed (culturally and 
psychoanalytically), the “prespeech,” the semiotic.  
That Hurst claims the novel represents her “new social consciousness” 
suggests, not only that the content of her novel is informed by her 
understanding of Marxism and the injustices that working class women in 
particular have to endure, but the development of her narrative technique is 
also the product of this “breakthrough.”  (Hurst tells an interesting anecdote 
about meeting Trotsky in Russia, who was such an admirer of Lummox that he 
recited a large portion of it, from memory, for her amusement [Anatomy of Me 
297].)  Hurst’s modernism, then, is anything but autonomous or opposed to the 
social.  Her stream of “social” consciousness invites the reader to not only 
witness Bertha’s life, but to assume her point of view—to merge with her and 
her consciousness.  At one point in the novel, one of the maids who works with 
Bertha (and who later becomes a prostitute) voices what could be taken as a 
defense for the aesthetic of Lummox:
“We can’t tell the truth about the kitchen side of the door, because 
we ain’t got the voice of organization [. . .].   There’s nobody to 
get up and explain for us [. . .].  We ain’t got the voice or the 
language.  Nobody writes pieces or prints articles about us from 
our side of the fence.  We’re not interesting.  Who wants to see a 
show about a servant?” (Lummox 220)
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Hurst not only gives servants a “voice” (however inarticulate it may be) and not 
only presents “the kitchen side of the door,” she works to insinuate the reader 
into the consciousness of the “other” and to adapt to this new perspective.  
Hurst, arguably, desires the reader to accept her “new social consciousness” by 
accepting Bertha’s.
The plot of Lummox concludes with Bertha being asked, by the 
immigrant widower Meyerbogen, who owns the dingy bakery where she stops 
for bread one day, to work for him and help him with his four children.  Bertha 
finally finds a place, as she gets the shop in order and cares for the family, 
where she is valued and contented.  More surprising than the happy ending, 
however, are the illustrations Hurst includes in the final pages.  On Bertha’s first 
visit to the bakery, she notices a chalkboard with a child’s drawing of the 
Meyerbogen family.  After she has worked and resided with them for a time, she 
discovers that a sketch of her has been added to the drawing (fig. 10).  
Sentimentalism aside, it is interesting that one of the final images the reader has 
of Bertha is just that—an image.   
While Bertha has represented the pre- or trans-verbal throughout the 
novel, in its conclusion, she is presented as an illustration.  In the same way that 
she sees words as material objects, Bertha, by the end of Lummox, is turned into 
a material object for the reader.  The drawing is still “symbolic” and 
representational (it does “signify” the family and Bertha), yet it literally interrupts 
the narrative in order to privilege the graphic over the linguistic.  Hurst, on the 
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level of the page, “does not suppress the semiotic chora but instead raises the 
chora to the status of a signifier” (Kristeva, Revolution 57): Bertha, as a chora 
analogue, is finally and fully “revealed” as that which cannot be expressed 
through the linguistic.  Hurst’s use of images (like Faulkner’s in The Sound and 
the Fury and As I Lay Dying) suggests the narrative has approached the limits of 
language—where the abstract signification of the symbolic is rejected for the 
immediate, the iconic, that which language cannot entirely reveal: the semiotic.  
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Fig. 10.  Drawing of Bertha in Fannie Hurst’s Lummox.  New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1923.  328.
Strange Interlude: Eugene 
O’Neill’s “Great Thinkie”
There is no better example of the widespread popularity of the stream of 
consciousness in the interwar years than Strange Interlude, dubbed by Life as 
“Gene O’Neill’s great thinkie” (“Neighborhood News: Chicago” 25).  The long 
play, which featured O’Neill’s modernization of the soliloquy as the expression 
of the character’s unspoken and preconscious thoughts, was the most 
successful of O’Neill’s career.  Strange indeed is how parenthetically Strange 
Interlude is treated by scholars—if it is mentioned at all.  O’Neill’s play, more 
than any other “modernist” literary text, was embraced by a mass audience, and 
it therefore merits consideration (indeed, the lack of critical attention the play 
has received has served only to uphold the specious “great divide” argument): 
both for what its popularity suggests about the reception of the modernist 
stream of consciousness, and for the way the text itself dramatizes the conflict 
between the semiotic and the symbolic.
While it may be surprising that a play which foregrounded the stream of 
consciousness trope became a popular entertainment, it was no less surprising 
to O’Neill and the producers of the play.  Doris Alexander, in her study of 
O’Neill’s career, Eugene O’Neill’s Creative Struggle, explains that Strange 
Interlude opened on January 30, 1928 at a small venue, and the Theatre Guild 
assumed an average run of a couple of months; “to their amazement,” however, 
“it became a triumph, with almost universally brilliant reviews [. . .].   They had 
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standees at all performances as late as April.  ‘That trends on fanaticism, it seems 
to me,’ said O’Neill when he heard about it.  ‘Myself, I wouldn’t stand up [four 
and a half] hours to see the original production of the Crucifixion!’” (125).  After 
playing for over a year, the Guild “had two traveling companies playing to 
crowded houses on the road” (Alexander 126).  The length of the play was no 
doubt part of its attraction (as Otis W. Winchester points out, “the performance 
began at five-thirty in the afternoon and recessed at a quarter to eight, for 
dinner, and resumed at nine for slightly more than two hours” [43]) and cause 
for many more quips in addition to O’Neill’s own.  The New York Daily News 
reported that, when a comedian was asked how he liked Strange Interlude, he 
replied, “I enjoyed every day of it!” (“Lengthy” 31).  It is not incidental to the 
argument that modernism was inseparable from mass culture to note that, when 
the play was banned by censors in Boston for its mentions of sex and abortion, 
and was relegated to the outskirts, too far away from restaurants (who were by 
then catering to the Strange Interlude crowds), the audiences, during the dinner 
intermission, gravitated to Howard Johnson’s local ice-cream shop and helped 
it become a national franchise (“Twenty-Eight Flavors Head West” 71).  
The play was not only successful in performance: it was quickly 
published in book form and became one of the best-selling plays of all time.  As 
Walker Gilmer writes, in his biography of O’Neill’s publisher, Horace Liveright, 
“when O’Neill made the national best-seller lists [. . .] with the appearance of 
Strange Interlude, both author and publisher were surprised.  That this nine-act 
drama became a national success was the result of O’Neill’s talent, the extensive 
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promotional treatment Liveright gave the work, and the popular appeal the play 
had for an audience which both of them had developed” (176-77).  Strange 
Interlude was one of the top-five bestselling titles of 1928 (Hackett 137), it went 
on to become a Book-of-the-Month Club selection (despite Radway’s claim that 
literary modernism was absent from the list of books offered) with its featured 
inclusion in the incentive Nine Plays by O’Neill collection (“Nine Plays by 
Eugene O’Neill Free for Your Library” BR24), and was “to become the best 
selling play of the Twenties and one of the most popular dramas in American 
history” (Gilmer 179).  
As sensational as its subject matter was to contemporary audiences, who 
were no doubt drawn to the play because of its censorship in Boston, it was 
O’Neill’s stylistic method and presentation of the “prespeech level” of 
consciousness (on stage and on the page) that garnered the most attention.  
The editor of O’Neill’s working notebooks, Virginia Floyd, explains that the 
“stream-of-consciousness asides” followed his reading of Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego in 1925, 
and he laid out his idea for the “method” in the following entry:
Start with soliloquy—perhaps have the whole play nothing but a 
thinking aloud (or this entrance for another play—anyway the 
thinking aloud being more important than the actual 
talking—speech breaking through thought as a random process 
of concealment, speech inconsequential or imperfectly 
expressing the thought behind—all done with the most drastic 
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logic and economy and simplicity of words—[. . . ] Carrying the 
method to an extreme—one sees their lips move as they talk to 
one another but there is no sound—only their thinking is aloud.  
(qtd. in Floyd 74)   
Interestingly, O’Neill’s own description of the method reads like an example of 
the stream of consciousness technique, with the dashes replaced by “dots,” that 
he would come to use in the construction of the “asides” in Strange Interlude.  
The convention of the elliptical fragment—already used in advertising and 
fiction—created a nevertheless distinctive enough stylistic mannerism that it 
became widely parodied.  In “Strange Interview with Mr. O’Neill,” Vanity Fair 
columnist John Riddell presents a dialogue between O’Neill and his “Inner 
Voice,” which tells him, “here I am swimming around in the stream of your 
subconscious, without water-wings, and I know more about what you’re doing 
than you do yourself” and “Whoops! . . . What funny things are beginning to 
float past me now, in the dim and troubled stream of Mr. O’Neill’s subconscious 
. . . Funny lavender things, with horns . . . Why, they’re thoughts . . .  I’ll be a 
son-of-a-gun, they’re thoughts of me . . .  (86).  Life presented O’Neill’s elliptical 
style in its send-up of dance marathons which includes a pause for a “Strange 
Interlude”: 
It’s five o’clock in the morning, we’ve danced the whole week 
through . . . the blaring jazz dies out, the musicians straggle off 
the platform . . . staggering couples stumble into red and white 
striped tents and disappear . . .  three hours’ rest! . . . [. . . ] the vast 
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white cavern is deserted . . . the goof god slowly clambers down 
from his dizzy pedestal . . . peace on earth!” (“New York Life” 18).  
Advertising had long been using the ellipsis, but after Strange Interlude, the 
style became even more pervasive and coded as “psychological,” as one 
advertisement for Piel’s beer—which seems to have O’Neill’s audience in 
mind—suggests (fig. 11).  The advertisement features an illustration of a couple 
in evening wear, standing uncomfortably under glaring lights during an 
intermission and, because it appears to be indebted to the literary modernism of 
Strange Interlude, the copy is worth quoting:
Bad moments . . . You know the entr’acte . . . When you troop out 
of the theatre onto the sidewalk with the rest of the audience . . .
Blinking slightly . . . Makeup looks pretty seasick under the arc-
lights . . . The inevitable cigarette . . . The inevitable “How do you 
like the play?”. . . You stand there . . . Everybody else stands there . 
. . You keep on standing there, barely suppressing a yawn . . . It’s
a bad moment . . . Don’t be such a sheep . . . Take your lady 
firmly by the hand . . . Lead her across the street to the bright 
little shop there . . . You have just time for a bottle of Piel’s apiece . 
. . When you finish, the sheep will have herded back into the 
theatre . . . Whereupon you trip neatly down the aisle, dropping 
into your seats at the psychological moment when the curtain 
rises . . . The entr’acte makes sense that way.  (33)
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 Fig. 11.  Piel’s “Bad Moments.”  Advertisement.  New Yorker 13 Jan.    
 1934: 33.
The advertisement turns the elliptical “aside” into an intimation of confidence, 
and the consumer, who is able to recognize the “psychological moment,” is set 
apart from the “sheep” who cannot think for themselves.  Piel’s associates itself 
with the style of Strange Interlude so that the consumer associates the interludes 
between the acts with Piel’s.
On stage, comedy revues were featuring Strange Interlude skits which, 
as the New York Times reported, “promise[d] to be regular features of every 
revue produced during the coming season,” with one “more than ordinarily 
funny in its depiction of characters who say their lines but act out their 
thoughts” (“White’s ‘Scandals’ Has Funny Skits” 19).  Even before the 1932 film 
adaptation, featuring Norma Shearer and Clark Gable, debuted with what one 
advertisement called “a new and revolutionary development in talking 
pictures[:] you hear the secret thoughts of each character!” (“What has M.G.M. 
Done Now?” 13) the Marx Brothers were depending on their audience’s 
familiarity with O’Neill’s play for Groucho’s parody in Animal Crackers, wherein 
he steps in front of a pair of women after he declares, “pardon me while I have a 
strange interlude” and, in mock-serious monotone, claims that, as Eugene 
O’Neill, he would be able to reveal “what I really think of you two.”
The Marx Brothers’ caricature of the actor speaking with a slightly 
modulated voice while the others on stage held their positions seems to be 
more faithful to the way Strange Interlude was actually performed than is the 
M.G.M. film, with its voice-overs which play over close-ups of the actor’s faces.  
According to Ronald H. Wainscott, in his Staging O’Neill, the first director, 
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Philip Moeller, who labored over how to present the asides, decided to have all 
but the speaking actor pause.  The effect he was after was for the play “to seem 
suddenly to stop and, at the same time, not to stop” (qtd. in Wainscott 234):
Moeller tried to avoid severe, dynamic halts which would call 
attention to themselves in their abruptness.  He thought of them as 
momentary lulls in which the secret thoughts could unobtrusively 
emerge [. . .].  Moeller furthermore heightened the sense of 
arrested motion by sometimes interrupting small movements and 
gestures, which were completed when normal dialogue resumed.  
(235)
While the effect was generally considered successful, it seemed “wooden” to 
New York Times critic Brooks Atkinson, who called O’Neill’s “method” a 
“fusion of relevant and irrelevant information” with “its artificial wording, its 
pungency and its general resemblance to a Fannie Hurst novel” (107).  Gilbert 
Seldes pointed out that the asides corresponded with the interior monologue, 
the stream of consciousness, as it is used by contemporary novelists” but that 
they tended to be “frequently unnecessary” and overused by O’Neill (348).  
While both Atkinson and Seldes compared the play to contemporary fiction, 
Dudley Nichols—whose review of the published edition was reproduced in 
Boni and Liveright’s promotional advertisements—went so far as declare 
Strange Interlude a hybrid genre: it is both a “great play and a great novel[;]” 
with “its amazing asides, [it] brings to the drama a psychological fourth 
dimension attained previously only in the novel,” yet it “reads with the intensity 
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and directness few novels in literature have ever achieved” (“Strange Interlude: 
Have We At Last the Great American Novel?” 21).  Nichols’ review must have 
caused some confusion, because Boni and Liveright had to issue a follow-up 
advertisement with the header “An Explanation,” clarifying that “it is of course a 
drama, but Mr. O’Neill’s use of the aside, to express the hidden thoughts and 
feelings impossible to convey in dialogue, has added a psychological fullness 
to the drama which gives it the quality of a novel” (“Strange Interlude: An 
Explanation” 19).
It would be easy to account for Strange Interlude’s success by focusing 
on its publicity (which includes not only advertisements but also the Pulitzer 
O’Neill received for the play), its purported salacious content, and the legal 
hearings for its “immorality” that almost always foretell an enthusiastic popular 
response (qtd. in Alexander 126), but it is clear that O’Neill’s “method”—his 
adaptation of the stream of consciousness—was central to its appeal.  Joel 
Pfister, who devotes surprisingly little time to Strange Interlude (it does not even 
merit its own chapter) in his study Staging Depth: Eugene O’Neill and the 
Politics of Psychological Discourse, dismissively notes that “the sensational box 
office and publishing success of the boldly experimental Strange Interlude can 
be attributed in part to the fact that pop psychology played a key role—along 
with the plays of Ibsen and Strindberg—in setting the stage for O’Neill’s staging 
of modernist depth” (64) and, he writes, 
my perspective is in alignment with that of Eric Bently, who in 
1962 argued that O’Neill had become the principal dramatist of 
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middlebrow consumers to whom ‘psychologism’ appealed, an 
audience that wanted their melodramas and soap operas (in my 
own terminology) written and staged to seem deep.  It was the 
pop psychological dimension of Strange Interlude that made its 
pop modernism commercially viable” (Staging Depth 64).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Pfister deftly manages to discount the play’s “middlebrow” audiences as well as 
its “deep” modernist pretensions.  While Pfister is indeed an adept literary 
historian, his view of Strange Interlude in particular as a popular text sullied by 
its modernism is essentially a contribution to the “great divide” claim; had 
O’Neill’s modernism been less appealing, less “pop,” it presumably would be 
less “middlebrow.”  Neither “highbrow” fish nor “lowbrow” fowl, its success 
seems to be enough reason for Pfister to disregard it as little more than a “soap 
opera.”  It is Pfister’s unforgiving view of the interwar middle-classes and their 
professional aspirations that is most responsible for his rejection of “deep” 
literature like Strange Interlude.
Like Jameson’s claims about modernism, Pfister’s argument depends on 
the notion of a homogenous interwar consumer—”white collar professionals 
and managers with a compensatory belief in and often sexy fascination with its 
own ‘psychological’ significance and individualism” (“Glamorizing the 
Psychological” 174).  Mary Poovey’s understanding of Victorian “middle-class 
ideology” as being “both contested and always under construction; because it 
was always in the making, it was always open to revision, dispute, and the 
emergence of opposite formulations” (3) seems no less fitting a description of 
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interwar middle-class subjectivity (or, for that matter, current middle-class 
subjectivity), and offers a richer way to consider the subject of modernism.  
“Individual subjects,” Poovey reminds us, “are material in the ever elusive last 
instance” and that “the material and economic relations of production can only 
make themselves known through representations” (17).  Rather than try 
understand the motivations of the individual subject who popularized Strange 
Interlude, then, it may be more revealing to look at the way Strange Interlude 
popularized subjectivity. 
The play is indeed expansive (the timespan of the plot is over twenty 
years).  The central figure is Nina Leeds, who is grieving over the death of 
Gordon Shaw, an aviator who died at the end of the War and who, we learn, 
was dissuaded from marrying her before he enlisted by Nina’s father.  Nina, to 
appease her guilty conscience at having denied Gordon, becomes a nurse and 
offers sexual comfort to the wounded soldiers in her care.  Made to feel only 
worse, she returns home, nearly hysterical, after her father dies, with Ned 
Darrell—one of the doctors from the hospital where she worked—and his 
earnest friend Sam Evans.  Convinced that marriage would help settle Nina’s 
nerves, Darrell persuades her to marry Evans, she conceives a child with him, 
and they go to meet his mother—who confides in Nina that insanity runs in the 
Evans’ family and that her child must be aborted.  To ensure that this does not 
ruin Evans, his mother urges Nina to take a lover and never reveal the family 
secret to him.  She and Darrell have an affair which produces a son (who Nina 
names Gordon), which Sam assumes is his.  Heartened by fatherhood, Sam 
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becomes wealthy in the advertising business, Nina and Darrell’s love fades, 
their child, Gordon, “instinctively” hates Darrell, who is cast as an Oedipal rival.  
Finally, after Sam dies of a heart attack, the collegiate Gordon, engaged, gives 
his mother and Darrell his blessing to marry, not knowing that their relationship 
has been over for years.  Throughout the play, Charles Marsden—a family 
friend of Nina’s and a successful novelist—serves as a kind of narrator, 
commenting on Nina and loving her from afar.  In the last scene, Marsden and 
Nina agree to be married, since they have “passed beyond desire” and might 
live peacefully, sexlessly together (SI 255; act 9).
From this summary, it may be noticed that the plot is structured around 
sanity and secrets: that order is maintained by keeping the truth hidden.  The 
form of the play, with its asides—which are “more important than the actual 
talking,” to use O’Neill’s words—mirrors the content, but foregrounds the 
“secrets” and repressed urges of each character that threaten to shatter their 
social order.  In Kristevan terms, Strange Interlude dramatizes the dialectic 
between the repressed semiotic—the “other” to spoken communication in the 
world of the play—and the symbolic.  
No sooner does the play begin than Marsden, waiting in Nina’s father’s 
library, begins thinking of his first sexual experience (the stage direction 
establishes the convention that signifies the aside: “his voice take on a 
monotonous musing quality, his eyes stare idly at his drifting thoughts” [SI 70; 
act 1]):
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Ugh! . . . always that memory! . . . why can’t I ever forget? . . . as 
sickeningly clear as it it were yesterday . . . prep school . . . Easter 
vacation . . . Fatty Boggs and Jack Frazer . . . that house of cheap 
vice . . . one dollar! . . . why did I go? . . . Jack the dead game sport 
. . . how I admired him! . . . afraid of his taunts . . . he pointed to 
the Italian girl . . . “Take her!” . . . daring me . . . I went . . . 
miserably frightened . . . what a pig she was! . . . pretty vicious
face under caked powder and rouge . . . surly and contemptuous 
. . . lumpy body . . . [. . .] “What you gawkin’ about?  Git a move 
on, kid” . . . kid! . . . I was only a kid! . . . sixteen . . . test of 
manhood . . . [. . .] back at the hotel I waited till they were asleep . 
. . then sobbed . . . thinking of Mother . . . feeling I had defiled her 
. . . and myself . . . forever!. . . .   (SI 71-2; act 1)
However heavy-handed the Freudianism may be to current readers, O’Neill 
essentially asks his audience (or reader) to assume the role of the analyst.  While 
he does not specify that Marsden suffers from his inability to complete the 
Oedipus complex, he does use this aside to establish Marsden as sexually 
stilted and prudish—or as Darrell will call him later, an “old sissy” (SI 203; act 7).  
Soon after his guilty “admission” about the prostitute, O’Neill  has 
Marsden—the most repressed character in the play—denounce psychoanalysis; 
an ironic moment that allows the audience to understand (again, like an analyst) 
Marsden in a way denied to himself: “Herr Freud!” he thinks, “punishment to fit 
his crimes, be forced to listen eternally during breakfast while innumerable plain 
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ones tell him dreams about snakes . . . pah, what an easy cure-all! . . . sex the 
philosopher's stone . . . ‘O Oedipus, O my kind!  The world is adopting you! . . 
.’”  (SI 98; act two).
Marsden serves as the traditional, anti-modernist foil in the play.  He 
makes a point of reminding Nina that, as a writer, he is “a stickler for these little 
literary conventions” (SI 87; act 1) and admits to himself: “my novels . . . not of 
cosmic importance, hardly . . . but there is a public to cherish them, evidently . . 
. and I can write! . . . . more than one can say of these modern sex yahoos! . . .”  
(SI 71; act 1).  When Darrell meets him for the first time, he thinks Marsden’s 
“novels just well-written surface . . . no depth, no digging underneath . . . why?  
has the talent but doesn’t dare . . . afraid he’ll meet himself somewhere . . . one 
of those poor devils who spend their lives trying not to discover which sex they 
belong to! . . .”  (SI 98; act 2).  While he does indeed posses a “prespeech” or 
“semiotic” consciousness, which is shared with the audience, his asides reveal 
to the audience what the other characters intuit—that he is a “repressed” 
character.  As the representative of the conventional, communicative, symbolic 
fiction, he is (to refer again to Woolf’s Edwardian/modernist binary) the Mr. 
Bennett to O’Neill’s Mrs. Brown.  A play like Strange Interlude, which uses a 
stream of consciousness method for “digging underneath” the “surface” in 
order to expose the secrets of the characters, is exactly the kind of “modern sex” 
literature that Marsden defines himself against.  
When Nina is introduced, she is on the verge of a breakdown (her father 
has confessed to Marsden that she needs a “nerve specialist” [SI 78; act 1]).  As 
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the feminine center of the play, O’Neill paints her with essentialist strokes: she is 
the neurotic, irrational and, ultimately, maternal counterpoint to Marsden, 
Darrell, and Evans.  Marsden, in one of his asides muses, “she has strange 
devious intuitions that tap the current hidden currents of life . . . dark 
intermingling currents that become the one stream of desire . . .” (SI 193; act 6).  
Nina, like Hurst’s Bertha, is “indifferent to language, enigmatic and feminine,” a 
representative of the semiotic challenge to patriarchal signification.  Indeed, in 
her first asides, she considers Marsden, her professorial father, and their 
language, critically:
The fathers laugh at little daughter Nina . . . I must get away! . . . 
nice Charlie doggy . . . faithful . . . fetch and carry . . . bark softly in 
books at the deep night. . . [. . .].  The Professor of Dead 
Languages is talking again . . .  a dead man lectures on the past of 
living . . . [. . .] dead words droning on . . . listening because he is 
my cultured father . . . [. . .] he is my father . . .  father? . . . what is 
father?. . . .  (SI 79, 81; act 1)
Nina’s story, then, begins—quite literally—with her rejection of the Law of the 
Father: the ”familial and social network,” to use Terry Eagleton’s phrase, of the 
patriarchy they represent, as well as their meaningless (to her) symbolic 
signification (165).  Nina enters the play in the same way Kristeva describes the 
entrance of the semiotic into the symbolic: as an example of the repressed or 
“archaic material in an outlook of revolt, insubmission, and defiance” (qtd. in 
Guberman 213).  Significantly, she repeats “father” until it loses meaning and 
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becomes—like his language—an empty signifier, and she transforms his 
language into material signs: as he speaks, she envisions “his words arising 
from the tomb of a soul in a puff of ashes . . . “ (SI 81; act 1).
If Nina rejects the symbolic order of patriarchy and signification in her 
asides (and through them, insofar as the elliptical text of all the character’s 
streams of consciousness stands in disordered, fragmented contrast to the 
ordered, communicative dialogue), she is no less direct in conversation.  After 
her ill-begotten attempt as a sexual healer at the sanitarium for wounded 
soldiers, she shares what she’s learned with Marsden in what is perhaps the 
most daring moment in the play (and certainly one that contributed to its 
censorship).  She begins by telling him she has “suddenly seen the lies in the 
sounds called words.  You know—grief, sorrow, love, father—those sounds our 
lips make and our hands write” (SI 104; act 2) and has questioned the most 
transcendental of signifiers: God.  “The mistake began,” she explains,
when God was created in a male image.  Of course, women 
would see Him that way, but men should have been gentlemen 
enough, remembering their mothers, to make God a woman!  But 
the God of Gods—the Boss—has always been a man.  That 
makes life so perverted, and death so unnatural.  We should have 
imagined life as created in the birth-pain of God the Mother [. . .].  
And we would feel that death meant reunion with Her, a passing 
back into substance, blood of Her blood again, peace of Her
peace.  (SI 106; act 2)   
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When she asks if Marsden would be comforted by the idea of a Mother-God, he 
agrees (which is fitting, since his thoughts return to his own mother throughout 
the play).  When Strange Interlude is brought up in critical studies of O’Neill’s 
work, this passage is treated as an example of the modernist break from—to 
quote from Brenda Murphy’s essay on O’Neill’s interwar period—“nineteenth-
century cultural beliefs—faith in the patriarchal God of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, and faith in the wisdom of the past and in the institutions based on that 
faith” (141).  It must be emphasized, however, that Nina has not merely lost faith 
in the idea of a “patriarchal God”; what she rejects here is the entire system of 
paternal authority, the “name of the father,” the “Law,” which, according to 
Lacan, “superimposes the kingdom of culture” and “is revealed clearly enough 
as identical with an order of language” (Écrits 67, 66) and reinscribes a 
“matriarchal God” who offers a “passing back into substance,” a reunion with 
the repressed maternal body, before the mirror stage and the acquisition of the 
“sounds called words.”     
When Nina, after her abortion, conceives a child with Darrell, she feels 
herself transformed into a Mother-God, and her stream of consciousness aside 
seems like an illustration of the semiotic chora:
There . . . again . . . this child . . . my child moving in my life . . . 
my life moving in my child . . . the world is whole and perfect . . . 
all things are each other’s . . . life is . . . and the is is beyond 
reason . . . questions die in the silence of this peace . . . I am living 
a dream with the great dream of the tide . . . breathing in the tide I 
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dream and breathe back my dream into the tide . . . suspended in 
the movement of the tide, I feel life move in me, suspended in me . 
. . no whys matter . . . there is no why . . . I am amother . . . God is 
a Mother. . . .  (SI 193; act 5)
This “regressive” moment represents, on both a textual and contextual level, a 
semiotic “return of instinctual functioning within the symbolic, as a negativity 
introduced into the symbolic order, and as the transgression of that order” 
(Revolution 69).  Nina’s own desire for a dyadic return to “God the Mother” 
after death is satisfied by the feeling of merging or subsumption of herself into 
her child (“my child moving in my life . . . my life moving in my child”), and the 
elliptical sentences suggest a the rhythmic “tide” of her own pulsations  that 
connect her to the life “suspended” within her.
The final acts of the play are spread out over two decades, and involve 
the dissolution of Nina and Darrell’s relationship, their son, Gordon’s suspicion 
of their relationship (Darrell, the doctor-scientist, uses the Oedipus complex that 
Marsden has rebuked earlier, to explain that, maybe Gordon “realizes 
subconsciously that I am his father, his rival in your love; but I’m not his father 
ostensibly, there are no taboos, so he can come right out and hate me to his 
heart’s content.  If he realized how little you love me any more , he wouldn’t 
bother!” [SI 201; act 7]), Evans’ death while watching Gordon win a rowing 
race, and, finally, after Gordon leaves to be married, Nina’s decision to marry 
Marsden (who is described in the stage directions as an “old maid” [SI 242; act 
9]) and live out the rest of their years in Platonic peacefulness.  The real note of 
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hope left at the end of the play is that Marsden has at last become a modernist: 
“Listen, Nina,” he tells her,
After we’re married I’m going to write a novel—my first real novel!  
All the twenty odd books I’ve written have been long-winded fairy 
tales for grown-ups—about dear old ladies and witty, cynical 
bachelors and quaint characters with dialects [. . .].  Now I’m 
going to give an honest healthy yell—turn on the sun into the 
shadows of lies—shout “This is life and this is sex, and here are 
passion and hatred and regret and joy and pain and ecstasy, and 
these are men and women and sons and daughters whose
hearts are weak and strong, whose blood is blood and not a 
soothing syrup!”  Oh, I can do it, Nina!  I can write the truth!  I’ve 
seen it in you, your father, my mother, sister, Gordon, Sam, 
Darrell, and myself.  I’ll write the book of us!  (SI 232-33; act 8).
The “book of us,” presumably, will be Strange Interlude (which, although it is a 
play, is also a “novel”)—and Marsden will finally begin “digging underneath” 
with a method more suited to excavating “truth.”  It is hard not to read this as the 
review O’Neill hopes his play will receive: that he has revealed character and 
exposed “the shadows of lies” by privileging the unspoken, the hidden.  
O’Neill, through Marsden, speaks out against the artifice of realism in favor of a 
more “honest” modernism—and it would appear his audience was listening, 
attentively.
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In retrospect, the title, Strange Interlude, seems, like Robert Graves and 
Alan Hodge’s The Long Week-End, to describe the interwar period—but O’Neill 
was not attempting prophecy (even if the timeline of the play spans fourteen 
years beyond 1928); the “interlude,” as Nina describes it in one aside, is the 
moment between “the past and the future . . . the present . . . is an interlude . . . 
strange interlude in which we call on past and future to bear witness we are 
living!. . .” (SI 222; act 8).  The idea of the transient present, the space between, 
is, of course, suggested by the ellipses on the page, as well as the “momentary 
lulls” of the “interrupting small movements and gestures” made by the actors 
(Wainscott 235); but it also suggests the incursion of the semiotic (the repressed, 
the “prespeech”) into the symbolic.  As Kristeva says of Céline’s prose, the 
“three dots to space the phrases” creates a rhythm that breaks through the 
sentence like a “surge of instinctual drive” (“From One Identity to An Other” 
141, 142).  The “interlude” is made “strange” by the dramatization of 
heterogeneity.     
Joel Pfister believes that Strange Interlude was popular because the 
asides “often take the form of sexually titillating confessions” and that the 
confessional nature of the play help account “for the play’s great success with 
middlebrow and highbrow audiences”; that “once the revelation of depth is 
interpreted as delectable, a literature that defines its raison d’être as the 
disclosure of depth also makes itself delectable (and sellable)” (Staging Depth 
68, 69).  Although this is no doubt a reasonable claim, it could be said that 
most literature is concerned with the “disclosure of depth” on some level (the 
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audience for an Ibsen play, or readers of a Dostoevsky novel, also, arguably, 
expect some insight, some “revelation of depth” into human behavior).  Pfister 
seems to find it easy to equate popularity with “bourgeois” or middle-class 
values and the audiences as passive, unreflective spectators.  It is interesting, 
though, that one of the early reviewers noted that 
Strange Interlude is not a play for lazy drama lovers.  [O’Neill’s] 
unlimited employment of “asides” to describe the unspoken 
thoughts of his characters is more of a whip than a cushion to our 
imagination, and it keeps us busy.  A five hour recital, with a 
hurried intermission for dinner, demands an alert and industrious 
audience” (Hammond 101).   
Like modernist fiction, the play required a constructive, analytical 
attention—and it would appear that an “alert and industrious audience” looked 
forward to the experience.  Even before Brecht advocated alienation as a way to 
situate audiences into the historical, ideological moment of the play, O’Neill 
was forcing audiences to adapt to, and construct, his narrative.
 It is just as likely that the audiences, who were learning to come to terms 
with being “split” by rational and irrational drives, went to see what Frederick 
Lewis Allen calls “O’Neill’s five-hour lesson in psychopathology” (202) because 
they wanted to see how modern subjectivity was performed.  If the play 
dramatizes the “preverbal” or semiotic working within and against the 
conventions of the symbolic, perhaps audiences felt a sense of transgressive 
pleasure in being able to witness (and navigate) these moments of irrationality.  
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Judith Butler’s argument about gender as performative, as “drag,” offers a 
provocative way to consider the audience reception of Strange Interlude:
If gender is drag, and if it is an imitation that regularly produces 
the ideal it attempts to approximate, then gender is a performance 
that produces the Illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic 
gender core; it produces on the skin [. . .] the illusion of an inner 
depth.  In effect, one way that genders get naturalized is through 
being constructed as an inner psychic or physical necessity.  
(728)
To extend Butler’s claims beyond gender, it is possible to see the modernist 
subject as learning how to imitate or approximate the new “psychological” self.  
Indeed, the notion of an “inner psychic necessity” may itself be a kind of “drag” 
that has, as a result of the literary stream of consciousness, come to seem natural 
and universally shared.  Arguably, texts like Strange Interlude did not merely 
entertain and reflect the modern “psychological” subject: they helped construct 
it.
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Two
Joyce’s Ulysses as Self-Help
“In the Little Review I learned that I was human through learning that others 
had the same thoughts and feelings that had many years been mine, but 
which through a false philosophy or teaching were regarded as deserving 
of repression”
— C. R. S., Columbus, Ohio.  (Letter. The Little Review 7.1 
[1920]: 74)
The “’mental stream’” of “our brain carries along images—remembered 
or modified—feelings, resolves and intellectual, or partly intellectual, 
conclusions, in vague or seething confusion.  And this process never stops, not 
even in sleep, any more than a river ever stops in its course” (Dimnet 8).  This 
definition of the stream of consciousness appears, not in a book of literary 
criticism—or in a book about the philosophy of William James—but in the 
opening of the best selling non-fiction title of 1929: Ernest Dimnet’s self-help 
book, The Art of Thinking (Hackett 139).  While Dimnet’s text has not received 
any scholarly attention—or much attention at all, for that matter, since its 
enormously successful debut (it sold 125, 000 copies by 1929 and remained on 
the bestseller list in 1930 [Hackett 140-41])—it offers a unique perspective on 
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modernist subjectivity.  The stated purpose of The Art of Thinking is to help the 
reader “think his best and live his  noblest” (xii); to learn how to overcome 
inferiority complexes and obstacles to thought so that readers might “find” and 
“be” themselves (vi-x).  To this end, Dimnet defines the stream of consciousness 
as a method to “get at what is nearest to our most personal, viz., our 
subconsciousness, by leaving the hubbub of the world where it is and seeking 
in deep repose for what differentiates us from other men and women” (197).  
Dimnet’s text followed other popular self-help guides, most notably P.D. 
Ouspensky’s Tertium Organum (which popularized the teachings of Gurdjieff 
and suggested a “higher” or “cosmic consciousness” could be reached and 
featured a fold-out chart of “the four forms of the manifestations of 
consciousness,” from the basic forms of sensation and apprehensive awareness 
to the highest form of “four dimensional space,” “new sensations,” and godly 
“Union with the One” [Chart]) and Emile Coué’s Self Mastery Through 
Conscious Autosuggestion, a book that pointed out “that two absolutely distinct 
selves exist within us”—the conscious and unconscious self—and that the 
unconscious could be influenced by affirmations (9).  Along with the Pelman 
Institute’s guide for harnessing the “Grasshopper Mind,” and advertisements for 
booklets that promised to reveal “How to Work Wonders with Your 
Subconscious Mind” (fig. 12), the self-help market, clearly indebted to Freudian 
psychoanalysis, claimed that controlling (or channeling) consciousness would 
lead to self-actualization and success.  Joel Pfister sees the rise of popular 
psychology as primarily aimed at the “growing population of university-
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educated white-collar workers” (Staging Depth 65), and while that may be true, 
the ubiquity and popularity of these self-help guides suggests they were met by 
a wide, general readership (including those, no doubt, who wanted to learn to 
think as if they were “university-educated”) for, as Malcolm Bradbury and James 
McFarlane note, “if anything distinguishes [the interwar] decades and gives 
them their intellectual and historical character it is a fascination with evolving 
consciousness: consciousness aesthetic, psychological, and historical” (47).  
Dimnet’s guide, however, is significant for its focus on stream of 
consciousness writing as a method to tap into the hidden reservoirs of the 
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Fig. 12.  “How to Work 
Wonders With Your 
Subconscious Mind.”  
Advertisement.  Mentor March 
1927: 62.
self—not for mere financial success, but to acquire a sense of “self-expression,” 
of “individuality,” and to make “literary production possible to all” (212, 209).  
The Art of Thinking, of all authors, singles out James Joyce and quotes James P. 
O’Reilly’s criticism of his “method”: “Sit in a favorite spot where the mind can 
concentrate on itself—or on nothing at all” O’Reilly writes, and “while thinking 
of nothing definite, write quickly whatever comes into your mind” until, “when 
you are conscious of influencing by reason what your hand is writing, begin 
again.  Write, for example, a series of l’s until the letter l unconsciously begins a 
word, and your thought series continues.  There’s the method” (qtd. in Dimnet 
200).  Although he is wrong defining Joyce’s style as automatic writing, Dimnet 
notes that this attempt to “write from [the] subconsciou[s]” is to write “as 
humanly, richly, and freely as possible” and “everybody wants to draw on that 
vein” (201).  
Suggestively, Dimnet describes this form of writing as favoring 
“rhythms”: “some rhythms—taking the word in its fullest meaning—keep the 
writer nearer his subconsciousness than others” and “the habit of working on 
such a rhythm results in an almost physical sensation informing us that we are 
drawing on our innermost” (201).  Anticipating Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic 
putting the subject “in process/on trial,” Dimnet seems to have popularized “the 
rhythms, the alliterations, the primary processes” that lie “closer to the 
unconscious” well before Kristeva termed this the “semiotic” (qtd. in Guberman 
212).  According to Dimnet, “getting at your innermost consciousness by 
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expressing yourself” is a way to avoid “year after year and day after day, 
[making yourself] more like anybody else and more anonymous” (212).    
Within the context of the popular appeal of the “subconscious,” the 
emergence and sensationalism of Ulysses suggests that Joyce’s “method” was 
not simply a new literary form, but also the presentation of a new kind of 
subjectivity.  Upon its first serialized appearance in The Little Review, the editors 
made a point of publishing reader reactions to Ulysses in the “Reader Critic” 
section of most issues.  While many letters expressed confusion and outrage (as 
does S. S. B., Chicago’s letter, which begins, “Really now: Joyce!  what does he 
think he’s doing?  What do you think he is doing?  I swear I’ve read his Ulysses 
and haven’t found out yet what it’s about, who is who or where” and concludes 
by offering some helpful writing advice: “Joyce will have to change his style if he 
wants to get on” [54]), at least one letter that followed the Ulysses comments 
offered thanks and a check to the magazine “to discharge in a small way a debt 
that would be difficult if not impossible to totally discharge” because from 
publications like Joyce’s, “I leaned that I was a human through learning that 
others had the same thoughts and feelings that had many years been mine, but 
which through a false philosophy or teaching were regarded as deserving of 
repression until the light of The Little Review showed them worthy of 
expression” (74).  Similarly, after the magazine was charged with obscenity for 
publishing the “Nausicaa” section, one of the editors pointed out that “Mr. 
Joyce’s chapter seems to a be a record of the simplest, most unpreventable, most 
unfocused sex thoughts possible” and asked, “can merely reading about the 
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thoughts he thinks corrupt a man when his thoughts do not?” (Heap 6).  After all 
of the discussions of Ulysses as an “epic,” as (to use Jennifer Levine’s categories) 
a “poem,” a “novel,” or a postmodern “text” (137, 142, 147), it is interesting to 
encounter the reactions of contemporary readers with no critical concepts or 
crib sheets of Homeric parallels; readers who either found themselves assaulted 
or assuaged by Joyce’s stream of consciousness.  It is easy to forget that Joyce’s 
representation of consciousness also shaped consciousness (the question 
whether the “subconscious” or preconscious is syntactical at all has seemingly 
been affirmatively answered by Ulysses and all of its imitators.  Indeed, Lacan’s 
notion of the self as constructed through language may be indebted to Joyce: 
according to Jean-Michel Rabaté, Lacan not only met Joyce, but also attended 
Larbaud’s Ulysses lecture in 1921, before he became an analyst [97]).  As Joyce 
explained to Djuna Barnes, “In Ulysses I have recorded, simultaneously, what a 
man says, sees, thinks, and what such seeing, thinking, saying does, to what 
you Freudians call the subconscious” (65).  Rather than approach Ulysses as a 
closed narrative, it will be considered here in light of its reception, as a cultural 
document that popularized the “subconscious” and offered, to readers able to 
navigate its defamiliarization, practice in maintaining the heterogeneity of split 
subjectivity.
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“Possibly Like a Cinema”: Ulysses and the
Interwar Reader
When Virginia Woolf is invoked in discussions of Ulysses, it is usually as 
a reminder that she thought it “an illiterate, underbred book [. . .] the book of a 
self-taught working man” and “ultimately nauseating” (qtd. in Steinberg 71), but 
more revealing than her irritation that Joyce had debuted his technique before 
she could reveal her own stream of consciousness method (to read her diary 
entries generously) is her reading notebook, in which she recorded her 
reactions to The Little Review chapters.  In a section entitled “Modern Novels 
(Joyce),” she notes that his style is “possibly like a cinema that shows you very 
slowly, how a hare does jump; all pictures were a little made up before” (qtd. in 
Scott 643).  Engaged in a similar project, Woolf nevertheless has to come to 
terms with the epistemology of Joyce’s style.  While she never considered her 
own writing to be “cinematic” (film had yet to acquire sound and she viewed 
her writing as primarily linguistic, not pictorial), that she approaches Ulysses as 
filmic is in keeping with the way most early readers understood the novel.  
In a representative 1922 review, the writer described Joyce’s method as 
being “in the new fashionable kinematographic vein, very jerky and elliptical” 
(“A New Ulysses” 194); Joseph Collins, an acquaintance of Joyce who is 
mentioned in Ulysses, described Joyce’s technique, in his 1923 study, The 
Doctor Looks at Literature, as a “film picture” that has “been thrown on the 
screen of [the] visual cortex” and writes that “the book in reality is a moving 
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picture with picturesque legends” (45, 50).  Collins is one of the first to 
acknowledge one of the most repeated Joycean fact: that “for a brief time, Mr. 
Joyce was associated with the ‘movies,’ and the form in which Ulysses was cast 
may have been suggested by experiences with the Volta Theatre, as his 
cinematograph enterprise was called” (50).  In his essay, “The Break-Up of the 
Novel,” John Middleton Murry claims that the stream of consciousness, as 
practiced by Richardson and Joyce, “can be as tiring as a twenty-four-hour 
cinematograph without interval or plot,” and that Joyce cannot “stop recording 
[his characters’] processes of mind” (298-99).  Perhaps most famously, Judge 
John Woolsey, in his written decision to lift the obscenity charges against the 
novel, aligned Joyce’s stream of consciousness method with film:
Joyce has attempted—it seems to me, with astonishing 
success—to show how the screen of consciousness with its ever-
shifting kaleidoscopic impression carries, as it were on a plastic 
palimpsest, not only what is in the focus of each man’s 
observation of the actual things about him, but also in a 
penumbral zone residua of past impressions, some recent and 
some drawn up by association from the domain of the 
subconscious.  He shows how each of these impressions affects 
the life and behavior of the character which he is describing.  
What he seeks to get is not unlike the result of a double or, if that 
is possible, a multiple exposure on a cinema film which would 
give a clear foreground with a background visible but somewhat
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blurred and out of focus in varying degrees.  (qtd. in Moscato and 
Le Blanc 310)
To emphasize that Joyce’s contemporaries compared the act of reading Ulysses 
with viewing a film is not to argue that the stream of consciousness is analogous 
with “montage,” “flash-backs,” or “fade-outs” as Robert Humphrey suggests 
(49) or that it is, as Alan Spiegel calls it, a “cinematographic form” (54); nor is it 
meant to imply that Joyce (any more than Richardson—who preferred “slow-
motion photography” to “the stream of consciousness,” but did not, like Woolf, 
see any connection between her fiction and film [Foreward 11]) was influenced 
by the emerging cinema.  Indeed, regardless of how readers received Ulysses, 
Joyce never admitted any aesthetic relationship to film (as Richard Ellmann 
notes, Joyce was intrigued by the idea of a movie adaptation of his novel, but 
did not think it could be translated successfully [654]), and instead credited the 
French novelist Edouard Dujardin, whose light novel Joyce purchased in a 
railway station, with inspiring his use of the stream of consciousness (Ellmann 
126).  It seems most likely that Joyce (who kept a dream journal [Ellmann 436-
38]) was influenced—despite his protestations to Barnes and others—by Freud, 
who advocated, in The Interpretation of Dreams, that “for the purpose of self-
observation,” the patient must “renounce all criticism of the thought formations 
which he may perceive” and “not[e] and communicat[e] everything that passes 
through his mind” (13).  The importance of noting how early readers perceived 
Ulysses as “cinematic,” suggests a new way to consider the text: not through 
literary, but film theory.  In particular, the idea of “suture,” as it has become 
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defined in film studies, offers a way to not only reconsider a novel like Ulysses,  
but also to understand how readers reacted to (and learned to negotiate) the 
presentation of consciousness.
The notion of “suture” was taken from Lacan and developed by Jacques-
Alain Miller to signify what Kristeva calls the “thetic”—the moment where 
speech and subjectivity begin.  The moment of “suture” is the drawing together 
of the subject into the symbolic or, as Stephen Heath explains it, “a certain 
closure” that follows the first recognition of the self in the mirror-stage and 
occurs with “’the junction of the imaginary and the symbolic” (55-56).  As it was 
appropriated by film studies, its meaning has shifted and expanded (as it shall 
here).  In her useful synthesis of the concept of suture, Kaja Silverman writes that 
the “cinematic organization depends upon the subject’s willingness to become 
absent to itself by permitting a fictional character to ‘stand in’ for it” and “the 
operation of suture is successful at the moment that the viewing subject says, 
‘Yes, that’s me,’ or ‘That’s what I see’” (205); this “castrating coherence, this 
definition of a discursive position for the viewing subject which necessitates not 
only its loss of being, but the repudiation of alternative discourses, is one of the 
chief aims of the system of suture” (205-6).  This moment of identification—or, 
rather, subsumption—at the moment of submitting to the filmic narrative 
functions as a re-enactment of the subject’s “entry into the symbolic order” 
(Silverman 213).  In other words, the cinematic narrative ultimately serves to 
privilege the symbolic: even as the filmic text “disrupt[s] the existing symbolic 
order [and] dislocat[es] the subject-positions within it . . . challenging its ideals 
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of coherence and fullness only in order subsequently to re-affirm that order, 
those positions, and those ideals”; despite the strange interlude of interruption, 
because film asks for passive consumption, “the system of suture functions not 
only constantly to re-interpellate the viewing subject into the same discursive 
positions, thereby giving that subject the illusion of a stable and continuous 
identity, but to re-articulate the existing symbolic order in ideologically 
orthodox ways” (Silverman 221).  Finally, while Silverman notes that “the theory 
of suture has yet to be extended to literary discourse” (which is still largely the 
case), it would seem a fitting way to account for “first-person narration and other 
indicators of point-of-view” that “seem to be the equivalents for novels and 
poems of the shot/reverse shot formations in cinema, and like the latter would 
seem both to conceal all signs of actual production, and to invite identification” 
(Silverman 236).  While suture is a helpful way to consider the “scopic” aspects 
of a stream of consciousness texts like Ulysses, which force readers to assume 
different (even “alien”) subject-perspectives, it must be adapted to be able to 
address the modernist text which, by definition, foregrounds the “signs of actual 
production.” 
It is important to note, in this regard, that many of Joyce’s contemporary 
readers resisted—if not rejected—identification with the subject-positions 
offered in the narrative.  Immediately after noting the filmic quality of the text, for 
example, John Middleton Murry contends that 
we long to escape from this iron wall of consciousness of which 
we are everywhere made sensible and to be allowed to trust to the 
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revelation of the object.  But we are forbidden.  Either the 
consciousness of Bloom-Ulysses, or of Marion-Penelope, or of 
Mr. Joyce in his avatar Stephen Dedalus-Telemachus [. . . ] is ever 
before us to mist and complicate the things we desire to see” 
(299).  Similarly, Holbrook Jackson, in his 1922 review of the 
novel, finds the point of view disconcerting:  you spend no 
ordinary day in [Bloom’s] company; it is a day of the most 
embarrassing intimacy.  You live with him minute by minute; go 
with him everywhere, physically and mentally; you are made privy 
to his thoughts and emotions [. . . ] his psychology is laid bare 
with Freudian nastiness until you know his whole life through and 
through; know him, in fact, better that you know any other being 
in art of life—and detest him heartily.  (199)
Ulysses, Jackson claims, is a “loose-limbed book which falls to pieces as you 
read it—as, indeed, you do” (199).  Arnold Bennett, unsurprisingly, writes that 
Joyce “has made novel reading into a fair imitation of penal servitude” 
(“Concerning James Joyce’s Ulysses” 570); he voices the common complaint 
against Joyce and other practitioners of the stream of consciousness that the 
style records “everything—everything” without order or selection (570, 569) 
and, when he finished the novel, Bennett admits, “I had the sensation of a 
general who had just put down an insurrection” (568).  C. C. Martindale goes 
further in his review, claiming that the novel is “incoherent” and Joyce “is trying 
to think as if he were insane”: the effect is that “we do not even float equably 
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down the dim disgusting sewer, but continually find ourselves hitched back, 
with a jerk, to where we started from.  Hence a new impression of desperate 
nightmare” (204-5).  As a final example, the self-proclaimed “enemy” of Joyce 
and the stream of consciousness, Wyndham Lewis, offers this particularly 
scathing—and revealing—observation:
The method of doctrinaire naturalism [. . . ] results in such a flux 
as you have in Ulysses, fatally.  And into that flux it is you, the 
reader, that are plunged, or magnetically drawn by its thousand 
pages [. . .].  But the author, of course, plunges with you.  He 
takes you inside his head, or, as it were, into a roomy diving-suit, 
and once down in the middle of the stream, you remain the 
author, naturally, inside whose head you are, though you are 
sometimes supposed to be aware of one person, sometimes of 
another.  Most of the time you are being Bloom or Dedalus, from 
the inside, and that is Joyce [. . .].  But, generally speaking, it is 
you who descend into the flux of Ulysses, and it is the author who 
absorbs you momentarily into himself for that experience.  (121)
The anxiety produced by the novel suggests that these readers could not allow 
themselves to identify—to say “‘Yes, that’s me,’ or ‘That’s what I see.’”  Whether 
that resistance is due to the identities he offers, his “chaotic” method, or (as in 
Lewis’s case) to Joyce himself, it is clear that the system of suture in the novel 
does not encourage easy or palliative assimilation.  The system of suture, in the 
stream of consciousness novel, is not dissimilar to Kristeva’s notion of “le sujet-
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en-procés,” or the moment a subject is split between the semiotic and the 
symbolic:
I myself speak of a “subject in process,” which makes possible my 
attempt to articulate as precise a logic as possible between identity 
or unity, the challenge to this identity and even its reduction to 
zero, the moment of crisis, of emptiness, and the reconstitution of 
a new, plural identity.  This new identity may be the plurality 
capable of manifesting itself as the plurality of characters the 
author uses; but in more recent writing, in the twentieth-
century novel, it may appear as fragments of a character, or 
fragments of ideology, or fragments of representation.  (qtd. in 
Guberman 190)
These border states, when the subject is placed in process, occur when the 
semiotic enters into the symbolic and, for Kristeva, when the experience is not 
prolonged into psychosis (as happened, Kristeva suggests, to Woolf [qtd. in 
Guberman 214]), it is a regenerative experience.  The moment of identification 
and “crisis,” that occurs in the system of suture, then, is the moment the subject 
is placed “in process”; importantly, however, the eruption of the semiotic does 
not serve to reinforce the orthodoxy of the symbolic—it serves as a negation 
and transgression of the symbolic order.  To bring Kristeva’s idea of the subject 
together with the film viewer—to suture the concepts—allows a way to read the 
stream of consciousness text which both calls for the reader to be placed “in 
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process” through identification and to be re-interpellated into the symbolic 
order (or, to use Bennett’s metaphor, to “put down an insurrection”).  
However resistant some critics may have been to enter into the narrative, 
it must be restated that the stream of consciousness was widely accepted by the 
interwar subject, and Ulysses is not an exception.  As Bennet Cerf explains in his 
publishing memoir, At Random, the eventual publication of the novel “had an 
enormous sale” and that Ulysses was “a great best seller” (93, 95); Catherine 
Turner notes that the novel “surprised everyone, with the possible exception of 
Cerf, by winding up on the best-seller lists” and sold well in every major city but 
Atlanta and New Orleans (210-11).  Of course, the sensational obscenity trial 
was behind its success (Cerf wonders how many purchased the novel only “to 
read the last part to see the dirty words” [95]), but its appeal (and the imitations it 
inspired throughout the interwar years) suggests that there were no shortage of 
readers who were willing to “descend into the flux” and experience the 
heterogeneity of its signification. 
While the relationship and congruities between Ulysses and film has 
certainly been discussed—notably and recently by Maria DiBattista, whose 
“Ulysses and Cinema” attempts to “negotiate a truce between literature and film 
that recognizes the rights and limits of their respective domains” (222) and 
considers, in particular, the contribution of Joyce’s interior monologues to 
Eisenstein’s development of montage, the role of suture in the construction of 
Ulysses’ reader-subject has received little attention (indeed, in the single article 
that does name “suture” in a discussion of Ulysses, Thomas W. Sheeban denies 
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its applicability and, because he does not take actual reader-responses into 
consideration, quickly concludes that “Joyce’s narrative is not sutured” [486]).  
The concept of the sutured reader is helpful because it can simultaneously 
address the visual or “cinematic” aspects of the novel, as well as the ways that 
Joyce’s contemporary readers either accepted or resisted identification.      
Instead of viewing a novel like Ulysses as a narrative that encourages 
passive reception and affirms the stability of the symbolic (which, of course, it 
does not)—or as a “revolutionary” text capable of inducing schizophrenic or 
“zero” states, the notion of the “sutured reader” may be used to describe the 
reader of stream of consciousness fiction who experiences the heterogeneity of 
the semiotic working within and against the symbolic as a moment of crisis (or 
even transgressive pleasure) but is able to work through chaos or incoherence 
and bring the semiotic back under the symbolic functioning in order to create 
textual meaning and satisfy a sense of subjective coherence.
If the “Proteus” chapter (along with “Nausicaa” and “Penelope”) is, 
according to Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, one of the exemplary “set 
pieces” of Joyce’s stream of consciousness method (194), it is important to 
notice that it opens by foregrounding what Stephen sees, and inculcates the 
reader into his subjective consciousness.  As he walks along the Sandymount 
beach, he thinks:
ineluctable modality of the visible; at least that if no more, thought
through my eyes.  Signatures of all things I am here to read,
seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot.
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Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs.  Limits of the 
diaphane.  But he adds: in bodies.  Then he was aware of them
bodies before of them coloured.  How?  By knocking his sconce
against them, sure.  Go easy.  Bald he was and a millionaire [. . .].
If you can put your five fingers through it is a gate, if not a door.
Shut your eyes and see.
    Stephen closed his eyes to hear his boots crush crackling wrack
and shells.  You are walking through it howsomever. I am, a stride 
at a time.  (U 31)
While this passage has traditionally been read as an example of Stephen’s 
highly allusive, and desultory (or “protean”) philosophical thought process 
(which is a contrast to Bloom’s more accessible consciousness), it is also a kind 
of primer for reading Ulysses.  The “modality of the visible” is not only an 
Aristotelian concept that leads Stephen to consider the realm of signs, colors, 
Aristotle’s bald head, and the meaning of words (like “gate” and “door”), it is a 
subtle rhetorical move to get the reader to assume Stephen’s perspective: the “I” 
here, which is initially undefined, is both Stephen and the reader.  As he 
considers sight and looks at the “nearing tide,” “that rusty boot,” so does the 
reader.  However abstruse Stephen’s thought process, Joyce manages to 
naturalize the seemingly “chaotic” and associative stream of consciousness 
showing its operation in an ostensibly “ordered” and “intellectual” mind.  
Whereas Faulkner’s presentation of Benjy’s consciousness, by contrast, 
suggests that the “preverbal” is an “incoherent nightmare” (to paraphrase
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Lukács [Realism in Our Time 31] Joyce illustrates that the “subconscious” stream 
is not only the province of the abnormal or inarticulate.  Through Stephen, 
Joyce presents consciousness as a semiotic activity: signs or “signatures” recall 
other signs in a chain of associational signification.  
As the reader follows these associations (and accepts the model of 
interiority Joyce presents), the pronouns shift: the “I” which begins the 
paragraph becomes “you.”  Stephen’s “you” here might easily be disregarded 
as an informal substitution for the first person, but “shut your eyes and see” is 
also a directive for readers to close their eyes and experience Stephen’s 
sensation of interior “vision.”  The passage that follows moves from the third 
person (“Stephen closed his eyes”) to the second (“You are walking”) to the first 
(“I am”).  The reader—and Stephen—as the “viewing subject” is not given “the 
illusion of a stable and continuous identity,” which, according to Silverman, is 
the purpose of the system of suture (321), but is instead expected, quite literally, 
to accept subjectivity as a linguistic construction.  As the text foregrounds “the 
signs of [its] own production” (Silverman 321), it calls the stability of the 
symbolic order into question. 
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Three
Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway and Sutured Consciousness
“I think what I’m at is to change the consciousness”
—Woolf, Selected Letters 13 Feb., 1921 (128).
Mrs. Dalloway has now become Woolf’s best-selling novel, with its film 
adaptation and its intertextual relationship with the novel and film The Hours 
(Biggs 157); but it was also the first novel she wrote that brought her 
international recognition and financial security.  As she wrote in her diary on 
September 22, 1925, her American publisher, Harcourt Brace, reported “that 
Mrs. D. & C.R. [The Common Reader] are selling 148 & 73 weekly—Isn’t that a 
surprising rate for the 4th months?  Doesn’t it portend a bathroom & a w.c. 
either here, or Southcease?”  (DIII, 43).  As a further example of the commercial 
appeal of the stream of consciousness, Mrs. Dalloway offers the reader the 
opportunity to navigate narrative heterogenity—to experience being placed “in 
process” in order to achieve a sense of coherence within the symbolic order.  In 
particular, Woolf’s novel, like Ulysses, asks the reader to identify with subject-
positions offered by differing streams of consciousness—to be sutured into the 
narrative—and interpellates the reader as a modernist split subject.
  148
Woolf’s conceptualization of her stream of consciousness method 
suggests a meging of interiority and the external—self and other.  In “Modern 
Fiction,” which was published in 1925—the same year as Mrs. 
Dalloway—Woolf, as she does in “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” opposes her 
literary style to the “materialists” (CEII, 104) represented by Galsworthy and 
Bennett and, in what would become one of the most quoted definitions of the 
stream of consciousness novel, asks her readers to “examine for a moment an 
ordinary mind on an ordinary day”: 
The mind receives a myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, 
evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel.  From all 
sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and 
as they fall, as they shape themselves into the life of Monday or 
Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old; the moment of 
importance came not here but there; so that if a writer were a 
free man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not 
what he must, if he could base work upon his own feeling, and 
not upon convention, there would be no plot, no comedy, no 
tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe in the accepted style, and 
perhaps not a single button sewn on as the Bond Street tailors 
would have it.  Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically 
arranged; but a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope 
surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end.  
Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this 
  149
unknown and uncircumscribed spirits, whatever aberration or 
complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and 
external as possible?  (CE III, 106)   
Embedded in her aesthetic is the modernist fascination with the boundaries of 
the inner and outer (the mind and the impressions of an ordinary day),  freedom 
and restriction (the “free” writer not enslaved by tradition), “aberration” and 
convention.  In her metaphor of the “semi-transparent envelope,” she 
distinguishes her developing style and form from the ”materialist” or realist 
novelist’s structural linearity in terms of illumination and containment.  When 
she positions herself as a reader of modern novels, she reacts to the “method” of 
the stream of consciousness technique as one that creates a strange feeling of 
restriction: “Is it due to the method,” she considers, “that we feel neither jovial 
nor magnanimous, but centered in a self which, in spite of its tremor of 
susceptibility, never embraces or creates what is outside itself and beyond?” 
(“Modern Fiction,” CE II, 108).  
Importantly, reviewers of Mrs. Dalloway would experience similar 
anxieties about the limits of the inner and outer self as a result of her stylistic 
technique, and, like Joyce’s readers, experienced Woolf’s stream of 
consciousness as both “cinematic” and as a trial of subjectivity.  Richard 
Hughes, in Saturday Review of Literature (16 May, 1925) begins by noting that 
in Mrs. Dalloway, “the visible world exists with a brilliance, a luminous clarity,” 
(an observation which was repeated in the New York Times advertisements for 
the novel) yet, despite rumbles about this new kind of fiction, it is “an unusually 
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coherent, lucid, and enthralling book”; curiously, Hughes observes that “in 
contrast to the solidarity of her visible world there rises throughout the book in a 
delicate crescendo fear,” which he explains as the loss of certainty and “the 
bottomlessness on which all spiritual values are based,” that Woolf illustrates 
through her characters (CH 158-60).  Gerald Bullett’s Saturday Review (30 May, 
1925) describes the “curious sensation which is the book’s continuous effect: 
the sensation of seeing and feeling the very stream of life, the undeviating tide of 
time, flowing luminously by, with all the material phenomena, streets and stars, 
bicycles and human bodies, floating like straws upon its surface” (CH 164).  
Admitting he does not know if Woolf means to convey  “this sense of the 
incessant flux,” he apologetically states that “I can only record my reaction to 
her book,” and concludes, “to those who desire a static universe, this speed, 
this insubstantiality, this exhilarating deluge of impressions, will be perhaps 
unpleasing” (CH 164).   
In the New Statesman (6 June 1925), P. C. Kennedy, describing Woolf’s 
method of presenting the past, points out that it is “a device that is used 
constantly, especially in the ‘pictures,’ where the hero closes his eyes, a blur 
crawls across the screen” and he recalls the heroine years before (CH 165).  
Although he admires Woolf as a writer, he finds her technique “distracting”: “I 
take it,” he begins, “that Mrs. Woolf means to show us the kaleidoscope of life 
shaken into a momentary plan; the vagueness, the casualness, the chaos, 
suffering the compulsion which gives orders and makes order. . . .  But all the 
novelty of Mrs. Woolf’s technique simply distracts from it” (CH 166).   Arnold 
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Bennett, writing, fittingly, for the Evening Standard, concedes he could not 
finish the novel because he “failed to discern what was its moral basis,” found 
no theme, disliked that “problems are neither clearly stated nor clearly solved” 
in the novel and, in reviving his criticism of Woolf’s ability to invent characters, 
writes that she “(in my opinion) told us ten thousand things about Mrs. 
Dalloway, but did not show us Mrs. Dalloway.  I got from the novel no coherent 
picture of Mrs. Dalloway” (CH 190).  
The most favorable critiques of Woolf’s technique include Clive Bell’s 
early essay for the Dial (December 1924) (in which he notes that in Jacob’s 
Room, Woolf presents “a perfectly comprehensible world in which no one has 
the least difficulty in believing; only she sees it though colored, or I had rather 
say oddly cut, glasses.   Or is it,” he wonders, “we who see it through stained 
glass—glass stained with our ruling passions?  That is a question I shall not 
attempt to decide” [CH 142]), John Crawford’s New York Times review (10 May, 
1925) singles Mrs. Dalloway out from Ulysses (a book about  “the science of 
language,” not literature) and Richardson’s Pilgrimage (a tiresome “stream of the 
whole of a woman’s mind . . . an almost hypnotic mass of undifferentiated 
syllables”) for its “clarity of thought” and design; novelists like Woolf, Crawford 
writes, divide readers “between those who are confused and those who are 
delighted and comforted to find themselves and their mental attitudes not 
entirely idiosyncratic”; they pose “a challenge to the reader’s own experience, 
and cal[l] for a sort of creative collaboration” between reader and author “which 
should serve to amplify the reader’s state of mind and of being.”  According to 
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Crawford, Woolf’s “design, in effect, is no more than another of those 
fashionable pictures of an attractive, pretty woman, who is selfish and worldly”; 
however, her “dissociations, instead of being bludgeoned directly . . . contrive 
insidiously to disintegrate accepted values.”  Clarissa Dalloway’s day, Crawford 
concludes, “make for a vivid interaction and interrelation of social forces and 
personal tendencies which act upon and proceed from Clarissa” (“One Day in 
London,” BR10).  Frederic Taber Cooper’s later (March 1927) essay on “The 
Twentieth Century Novel” for The Bookman notes Mrs. Dalloway’s “flooding 
tide of detail” that is “so intimately sensed” that “we go circling backward and 
forward in dizzy spirals, until the whole complex fabric of [Clarissa’s] vanished 
years and future hopes lies clear before us”; her use of the stream of 
consciousness technique allows “the speech and actions of the characters, their 
intimate thoughts and feelings, the impalpable background of sights and 
sounds and odors, [to] all fuse and interweave, until Mrs. Dalloway merges into 
the environment, and the environment emerges with an acting part” (46).  
Finally, an anonymous reviewer from the Times Literary Supplement (21 May, 
1925) praises the novel’s “stream-like continuity” but notes that “the cinema-like 
speed of the picture robs us of a great deal of the delight in Mrs. Woolf’s style”; 
still, “the new form” of the novel “enhance[s] the consciousness and the zest of 
living” (CH 162).        
What each of these early readings of Woolf’s novel share is a metaphor 
for seeing or viewing: her writing presents the “visible world”; it produces the 
sense of watching a “deluge of impressions”; it is a “kaleidoscope,” a world 
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witnessed “behind stained glass,” the novel is like a “picture” that unrelentingly 
presents “sights and sounds and odors.”  Even Bennett’s criticism is related to 
sight:  Woolf does not “show us” Clarissa and he “got from the novel no 
coherent picture” of her.  Woolf did not consider or develop her stream of 
consciousness technique to be cinematic—indeed, in her only essay on film, 
“The Movies and Reality” (reprinted, largely unchanged, as “On Cinema” in her 
Collected Essays), which appeared a year after the publication of Mrs. 
Dalloway, she dismisses film for encouraging passive reception (“the eye licks it 
all up instantaneously, and the brain, agreeably titillated, settles down to watch 
things happening without bestirring itself to think,” she writes; “we see life as it 
is when we have no part in it”), laments the adaptation of novels like Anna 
Karenina, and dislikes the emphasis placed, not on the interiority and feelings of 
a character, but on appearance (“All the emphasis is laid by the cinema upon 
her teeth, her pearls, her velvet”).  (CE II 268-70).  After finding herself more 
interested in a flaw, a “shadow shaped like a tadpole” that “swelled to an 
immense size” in the negative than in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, she writes that 
“for a moment it seemed as if thought could be conveyed by shape more 
effectively than words.  The monstrous quivering tadpole seemed to be fear 
itself, and not the statement ‘I am afraid.’”  Woolf’s essay reveals above all that 
she believed film should not try to emulate or encroach upon literature, but 
should find a vocabulary of its own.  “Is there, “ she asks, “some secret 
language which we feel and see, but never speak, and, if so, could this be made 
visible to the eye?  Is there any characteristic which thought possesses that can 
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be rendered visible without the help of words?”  All that is communicable or “is 
accessible to words and words alone, the cinema must avoid” (CE IIm 268-71).  
Despite Woolf’s reservations about the cinema, it is nevertheless 
apparent that her first readers understood her technique as essentially visual, if 
not specifically filmic (the “cinema-like speed” and the “blur” before flashbacks 
in “the ‘pictures’”).  To mediate between, on the one hand, Woolf’s belief that 
her goal as a writer is to “get in touch with [her] reader by putting before him 
something which he recognizes, which therefore stimulates his imagination, 
and makes him willing to cooperate in the far more difficult business of 
intimacy” (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” CE I, 331); that “the state of reading 
consists in the complete elimination of the ego” (qtd. in Lee, 403) (or, as she 
writes in “How Should One Read a Book,” “Do not dictate to your authour; try 
to become him.  Be his fellow worker and accomplice” [CE I, 2) and, on the 
other hand, her readers’ “curious sensation” of visualization, it would seem that 
the only theoretical concept equipped to address the simultaneity of viewing 
and identification is the idea of “suture,” which has come to be defined in film 
studies as “the procedures by means of which cinematic texts confer subjectivity 
upon their viewers,” according to Kaja Silverman (195).  To call Mrs. Dalloway 
a “cinematic text” is not to agree with previous studies of the stream of 
consciousness technique which find chronological shifts or associative 
thoughts in the narrative analogous to “montage” or “cuts”; [[this review will 
appear in chapter one]] while these arguments may help codify or analyze the 
stylistic features of the text, they do little to contribute to an understanding of 
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how the novels that employ the technique were, and continue to be, received 
by readers.  
“Suture,” Silverman explains, is a complex term “rendered more complex 
with each new statement about it, so that it now embraces a set of assumptions 
not only about cinematic signification, but about the viewing subject and the 
operations of ideology” (200).  Existing on the fulcrum between the imaginary 
or the semiotic and the symbolic order, it is “the moment when the subject 
inserts itself into the symbolic register in the guise of a signifier”; it is the 
moment in which “subjects emerge within discourse” (Silverman 200) and is 
thus analagous with Kristeva’s idea of the semiotic (the space that precedes 
language).  Because the film narrative achieves its sense of coherence through 
cutting (the dividing or transitional shots) and exclusion (we are unable to see 
beyond the frame), it is a “castrating coherence,” for the viewing subject which 
necessitates not only a loss of being, but the repudiation of alternative 
discourses” (Silverman 205-6).  This submission and identification with the 
cinematic perspective offers the pleasures of the imaginary (of loss of being) as 
well as a repetition of the entry into the symbolic (by accepting the discursive 
position offered by the narrative)—or, to use Kristeva’s description, the subject is 
placed “in process” by the eruption of the semiotic.  Finally, because suture 
depends upon the viewer accepting the cinematic perspective (“’Yes, that’s me,’ 
or ‘That’s what I see’”), it is similar to Althusser’s idea of “interpellation,” wherein 
“the individual who is culturally ‘hailed’ or ‘called’ simultaneously identifies 
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with the subject of the speech and takes his or her place in the syntax which 
defines that subjective position” (Silverman 219).    
If, then, the process of suture is the acceptance of a viewing position that 
carries with it at once the loss of self and confers subjectivity, Bennett’s inability 
to “see” Clarissa Dalloway is not only tied to his inability to identify with Woolf’s 
character, it is also a resistance to accept Woolf’s perspective on 
characterization.  Conversely, the reviewers who did experience suture while 
reading Mrs. Dalloway, appear to have entered into the same dialectic between 
the rational and irrational, between order and confusion, experienced by 
viewers of the Post-Impressionist Exhibition: Hughes contrasts the 
“coheren[ce]” and “solidarity” of the novel with a  rising sense of “fear”; Bullett 
describes the “sensation” of reading as a “deluge of impressions” that contrasts 
with a “static universe”; Kennedy, who keeps the text as a distance, nevertheless 
perceives an attempt to shape “chaos” into a “momentary plan”; Crawford 
assumes readers will either experience confusion or collaboration, and Cooper 
describes the “intimately sensed” experience of the inner and outer, thought 
and action, “sights and sounds and odors” that “fuse and interweave” in terms 
of merging.  
The pleasure and the anxiety produced by the text, as described by the 
reviewers, suggests a regression to the moment of subject formation, the 
boundary between the pre-Oedipal, or what Kristeva calls the semiotic register 
of pre-signification, of irreducible rhythm and drives, and the “coherence” and 
order of the symbolic.  To be sutured into Mrs. Dalloway, then, as her 
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contemporary critics suggest, is to be presented at once with the loss of self and 
the opportunity to assume multiple, polymorphous subject-positions that allow 
the reader to navigate between the chaotic, irrational, transgressive register of 
the semiotic and the standardized, rational, conventionalized symbolic order.
Mrs. Dalloway and the
Sutured Reader
As she was writing Mrs. Dalloway, under the working title The Hours, 
Woolf wrote in her diary, “I want to give life and death, sanity and insanity; I 
want to criticise the social system” (D II, 248).  Through her technique, which 
sutures the reader into the subjective experience of characters—both sane and 
insane—she effects a critique of the “social system” by, specifically, compelling 
the reader to meditate (with the characters) on the nature of class and the self 
amidst an increasingly standardized consumer culture. The first sentence of the 
novel announces: “Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself,” and 
inaugurates the relationship between class-based identity (she would buy the 
flowers, not Lucy, the maid) and the marketplace.  Jennifer Wicke argues that 
Woolf’s “market modernism,” despite Frankfurt School arguments about “high” 
modernism’s resistance to the culture industry, “does not target publicity or 
consumption per se as problems” (130); indeed, Wicke argues Woolf’s writing 
is “an experiment in coterie consumption” (110) and considers shopping in 
Mrs. Dalloway as “an active, even productive, creative process” (120).  Aligning 
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Woolf’s writing with economist and fellow Bloomsbury member John Maynard 
Keynes, Wicke writes that 
for both Keynes and Woolf this activity of the market, or within the 
market, has an aura of enchantment [. . .].  Both comprehend that 
the market can be a battlefield , or a minefield, or a liquid terrain 
of experience, choice, agency and desire exquisitely sensitive to 
all the ripples that play across its surface.  And for them 
consuming is at the heart of this rough magic.  (128-9).  
While Wicke does not try to oversimplify the complexity of consumption and 
subjectivity, her desire to redeem Woolf from critics who would cast her as a 
snobbish elitist with a suspicious of mass culture and perpetuate the myth of the 
“great divide” in order to place her at the center of a “magical” market 
modernism does not acknowledge how little is actually purchased or 
consumed in Mrs. Dalloway.  Flowers, certainly, are bought, but, despite the 
single purchase of a petticoat by the pitiable Miss Kilman, the many shopping 
scenes in the novel result in a turning away from consumption and towards self-
reflection—in some cases literally, as when Peter Walsh, after his emotional 
meeting with Clarissa, stops to look at new cars on display:
And there he was, this fortunate man, himself, reflected in the 
plate-glass window of a motor-car manufacturer in Victoria Street
[. . .].  Clarissa had grown hard, he thought; and a trifle 
sentimental into the bargain, he suspected, looking in at the great 
motor-cars capable of doing—how many miles on how many 
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gallons?  For he had a turn for mechanics; had invented a plough 
in his district, had ordered wheel-barrows from England, but the 
coolies wouldn’t use them, all of which Clarissa knew nothing 
whatever about [. . .].  There was always something cold in 
Clarissa, he thought.  She had always, even as a girl, a sort of 
timidity, which in middle age becomes conventionality, and then 
it’s all up, it’s all up, he thought, looking rather drearily into the 
glass depths, and wondering whether by calling at that hour 
he had annoyed her; overcome with shame suddenly at having 
been a fool; wept; been emotional; told her everything, as usual, 
as usual.  (MD 48-9)                   
Rather than offer a jubilant picture of uncritical shopping or a disinterested, 
critical position on consumption, the image presented here of Peter looking 
“drearily” at his reflection superimposed over the automobiles on display 
suggests a deep meditation on the nature of the selfhood in consumer culture.  
It is as if the mirror stage is re-enacted in reverse: the showroom window, rather 
than offering an image of transformation or induction into a consuming subject 
position, offers instead what Lacan calls the “obsessional inversion” and 
“isolating processes” that precede the moment of identification with the 
specular image that “will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations” 
(Écrits 5).  The new automobiles, with their promise of future travel, only invite 
images of the past and regression that destabilize the ego.  If, as readers, we are 
sutured into the text, into Peter’s subjectivity, it should be noted that Woolf does 
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not allow us any commodity fetishism: other than providing us with the 
adjective “great,” we are denied Peter’s view of the new automobile models on 
display; instead, we are drawn further into his consciousness, into the past, to 
India, to when he knew Clarissa “as a girl,” into the “glass depths” that produces 
subjectivity itself.  Instead of entering the motor-car manufacturer’s, Peter turns 
from the storefront and walks on, towards Trafalgar Square, continuing his 
reverie about Clarissa, Empire, and his Socialist past.  For Woolf, commodity 
culture does not interpellate the the subject as a consumer; instead, it is met with 
an ever increasing self-reflexivity.       
Similarly, as Clarissa walks towards the flower shop, she pauses to look 
into a book store window where she sees “Jorrick’s Jaunts and Jollities[,] Soapy 
Sponge and Mrs. Asquith’s Memoirs and Big Game Shooting in Nigeria, all 
spread open.  Ever so many books there were,” Clarissa thinks, but none that 
would be enough of a gift to make Evelyn Whitbread express joy to see her: 
“how much she wanted it—that people should look pleased as she came in,” 
Clarissa thinks as she continues walking (10).  As she meditates on her need for 
validation from others, she becomes self-conscious of her 
narrow pea-stick figure; a ridiculous little face, beaked like a 
bird’s.  That she held herself well was true; and had nice hands 
and feet; and dressed well, considering she spent so little.  But 
often now this body she wore (she stopped to look at a Dutch 
picture), this body, with all its capacities, seemed
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 nothing—nothing at all.  She had the oddest sense of being 
herself invisible, unseen; unknown[. . . ].  (MD 10-11)   
Again, the navigation of commercial culture, if it does promise signifiers that 
confer status and subjectivity, can intensify alienation and threatens the erasure 
of the self.  If, to use Terry Eagleton’s summation, the ego is, for Lacan, “this 
narcissistic process whereby we bolster up a fictive sense of unitary selfhood by 
finding something in the world with which we can identify” (Literary Theory 
165), then consumption serves to expose the fiction of the unified self.  Even 
stopping “to look at a Dutch picture,” presumably a work of art, does not assure 
Clarissa of either social or corporeal distinction; her identity threatened, she is 
aware of “only this astonishing and rather solemn progress with the rest of 
them, up Bond Street” (MD 11).   If the theory of suture holds that, when we 
identify with a character (when we see through Clarissa’s eyes, in this case), we 
are inscribed into a subject-position, Mrs. Dalloway denies us the security, 
however illusory, of a sense of unitary selfhood.  As tempting as it is to consider 
these moments when we are sutured into a subjectivity destabilized by the 
marketplace as implicit critiques of reification or mass culture, from the 
poststructuralist vantage point of the twenty-first century, where any attempt to 
discern between the “subject” from the “consumer” (or the “private” from the 
“public” self, for that matter) immediately deconstructs itself, the reflections of 
Peter Walsh or Clarissa Dalloway as they look through storefront windows seem 
more like ghostly images captured as the inner “self” is becoming 
indistinguishable from the products of mass consumption.
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In contrast to Peter and Clarissa’s “shopping” experiences, Walter Dill 
Scott’s description of the workings of “an ordinary mind on an ordinary day” 
from The Psychology of Advertising in Theory and Practice (1921) proposes 
how the consumer’s mind should think:
As I walk down a busy street, unless I am oblivious to my 
surroundings my thought is determined for me by the objects 
which surround me.  My eye is caught by an artistically decorated 
window in which sporting goods are displayed.  My mind is fully 
occupied for the time with the perception of  these articles.  The 
perception of one object is superseded by the perception of 
another, and in most cases nothing but the present objects are 
thought of, and this perception of present objects does not recall 
to my mind any objects which I have seen at other times.  It 
happens, however, that as I see a sweater I think of the sweater 
which I used to wear, and then of the circumstances which 
attended its destruction [. . .].   At the sight of shoes I am 
reminded of my need for a new pair [. . .] .  In the case of simple 
perception the mind seems to act under the ordinary laws of 
cause and effect.  (87)
According to the advertiser’s understanding of the workings of the stream of 
consciousness, the objective correlative of the product is another product (or a 
previously possessed product).  The sweater or shoes that represent the 
madeline in this associative process calls forth the need for a new sweater or 
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shoes.  As Scott emphasizes for the student of advertising: “’Whenever there is in 
consciousness one element of a previous experience, this one element tends to 
bring back the entire experience’”; in other words, “Things thought together or 
in immediate succession become ‘associated,’ or welded together so that when 
one returns, it tends to recall the others.  The sight of a shoe suggested the 
entire ‘shoe experience’” (89).  The importance of understanding this 
associative consciousness, of course, is to be able to create consistent, habitual 
consumer responses to the advertised product.  What should be pointed out 
here is that while Woolf (along with other modernists) was developing her 
technique of exploring character through subjective interiority (“people have 
any number of states of consciousness,” she entered in her diary upon the 
publication of Mrs. Dalloway and, in the margin beside this claim wrote, 
“second selves is what I mean” [D III ,12]), the burgeoning advertising industry 
made interiority the subject of exploration in order to understand the stream of 
consciousness and channel it into predictable patterns of consumer behavior.  
“The advertiser must know his customers,” Scott writes; “he must know their 
habits of thought, for it is too difficult to attempt to get them to think along new 
lines.  He must present his commodity in such a way that [the customer] can 
understand it without being compelled to think a new thought”  (219).  
As Mrs. Dalloway illustrates, associative interiority or the stream of 
consciousness is unpredictable and unrestrainable, irreducible to “habits of 
thought”; as if addressing the postwar anxiety about the loss of individuality to 
the “herd instinct” of “uniformity and standardization” that Leonard Woolf 
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attributes in After the Deluge to “democracy and the industrialization which has 
accompanied it [and that] give enormous opportunities for the production of 
the sheep-like mind.  Mass education, mass government, mass production, [all] 
encourage material and mental uniformity, and the scale of social life becomes 
so large that the individual seems lost and hopeless” (218).   Although Virginia 
Woolf did not share her husband’s evidently characteristic cynicism, Mrs. 
Dalloway does foreground the conflict between the individual and uniformity, 
“abnormality” and conformity.
After Clarissa arrives at home with her flowers, a skywriting plane 
appears over Regent’s Park, and we are sutured into, and have to navigate 
several abruptly changing subject-positions.  As the plane scrawls an 
advertisement, the spectators below try to decipher the message:
Dropping dead down the aeroplane soared straight up, curved in 
a loop, raced, sank, rose, and whatever it did, wherever it went, 
out fluttered behind it a thick ruffled bar of white smoke which 
curled and wreathed upon the sky in letters.  But what letters?  A C 
was it?  an E, then an L?  Only for the moment did they lie still; 
then they moved and melted and were rubbed out up in the sky, 
and the aeroplane shot further away again and again, in a fresh 
space of sky, began writing a K, an E, a Y perhaps?
   “Glaxo,” said Mrs. Coates in a strained, awe-stricken voice, 
gazing straight up, and her baby, lying stiff and white in her arms, 
gazed straight up.
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   “Kreemo,” murmured Mrs. Bletchley, like a sleepwalker [. . .].
   “It’s toffee,” murmured Mr. Bowley—.  (MD 20-1)
This important moment in the novel has been read by Michael North as 
evidence that it reveals a “public constituted by advertising” that is “not so very 
different from the intersubjective public that is coterminous with the novel itself”; 
the sky-written advertisement serves to “knit together subjectivities” (Reading 
1922, 83-4).  According to Reginald Abbott, in his article, “What Miss Kilman’s 
Petticoat Means: Virginia Woolf, Shopping, and Spectacle,” however, this 
moment is less communal; it is an example of a moment where “advertising 
literally invades Bond Street and its airspace and invites (demands)” that viewers 
become “mesmerized,” uncritical, receivers of “commodity speak” (202).  
Taking the middle ground between North’s more positive, socially unifying 
reading of the skywriting scene and Abbott’s reading of the scene as a 
resistance to advertising, John Young believes the point of the scene is to 
“satirize both military and commercial capabilities to produce a ‘KEY’ for 
reading the world’” (100).  The problem with each of these readings is that they 
gloss over the failure of the skywriting to communicate a clear advertisement 
that will focus attention outward, toward a purchase.  
In the preceding scene, as the the car which bystanders speculate 
contains the Prime Minister or the Queen (after being repaired) continues down 
Bond Street, we are told that “in all the hat shops and tailors’ shops strangers 
looked at each other and thought of the dead; of the flag; of Empire” (MD 18).  
Whereas the car is a clear, culturally unifying signified, the plane which averts 
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all the spectators’ attention away from the car presents a signifier no one can 
decipher: as soon as a new letter appears, the other letters fade and dissolve.  
That the skywriting literally overwrites the importance of the car (“The car came 
on.  Suddenly, Mrs. Coates looked up into the sky.  The sound of an aeroplane 
bored ominously into the ears of the crowd.  There it was coming over the trees, 
letting our white smoke from behind, which curled and twisted, actually writing 
something!” [MD 20]) suggests Woolf wanted to call attention to the similarities 
between political and commercial propaganda and dramatize the increasing 
power of mass culture.    
The significance of the sky-written advertisement is its lack of it—except 
for Septimus Smith.  As Septimus sits in Regent’s Park with his wife, Lucrezia, he 
interprets the slogan as a personal message:
So, thought Septimus, they are signalling to me.  Not indeed in 
actual words; that is, he could not read the language yet; but it 
was plain enough, this beauty, this exquisite beauty, and tears 
filled his eyes as he looked at the smoke words languishing and 
melting in the sky and bestowing on him in their inexhaustible 
charity and laughing goodness one shape after another of 
unimaginable beauty and signalling their intention to provide 
him, for nothing, for ever, for looking merely, with beauty, more 
beauty!  Tears ran down his cheeks.  (MD 21-22)
Septimus’ “epiphany,” if it can be called that, is ironic.  As readers who have 
been sutured into a successive series of subjective consciousnesses trying to 
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decode the slogan (Mrs. Coates, Mrs. Bletchley, Mr. Bowley), the assumption of 
Septimus’ inordinately emotionally wrought position at once places us in an 
irrational, “abnormal” consciousness and provides us with the “correct” 
response to the message which escapes everyone else.  Septimus receives the 
coded meanings that advertising desires to send: feelings of passion, happiness, 
and sated desire (“for ever”).  Septimus can understand the “message” because, 
like him, it is on the other side of signification; it is an example of a “trace,” what 
Kristeva terms the semiotic.  She defines the semiotic as that which precedes 
discourse but which 
operates through, despite, and in excess of it and produces in 
poetic language “musical” but also nonsense effects that destroy 
not only accepted beliefs and significations, but, in radical 
experiments, syntax itself, that guarantee of thetic consciousness 
(of the signified object and ego) [. . . ].  [T]his signifying 
disposition is not that of meaning or signification: no sign, no 
predication, no signified object and therefore no operating 
consciousness of a transcendental ego.  We shall call this 
disposition semiotic (le sémiotique), meaning [. . . ] a distinctive 
mark, trace, index, the premonitory sign, the proof, engraved 
mark, imprint—in short, a distinctiveness admitting of an 
uncertain and indeterminate articulation because it does not yet 
refer (for young children) or no longer refers (in psychotic
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 discourse) to a signified object for the thetic consciousness. 
(“From One Identity to an Other 133)
The “ruffled bar” (MD 20) of smoke, like the “bar” between the signified and 
signifier dissolves or “melts,” and the symbols lose their meaning.  Reading 
through Septimus, we perceive the “distinctive mark, trace, index” in the sky as 
an “indeterminate articulation” that defies symbolic meaning and, furthermore, 
we are aware that his ability to comprehend the meaning is because he has 
experienced a psychic break.  Within the world of the novel, Septimus is the 
representative of the semiotic: that which challenges the social order (the 
“accepted beliefs and significations”).  
It is important to note that Woolf positions us—sutures us—into 
Septimus’ consciousness after we have inhabited, however quickly, other, 
ostensibly “rational” if not “ordinary” perspectives; as Clarissa’s “other” in terms 
of gender and class, he also represents the irrational and antisocial side of the 
modernist dialectic, while she (however anxiously) embodies rationality and 
conventionality, if not conformity (as Peter reflects, she had, “even as a girl, a 
sort of timidity, which in middle age becomes conventionality” [MD 49]; she is 
the  “perfect hostess” [MD 7; 62]; “the obvious things to say of her was that she 
was worldly; cared too much for rank and society and getting on in the world” 
[MD 76], and Sally later says that “Clarissa was at heart a snob—one had to 
admit it, a snob” [MD 190]); as Woolf wrote in her diary when she began the 
novel, “I adumbrate here a study of insanity and suicide; the world seen by the 
sane and the insane side by side—something like that” (D II, 207).  While, to a 
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critic like Lukács, Septimus would simply be another example of modernism’s 
“devaluation of the social” and “glorification of the abnormal” (“The Ideology of 
Modernism” 32), Woolf gave Septimus her own visions and hallucinatory 
experiences (Lee 191-2) and approached the “mad scene in Regent’s Park” with 
trepidation: “I write it by clinging as tight to fact as I can & write perhaps 50 
words a morning, ” she wrote (D II, 272).  By forcing the reader to assume 
Septimus’ subjectivity, not only does Woolf attempt to create empathy for him 
and his condition, she also allows the reader the transgressive experience of 
navigating through the irrational and the antisocial.   As he sits on the bench, he 
realizes that “sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the spaces between 
them were as significant as the sounds” and
Men must not cut down trees.  There is a God.  (He noted such 
revelations on the backs of envelopes.)  No one kills from hatred.  
Make it known (he wrote it down).  He waited.  He listened.  A 
sparrow perched on the railing opposite chirped Septimus, 
Septimus four or five times over and went on, drawing its notes 
out, to sing freshly and piercingly in Greek words how there is no 
crime and, joined by another sparrow, they sang in voices 
prolonged and piercing in Greek words, from trees in the 
meadow of life beyond a river where the dead walk, how there is 
no death.  (MD 23-24)
While both Peter and Clarissa experience, to varying degrees, crises of 
subjectivity, Septimus’ consciousness is given to us without any of the 
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mediating language Woolf provides for the other characters (“She had the 
oddest sense of being herself invisible” [MD]; Peter “looking rather drearily into 
the glassy depths” [MD 49]); the directives that hail us as readers into the text 
and ask us to participate in Septimus’ hallucinations at the same time assures us 
(by our ability to understand the narrative) of the stability of our own subject-
positions.  
For Kristeva, the semiotic—which is associated with the pre- (or trans-) 
linguistic, with repressed drives—is ever present in both the text and the 
speaking subject, putting each “in process / on trial” (Revolution 22-58); the 
repressed drives that underlie and effectuate signification also threaten to return, 
to destabilize the linguistic and social order—and the individuated subject.  In 
discourse, poetic language distorts or places symbolic language “in process / 
on trial” by threatening to undo or erase meaning and identity; at the same time, 
the production and prolongation of the deconstruction of meaning places the 
writer “in process / on trial.”  Unfortunately for Septimus, he is caught at “zero, 
the moment of crisis, or emptiness” (qtd. in Guberman 190) and while he does 
try to constitute a new identity through his written observations “on the backs of 
envelopes,” he is growing more incapable of communicating in the symbolic 
order at all, and Rezia must write for him:
The table drawer was full of those writings; about war; about 
Shakespeare; about great discoveries; how there is no death [. . .].  
She wrote it down just as he spoke it.  Some things were very 
beautiful; others sheer nonsense.  And he was always stopping in 
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the middle, changing his mind; wanting to add something; 
hearing something new; listening with his hands up.  (MD 140)
Before Lacan, Woolf is exploring the relationship between signification and 
psychosis.  Septimus’ “psychotic discourse” includes not only fragmented 
language or “nonsense,” but also surrealist images like
 diagrams, designs, little men and women brandishing sticks for 
arms, with wings—were they?—on their backs; circles traced 
round shillings and sixpences—the suns and stars; zigzagging 
precipices with mountaineers ascending ropes together, exactly 
like knives and forks; sea pieces with little faces laughing out of 
what might perhaps be waves.  (MD 147)
At the limits of language, Septimus’ signifiers float without any clear signifieds.  
They recall the childish representations that precede or correspond with 
language acquisition (stick figures) but they also include appropriations of the 
symbolic (coins turned into empty circles or “zeros”) and images of the 
“plurality” of characters of selves (the laughing faces) that speak to his inability 
to assume a coherent,  unified sense of self.   These drawings, which are 
revealed just before Septimus’ suicide, when read against his earlier 
hallucinations in Regent’s Park, reveal something of schizophrenic “logic”: 
when Rezia removes her wedding ring because she has “grown so thin,” he 
interprets the action as a severance of their marriage: “The rope was cut; he 
mounted; he was free” (MD 67).  He felt “his body was macerated until only the 
nerve fibres were left.  It was spread like a veil upon a rock”; and, as he 
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experiences a synaesthetic merging with the sounds around him, he “remained 
high on his rock, like a drowned sailor on a rock.  I leant over the edge of the 
boat and fell down, he thought.  I went under the sea” (MD 69).  In his inverted 
reasoning, the ascending mountaineers “ascending ropes” are able to mount 
the “high rock” of the complete submersion of the self once his last tie—the 
“rope” that connects him to Rezia—is (he believes) cut.   
   Septimus, no longer able to repress the irrational, is not only a subject 
continually “in process / on trial,” he becomes the embodiment of the semiotic 
and its challenge to the social, symbolic order.   As Woolf describes him, he 
poses not only a challenge to signification, but to the class system:
To look at, he might have been a clerk, but of the better sort; for 
he wore brown boots; his hands were educated; so, too, his 
profile—his angular, big-nosed, intelligent, sensitive profile; but 
not his lips altogether, for they hung loose; and his eyes (as eyes 
tend to be), eyes merely; hazel, large; so that he was, on the 
whole, a border case, neither one thing nor the other, might end 
with a house at Purley and a motor car, or continue renting 
apartments in back streets all his life; one of those half-educated 
men whose education is all learnt from books borrowed from 
public libraries, read in the evening after the day’s work, on the 
advice of well-known authors consulted by letter.  (MD 84)
Unlike Forester’s self-educated clerk, Leonard Bast, Septimus is not only a 
“border case” in terms of the social hierarchy, he is “neither one thing nor the 
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other”: he also presents challenges to boundaries of signification (Kristeva 
describes instances where the semiotic erupts into the symbolic “borderline 
experiences” [“From One Identity to An Other,” 139]), of sexuality (his 
breakdown is tied to the death, at the end of the War, of his commanding officer 
Evans, who showed Septimus “affection” and who was “undemonstrative in the 
company of women” [MD 86], and Septimus, before marrying Rezia, thinks, 
“love between man and woman was repulsive to Shakespeare” [MD 89]), even 
spatiality.  As he cries at the beauty of the sky-written words, Rezia, in her 
desperation, imagines Regent’s Park “as perhaps at midnight, when all 
boundaries are lost” and “the country reverts to its ancient shape, as the Roman 
saw it, lying cloudy, when they landed, and the hills had no names and rivers 
wound they knew not where” (MD 24); before order, before definition.  Even 
after his death, his presence is felt as an intrusion upon Clarissa’s party (“Oh! 
thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here’s death, she thought” [MD 
183]) as she is compelled to envision his suicide: “Up had flashed the ground 
through him, blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes.  There he lay with a 
thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness” and Clarissa 
assumes “somehow it was her distaster—her disgrace” (MD 183-4).     
When the ineffectual Dr. Holmes’ directives that Septimus “notice real 
things, got to a music hall, play cricket” or “try two tablets of bromide dissolved 
in a glass of water at bedtime” (MD 25; 90) fail, Rezia takes him to specialist Sir 
William Bradshaw, who advises a rest cure and, above all, a sense of 
“proportion”:
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Proportion, divine proportion, [was] Sir William’s goddess. . . . 
Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself 
but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade 
childbirth, penalised despair, made it impossible for the unfit to 
propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of 
proportion [. . .]  Sir William with his thirty years’ experience of 
these kinds of cases, and his infallible instinct, this is madness, this 
sense; in fact, his sense of proportion.  (MD 99)
Sir William, defender of “sense,” or standardized behavior, is cast as the 
antagonist in the novel; not only does his “cure” pose the ultimate threat to 
Septimus (who kills himself rather than submit to Sir William’s treatment), we 
also see him from Clarissa’s less paranoiac perspective as “a great doctor, yet to 
her obscurely evil” who “make[s] life intolerable, men like that” (MD 184-5).  
The enemy of proportion is not only madness, but “conversion”: 
A Goddess even now engaged—in the heat and sands of India, 
the mud and swamp of Africa, the purlieus of London, wherever 
in short the climate of the devil tempts men to fall from the true 
belief which is her own [. . .].  Conversion is her name and she 
feasts on the wills of the weakly [. . .].   At Hyde Park 
Corner on a tub she stands preaching; shrouds herself in white 
and walks penitentially disguised as brotherly love through 
factories and parliaments; offers help, but desires power; smites 
out of her way roughly the dissentient, or dissatisfied; bestows her 
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blessing on those who, looking upward, catch submissively from 
her eyes the light of their own.  (MD 100) 
Sir William is not only the representative of rationality, he is also representative 
of Empire, of the symbolic order, of the paternal Law (of Septimus’ 
institutionalization he says, “there was no alternative.  It was a question of law” 
[MD 97]; “if they failed to support him, he had to support police and the good 
of society, which, he remarked very quietly, would take care, down in Surrey, 
that these unsocial impulses, bed more than anything by the lack of good 
blood,  were held in control [MD 102]); for Woolf to characterize him as an 
“obscurely evil” figure is to interpellate the reader into a position of collusion, 
not only with Clarissa, but also with Septimus—with irrationality, with dissent, 
with the semiotic.  
If the theory of suture holds that to be “hailed” forces us to “identif[y] 
with the subject of the speech and take his or her place in the syntax which 
defines that subjective position” (Silverman 219) and that this is inseparable 
from an ideological assumption or identification, Woolf is, using her narrative 
style as a form of persuasive rhetoric.  Tellingly, Sir Bradshaw’s philosophy of 
“proportion” versus “conversion” is presented impersonally, if not satirically; 
before it is explained, we are told that Rezia thinks “Sir William Bradshaw was 
not a nice man” (MD 98) and, as we learn of the dangers of “conversion,” we 
learn that Rezia “divined it” that “[conversion] had her dwelling in Sir William’s 
heart, though concealed, as she mostly is, under some plausible disguise; some 
venerable name; love, duty, self sacrifice” (MD 100).  To identify with Septimus, 
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to privilege his hallucinatory visions over Sir William’s ideal of a conformity of 
“proportion” is to suture ourselves into the position of a subject “in process / on 
trial.”  As Kristeva writes:
an understanding of intertexuality—one that points to a dynamics 
involving a destruction of the creative identity and reconstitution 
of a new plurality—assumes at the same time that the one who 
reads, the reader, participates in the same dynamics.  If we are 
readers of intertextuality, we must be capable of the same putting-
into-process of our own identities [. . .].  We also must be able to 
be reduced to zero, to the state of crisis [. . .].  (“Intertextuality and 
Literary Interpretation” 190).
The notion of an “intertextual” reading, which seems congruous with the notion 
of suture, involves an openness to a loss of self and an identification with a new 
“plurality.”  It is interesting to consider Hughes’ idea of “fear,” Cooper’s 
metaphors of “merging” and “emerging,” and Crawford’s statement about how 
the novel “disintegrate[s] accepted values” as examples of readers placed “in 
process / on trial” by Mrs. Dalloway.  It must be noted that the novel itself 
appeared at a time when modernism and the stream of consciousness was 
viewed as potentially harmful, as threatening to a socially acceptable sense of 
“proportion.”  In “Literature and Bad Nerves,” an article that appeared in 
Harper’s in 1921, Wilson Follett argues that “in the most striking of the ultra-
modern tendencies in art and literature the neurotic element is uppermost, and 
that the rapid vogue of these ultra-modern tendencies is simply the answer of a 
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nervously overwrought public to art in which it finds its own neurotic impulses 
perfectly reproduced” (107).  Follett sees modernism as adversarial to 
communication and views it as a serious threat to the reader:
The truth is that there is a degree of actual peril in the theory 
which makes uncontrolled intuition the ultimate fine fruit of 
consciousness.  The neurotic theory, consistently followed out 
[ . . .] induces a quite definitely neurotic condition in the 
individual, even if he be normal to begin with.  It leads him by 
degrees into the exact state of a man whose nerves are set 
twitching and jangling by a combination of overwork, worry, 
insomnia, and black coffee.  (113)
The end result of exposure to this type of literature, is an “ingrowing self-
consciousness, which leads always to philosophic or esthetic anarchy [and] is 
an unhealthful condition for the mind of man the social animal.  Mostly, he 
cannot live to himself alone and keep his sanity” (116).  While it would be easy 
to dismiss Follett’s argument as ridiculous and reactionary, it does reveal the 
fear and suspicion modernism encountered as it emerged, and suggests how 
those who risked their “nerves” on these texts might have considered the act of 
reading to be transgressive and evidence of a countercultural statement of 
individualism.  
Although Rezia again admits to herself “that she did not like [Sir 
William],”  that “he swooped; he devoured.  He shut people up” (MD 102), they 
return to their lodging house in Bloomsbury to await instructions about when 
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Septimus will be committed to one of Sir William’s “homes,” but he kills himself 
before Holmes and Bradshaw can “get him” (MD 149).  What precedes 
Septimus’ death is one of the more enigmatic scenes in Mrs. Dalloway: as Rezia 
makes a hat for their landlady’s daughter, Septimus, on the couch, “began, very 
cautiously, to open his eyes, to see whether the gramophone was really there.  
But real things—real things were too exciting.  He must be cautious.  He would 
not go mad” (MD 142), realizing he is not hallucinating, he looks at Rezia: “he 
shaded his eyes so that he might see only a little of her face at a time, first the 
chin, then the nose, then the forehead, in case it were deformed, or had some 
terrible mark on it. But no,” he realizes,  “there she was, perfectly natural, 
sewing, with the pursed lips that women have, the set, melancholy expression, 
when sewing” (MD 142).   In a simulation of the infant’s identification with the 
coherent image in the mirror that initiates selfhood, Septimus works through 
fragmentation to attain a sense of a coherent image for which to see Rezia.  
Significantly, when he is able to recognize her, he is able to speak “for the first 
time in days . . . as he used to do” (MD 143) when he makes fun of the hat and 
helps Rezia decorate it.  Believing he has returned to his former self, Rezia pins 
a rose to the hat and gushes, “never had she felt so happy!  Never in her life!” 
(MD 143).  As Septimus “began putting odd colours together” for the hat’s 
design, he instructs Rezia: “be very, very careful, he said, to keep it just as he 
made it” (MD 143).  In a literal moment of “suture,” Rezia sews the hat: 
when she sewed, he thought, she made a sound like a kettle on 
the hob; bubbling, murmuring, always busy, her strong little 
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pointed fingers pinching and poking; her needle flashing straight
[. . .].     
   “There is it,” said Rezia, twirling Mrs. Peters’ hat on the tips of 
her fingers.  “That’ll’ do for the moment.  Later . . .” her sentence 
bubbled away drip, drip, drip, like a contented tap left running. 
   It was wonderful.  Never had he done anything which made 
him feel so proud.  It was so real, it was so substantial, Mrs. Peters’ 
hat.  
   “Just look at it,” he said.  
Yes, it would always make her happy to see that hat.  He had 
become himself then, he had laughed then.  (MD 1434)
As the precursive event to his suicide, the construction of the hat requires some 
examination.  On the one hand, we might see the act of suture here and the 
construction of the hat as evidence of Septimus’ return to sanity and, thereby, 
ascribe a sense of agency or conscious defiance to his suicide for, as Jacques-
Alain Miller writes, “suture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its 
discourse [. . .] it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a 
stand-in” and “it implies the position of a taking-the-place of” (qtd. in Silverman 
200)—in other words, the image of Rezia sewing allows him to bring together 
inner and outer, signified and signifiers, self and image and reinscribe himself 
into the symbolic order.  One the other hand, however, Septimus ascribes a 
disproportionate amount of significance to the finished hat: it articulates what 
his diagrams, his writings, even his prewar, Shakespeare-inspired poems could 
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not: “never had he done anything which made him feel so proud.  It was so 
real, so substantial.”  It  does not represent a hat, for him, but completion, 
fulfillment.  It is difficult not to emphasize the word “real” in the description of 
the hat and try to consider it in relation to Lacan’s idea of “ the Real” as an 
object that seems to satisfy primordial lack.  While “the Real” for Lacan is 
unknowable, a sacrifice to language, it is interesting to consider how Woolf 
might be using the hat as an approximation of the Real for Septimus, who has 
passed through signification and the imaginary in his psychosis, and finds 
ultimate meaning in this object.  Doreen Fowler explains that
what is important about the Real is that it posits the possibility of 
meaning outside of the arbitrary cultural orderings of the 
symbolic order.  This “real” meaning may be the transcendental 
meaning that we so desperately desire [. . . ].  As creatures trapped 
in language, we cannot know; however, Lacan implies that the 
Real is implicated in the subject’s encounter with death 
(Faulkner: The Return of the Repressed, 14).
From this perspective, then, we might see Rezia’s act of sewing as a reversal or 
“undoing” for Septimus (which is in keeping with his previous reversals of 
being “high” as he is “under the sea”); as she sews and speaks he hears her 
rhythms as water, “bubbling, murmuring” and her sentence as a “drip, drip, 
drip,” like a “tap left running.”  On the other side of meaning, having accepted 
the semiotic, “he had become himself.”  While he does speak, it is to direct his 
own gaze: “just look at it,” he says—but what he sees is not an imaginary I that 
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will re-connect him to the world of the symbolic; it is a manifestation of the Real, 
which is the prefiguration of his death.  Understanding, now, that his drawings 
and notes on the backs of envelopes are unable to reach the Real, he tells Rezia, 
“Burn them!” (MD 48).  When she leaves the room to intercept Dr. Holmes, 
Septimus decides to jump out of the window, “but he would wait till the very last 
moment,” we are told.  “He did not want to die.  Life was good.  The sun was 
hot  Only human beings—what did they want?”; it is only when Holmes enters 
that Septimus “flung himself vigorously, violently down on the Mrs. Filmer’s 
area railings” (MD 149), rather than be reinscribed into the symbolic order.
As Septimus’ “double” (according to Woolf in her original preface to the 
novel [“Introduction” vi]), Clarissa serves as not only the rational counterpart to 
his irrationality in the novel’s dialectic, but she also presents the sutured reader 
with a point of identification and reinscription into the symbolic order that 
Septimus so vociferously rejects.  This is not to say, however, that she offers an 
unchallenging or totalizing perspective that negates the reader’s experience, 
with Septimus, of being placed “in process / on trial” (indeed, Woolf’s 
alternation of Clarissa’s stream of consciousness with Septimus’—among the 
others in the novel—keeps the tension between the rational and irrational rising 
throughout the narrative).  When she returns from her trip to buy the flowers, 
she retires to her private bedroom and contemplates her sexless marriage, the 
“virginity preserved through childbirth which clung to her like a sheet” (MD 
31), and considers her attraction to women (“of women together.  For that she 
could dimly perceive” [ (MD 31]).  When other women have confided in her, 
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she did undoubtedly feel what men felt.  Only for a moment; but it 
was enough.  It was a sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush 
which one tried to check and then, as it spread, one yielded to its 
expansion [. . .].  Then, for that moment, she had seen an 
illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning 
almost expressed.   (MD 32)          
From this thinly veiled metaphor for the orgasmic sensation she approaches 
only in moments of feminine contact, she asks herself, “bu this question of love 
(the thought, putting her coat away), this falling in love with women.  Take Sally 
Seton; her relation in the old days with Sally Seton.  Had not that, after all, been 
love?” ( (MD 32).  With Sally she entertains socialist ideals (“they sat, hour after 
hour, talking in her bedroom [. . .] talking about life, how they were to reform 
the word.  They mean to found a society to abolish private property, and 
actually had a letter written, though not sent out” [MD 33]), experiences the 
“feeling as she crossed the hall if it were now to die  ‘twere now to be most 
happy” because Sally is under the same roof at Bourton, and recalls “the most 
exquisite moment of her whole life”: “Sally stopped; picked a flower; kissed her 
on the lips.  The whole world might have turned upside down!  The others 
disappeared; there she was alone with Sally”  (MD 35).  
As remarkable as Clarissa’s meditations on her romantic feelings for 
women in general and Sally in particular may seem now, it is even more 
compelling to consider how Woolf’s contemporary readers, sutured into 
Clarissa’s experience, reacted to being placed in her subject-position.  
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Revealingly, the first reviewers are conspicuously silent about Clarissa’s 
relationship with Sally Seton (as they are about Septimus’ relationship with 
Evans), but the concept of suture may offer some explanation for this: Richard 
Hughes, remarkably summarizes the novel as “an account of a single day in 
London life; its sole principal event is the return from India of Mrs. Dalloway’s 
rejected suitor” (159) and Gerald Bullett believes the central perspective of the 
novel to belong to Peter: “It rests, this penetrating ray, longest upon Peter Walsh 
himself, who is just returned from long exile in India” (163).  P. C. Kennedy 
begins his summary of the novel with “Peter Walsh, home from India, has all his 
life loved Clarissa, who has married Richard Dalloway and borne a daughter, 
Elizabeth.  Clarissa goes for a walk, and sees a motor-car containing a 
Personage [. . .]” (165).  Conspicuously, each of these male reviewers place 
Peter at the center of the novel—even, in Kennedy’s case, to the extent of 
altering the sequence of the novel to make Peter’s return (and not Clarissa or her 
party) the beginning of, and the occasion for, the narrative.  
After her reverie about Sally, Clarissa  passes her dressing table mirror 
and sees “the whole of her[self] at one point (as she looked into the glass), 
seeing the delicate pink face of the woman who was that very night to give a 
party; of Clarissa Dalloway; of herself” (MD 37).  As she studies her reflection, 
she thinks, “how many million times she had seen her face, and always with the 
same imperceptible contraction!  She pursed her lips when she looked in the 
glass [. . .].  That was her self—pointed; dart-like; definite” (MD 37).  As she 
reassures herself of the unity of her identity after her moment of anxiety while 
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shopping, earlier, she is presented as a sharp, “definite” contrast to Septimus, 
who feels empty and undefined, his body “spread like a veil upon a rock” (MD 
69).  While Septimus is a “subject in process,” a “border case,” Clarissa offers a 
more stable, consistent point of identification within the symbolic order, while 
also presenting challenges to its patriarchal authority.  From her moment of self-
reflection, she turns to mend the gown she will wear for her party and, in a turn 
that serves as an interesting counterpoint to the sewing scene with Rezia and 
Septimus, is reunited with Peter Walsh.  Before he rushes in, she sits sewing, 
“calm, content, as her needle, drawing the silk smoothly to its gentle pause, 
collected the green folds together and attached them, very lightly, to the belt.  
So an a summer’s day waves collect, overbalance, and fall; collect and fall; and 
the whole world seems to be saying ‘that is all’ more and more ponderously”  
(MD 39); into this rhythmic peaceful moment where silk and self merge with the 
sea (as opposed to Septimus’ vision of the sea as death and the dissolution of 
self), “the door opened, and in came—for a single second she could not 
remember what he was called! so surprised was she to see him, so glad, so shy, 
so utterly taken aback to have Peter Walsh come to her unexpectedly in the 
morning! (MD 40).  In the conversation that follows, Clarissa continues to sew 
while Peter engages in his habit of playing with his pocket-knife:
   “And what’s all this?” he said, tilting his pen-knife towards her 
green dress.
   He’s very well dressed, thought Clarissa; yet he always criticises 
me.
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   Here she is mending her dress; mending her dress as usual, he 
thought; here she’s been sitting all the time I’ve been to India; 
mending her dress [. . .].
   And she opened her scissors, and said, did he mind her just 
finishing what she was doing to her dress, for they had a party 
that night? (MD 43)
Before his moment of crisis, when he admits he is in love with a woman in India 
and begins to cry, he studies Clarissa and thinks he “would like to make a clean 
breast of it all [. . .] but she is too cold, he thought; sewing, with her scissors; 
Daisy would look ordinary beside Clarissa.  And she would think me a failure. . . 
.  he was a failure, compared with all this—the inlaid table, the mounted paper-
knife, the dolphin and the candlesticks . . . he was a failure!”  (MD 43).  The 
tension in the scene between suture and cutting (“he said, titling his pen-knife 
towards her green dress”; “she opened her scissors”) is analogous to the act of 
reading the novel.  If the process of suture , according to Silverman, is a 
“castrating coherence, this definition of a discursive position for the viewing 
subject which necessitates [. . .] its loss of being” (205), it is important to notice 
the way Peter and Clarissa’s subject-positions each carry a threat of castration: 
as the past and present, the inner and outer, the self and other are brought 
together within the novel, there is always the threat of a narrative cut or shift into 
another consciousness or subject-position.  Importantly, it is Peter’s subject-
position which relents to Clarissa’s: his pretensions to phallic power (his pen-
knife) is no match for her needle, her scissors, her paper-knife, her candlesticks: 
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as he sits, “running his finger along the blade of his knife . . . to his utter 
surprise, suddenly thrown by those uncontrollable forces thrown through the 
air, he burst into tears; wept; wept without the least shame, sitting on the sofa, 
the tears running down his cheeks”  (MD 46).  
Clarissa’s stability within the symbolic order owes much to her belief in 
and interpellation by the class system.  Peter recalls, once, at Bourton, “talking 
about a man who had married his housemaid, one of the neighboring squires [. 
. . . ] he had married his housemaid and she had been brought to Bourton to 
call—an awful visit it had been.  She had been absurdly over-dressed, ‘like a 
cockatoo,’ Clarissa had said” (MD 59); and when she learns that the former 
housemaid had had a baby before the marriage, Clarissa replies, “Oh, I shall 
never be able to speak to her again!” (MD 59).  For all of her self-confidence, 
she depends upon the construction of an “other” to keep herself defined.  On a 
structural level, Septimus is her “other”—the irrational, antisocial side of the 
dialectic for which she represents rationality and the social—but on a personal 
level, Clarissa’s “other” is Doris Kilman.  As Miss Kilman, Elizabeth Dalloway’s 
tutor, waits for Elizabeth, Woolf offers the following description:
outside the door was Miss Kilman, as Clarissa knew; Miss Kilman 
in her mackintosh, listening to whatever they said.
   Yes, Miss Kilman stood on the landing, and wore a mackintosh 
but had  her reasons.  First, it was cheap; second, she was over 
forty; and did not, after all dress to please.  She was poor, 
moreover; degradingly poor.  Otherwise she would not be taking 
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jobs from people like the Dalloways; from rich people, who liked 
to be kind.  Mr. Dalloway, to do him justice, had been kind.  But 
Mrs. Dalloway had not.  She had been merely condescending.  
She came from the most worthless of all classes—the rich, with a 
smattering of culture.  They had expensive things everywhere; 
pictures, carpets, lots of servants.  She considered that she had a 
perfect right to anything that the Dalloways did for her.  (MD 123) 
If the “other” is that which designates and defines subjectivity, both Clarissa and 
Miss Kilman see each other as  “the other.”   What is particularly interesting 
about this passage is the way Woolf makes the transition from Clarissa’s 
consciousness (“Clarissa knew”) to Miss Kilman’s ambiguous; without 
attributing any directives or tags, it is not clear that we have moved into Miss 
Kilman’s consciousness until we read “people like the Dalloways.”  As with Sir 
William’s perspective on “proportion” and “conversion,” the reader is kept from 
a direct identification or suture with Miss Kilman: like Sir William’s, her values 
are introduced only to be exposed as antithetical to Clarissa’s and Septimus’.  
Cast as self-righteous, sanctimonious, and hypocritical, Miss Kilman, we are 
told, “pitied and despised” Clarissa Dalloway, and wishes to expose, to 
“unmask” Clarissa: “If only,” we are told,  “she could make her weak; could ruin 
her; humiliate her; bring her to her knees crying, You are right!  But this was 
God’s will, not Miss Kilman’s.  It was to be a religious victory.  so she glared; so 
she glowered” (MD 125).  Perhaps more damning, for postwar readers, than her 
religious zealotry, is her German heritage (“It was true that the family was of 
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German origin; spelt the name Kiehlman” [MD 123]) and belief that “after all, 
there were people who did not think the English invariably right” about the War 
(MD 130).  Despite her “pity” for Clarissa (MD 132), “she minded looking as 
she did beside Clarissa . . . but why wish to resemble her?  Why?  She despised 
Mrs. Dalloway from the bottom of her heart.  She was not serious.  She was not 
good.  Her life was a tissue of vanity and deceit.  Yet Doris Kilman had been 
overcome” (MD 128).  As her “other,” Clarissa is all that Miss Kilman is not, yet 
also what she desires to be.  After she purchases her petticoat and is unable to 
keep Elizabeth with her any longer, Miss Kilman is left alone, admitting that 
“Mrs. Dalloway had triumphed” as she is left to walk through the department 
store, “through all the commodities of the world, perishable and permanent, 
hams, drugs, flowers, stationary, variously smelling, now sweet, now sour she 
lurched” until, like Peter Walsh, she is faced with her own reflection: she “saw 
herself thus lurching with her hat askew, very red in the face, full length in a 
looking-glass; and at last came out into the street” (MD 133).  Unlike Peter, 
however, or Clarissa, for that matter, Doris Kilman does not experience any 
crisis of subjectivity; she goes immediately to Westminster Cathedral to pray.  As 
the only consumer in the novel, she is also the least sympathetic and the least 
self-reflexive.  While she is haunted by her desire to “resemble” Clarissa, she 
does not acknowledge how her subjectivity is dependent upon her.
Clarissa, on the other hand, unencumbered by religious hypocrisy, does 
try to understand Miss Kilman and her own feelings of antipathy toward her.  As 
she thinks about Elizabeth’s relationship with Miss Kilman, Clarissa thinks, 
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but why with Miss Kilman?  who had been badly treated, of 
course; one must make allowances for that [ . . .].   Anyhow they 
were inseparable, and Elizabeth, her own daughter, went to 
Communion [. . .].  She was never in the room five minutes 
without making you feel her superiority, your inferiority; how 
poor she was; how rich you were; how she lived in a slum 
without a cushion or a bed or a rug or whatever it might be, all 
her soul rusted with that grievance sticking in it, her dismissal 
from school during the War—poor embittered unfortunate 
creature!  For it was not her one hated but  the idea of her[. . .].  
(MD 12)         
Able to separate the person from the “idea,” Clarissa humanizes Miss Kilman 
and is aware that the offense she causes is to Clarissa’s own sense of self.  Even 
as Miss Kilman stands in judgment of her, Clarissa sees her and, “second by 
second, the idea of her diminished, how hatred, (which was for ideas, not 
people) crumbled, how she lost her malignity, her size, became second by 
second merely Miss Kilman, in a mackintosh, whom Heaven knows Clarissa 
would have liked to help” (MD 126).  Finally, at her party, Clarissa realizes that 
designating “Kilman her enemy” was “satisfying.”  Startlingly, she admits, “she 
hated her: she loved her.  It was enemies one wanted, not friends” (MD 175).  
To secure her sense of self as her party begins, she simultaneously admits her 
rejection of and need for Miss Kilman.
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   As useful as Miss Kilman is in helping to uphold her identity, it is only 
when Clarissa learns of Septimus’ suicide that the dialectic between the 
irrational and rational comes to a close and Clarissa’s perspective is validated.  
When Sir William relays the news of Septimus’ death and Clarissa is made to 
visualize it, she is at first stunned that death has intruded upon her party; 
ultimately, though, she realizes that
The young man had killed himself; but she did not pity him; with 
the clock striking the hour, one, two, three, she did not pity him [. 
. . .].  She felt somehow very like him—the young man who had 
killed himself.  She felt glad he had done it; thrown it away.  The 
clock was striking.  The leaden circles dissolved in the air.  He 
made her feel the beauty, made her feel the fun.  (MD 186)
Septimus’ death is presented as that which not only enables her to sustain the 
“beauty” and “fun” of her class, it is also presented as a victory for the symbolic.  
As the representative of the chaotic, irrational semiotic, Septimus, the “border 
case,” threatens to collapse boundaries not only of class, but also of and 
signification and subjectivity.  With the death of Septimus, the reader, along 
with Clarissa, is left re-inscribed into a stable identity.  
Where the suture of Mrs. Dalloway differs from the suture of cinema, 
however, is that, while “the viewing subject’s position is an supremely passive 
one,” according to Silverman, and offers to “disrupt the existing symbolic order 
[and] dislocat[es] the subject-positions within it,” it does so “only in order to 
subsequently re-affirm that order, those positions, those ideals” (Silverman 231; 
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221).  Reading Mrs. Dalloway, on the other hand, must be active and, as John 
Crawford notes, demands “a sort of creative collaboration.”  As Woolf writes in 
“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” “it is this division between reader and writer, this 
humility on your part, these professional airs and graces on ours, that corrupt 
and emasculate the books which should be the healthy offspring of a close and 
equal alliance between us” (336); interpellating the reader as a collaborator, she 
contributed to the creation of the modern consciousness.
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Four
Addie’s Coffin and the Narrative I/Eyecon: Faulkner’s Typographic Semiotics
At the 1983 Faulkner and Yoknapatawpha Conference, André Bleikasten 
called for a redirection in Faulkner studies.  Addressing a predominately New 
Critical audience, he argued that “there has been much more interest in what 
[Faulkner’s] fiction is presumed to say (its social or psychological significance, 
its moral “message,” etc.) than in what it is, how it functions, and what it does” 
(“Reading Faulkner” 16).  Although some recent critics have tried to address the 
aesthetic dimensions of Faulkner’s texts, to account for the way these texts 
function, there is still considerable lacunae in the scholarship.  In particular, 
while there has been no shortage of arguments about the indeterminacy and 
inadequacy of language which oppress many of Faulkner’s central characters, 
few inroads have been made in connecting this thematic “message,” to use 
Bleikasten’s term, with the radical textual and typographical experiments that 
distinguish the novels of his “high modernist” period.  Conventionally, 
Faulkner’s stylistics have been relegated to heuristic status; they function to 
define character, to advance (or defer) the plot, or to approximate “pre-speech” 
levels of consciousness.  When his “technique” is foregrounded—as in Michael 
J. Toolan’s more recent The Stylistics of Fiction: A Literary-Linguistic Approach 
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(1990) (which pays more attention to the more conventional later work, 
specifically Go Down, Moses)—Faulkner’s narrative innovations are 
domesticated into pat syntactic units and deictic and lexical patterns.  If indeed 
Faulkner’s early experimental novels, namely As I Lay Dying and The Sound 
and the Fury are, in the words of one representative critic, “about language and 
experience and experience in language” (Delville 62), it follows that a study of 
his unconventional typography cannot be ignored in favor of thematic or 
character analysis (no matter how informed by poststructuralism); rather, the 
textuality must be read as a concretization or materialization of the crisis in 
signification.  If there has  been a critical inability to reconcile what As I Lay 
Dying and The Sound and the Fury “mean” and how they function, it is 
because linguistic critics after Bleikasten have employed, almost exclusively, a 
Saussurean approach to novels which clearly do not conform to the strict 
signified/signifier binarism.  Because these texts foreground the materiality of 
language and the page, because they introduce typographical features and 
pictograms as substitutes for syntactic signs, and because they attempt to 
present the unsayable, As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the Fury, to be read 
on their own terms, “to heed [their] uncertainties and indeterminacies, [their] 
disjunctions and dissonacnes” (Bleikasten 17), must be considered from the 
semiotic perspectives of Julia Kristeva and C. S. Peirce.
The metatextuality of As I Lay Dying is evident from the first pages when 
we are introduced into Darl Bundren’s fragmented consciousness and reaches 
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its apex in Tull’s section, when the reader is presented, mid-sentence, with a 
drawing of the coffin Cash has made for Addie:
They had laid her in it reversed.  Cash made it clock shape, like 
this  with every joint and seam beveled and scrubbed 
with the plane, tight as a drum and neat as a sewing basket, and 
they had laid her in it head to foot so it wouldn’t crush the dress.  
It was her wedding dress and it had a flare-out bottom, and they 
had laid her head to foot in it so the dress could spread out [. . .].  
(AILD 88).
What is perhaps as startling as this interruption in the narrative is the lack of 
critical attention it has received.  To date only two articles have focused on this 
drawing: Michael Kaufmann’s “The Textual Coffin and Narrative Corpse of As I 
Lay Dying” (reprinted in his book Textual Bodies: Modernism, Postmodernism, 
and Print) and Barry McCann’s “Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying: The Coffin 
Pictogram and the Function of Form.”  According to Kauffman, the coffin 
exemplifies the central conflict in the novel: the tension between the oral (“tall”) 
tale of the narrative and the printed page.  He writes:  
The dominance of the coffin—in print and in the 
narrative—exposes the posteriority of the printed text, the fact that 
all print accounts—even those like As I Lay Dying in the present 
tense—are past accounts [. . .].  It is as if the morbidity of Addie’s 
corpse and her coffin container reveal the nature of the text itself, 
exposing the illusion of the present tense and the preterite nature 
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of the printed text, which is always already “done,” always already 
dead, a coffin encasing its formerly living oral content.  The 
exposure reveals Faulkner’s high-modernism in his showing of 
printed form and its intersection with narrative, yet the contrast of 
dead print with living oral tradition recalls early modernism’s 
attempt to revivify printed language with speech.  (47)
Turning his attention to Addie’s section of the novel, Kauffman concludes that 
“her voice destabilizes all voices” and “makes it apparent that no living voice 
speaks from beyond the page.  All the voices in the book must be seen as 
printed voices [. . .].  Addie’s complaint about the disjunction between words 
and deeds, then, does not show Faulkner’s distrust of language so much as his 
uneasiness with printed language” (48).  What Kauffman overlooks is crucial 
here.  As I Lay Dying does not present soliloquies—not “voices”—but the 
predominately unvocalized consciousnesses of alternating characters.  
However much the “plot” of the novel resembles a folk tale, it is nevertheless 
recast as unspoken discourse.  Not only is there little foundation to support that 
Faulkner was “uneasy” with printed language (indeed, the biographical 
evidence reveals him to have been a much more recalcitrant speaker than 
writer), Kauffman, in insisting on the disjunction between print and speech, 
misses the point that consciousness is not exclusively linguistic and that what 
would be implausible in speech (the introduction of images) is 
endemic—indeed elemental—to thought.
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For McCann, “the coffin pictogram is a structural symbol” for the 
Bundren Family, on the one hand: “In giving a geometric diagram, Faulkner 
begs the reader to notice the coffin has six sides, with perfect symmetry.  
Interestingly enough, there are six family members, excluding Addie: Darl, 
Jewel, Case, Dewey Dell, Vardaman, and Anse.  Addie, naturally, fills the coffin” 
(273).  On the other hand, “with the coffin shape,” McCann also suggests, 
Faulkner replaces an “abstract idea” with a “concrete object”:
The pictogram is similar to Lacan’ mathematical symbol of S/s, 
which represents “distinct orders separated initially by a barrier 
resisting signification,” “the signifier over the signified” [. . .].  In 
linguistic terms, the coffin pictogram (signifier) transforms itself 
into a metonymic chain that holds the novel together across levels 
of reading [. . .].  The metonymy exchanges the inner (death) for 
the outer (coffin), but neither exists apart from each other; they 
exist in tension with one another.  In linguistic terms, the signifier 
does not hold together a larger meaning structure—the tension 
between the signifier and the signified is the bonding force.  Or, 
in Neo-Freudian terms, this tension is the desire to find meaning, 
to discover true substance and identity behind the form.  (273, 
279)
As tempting as it may be to read the coffin image as a resisting signifier, this 
does not yet account for its inclusion in the text.  While McCann’s gesture 
towards a Lacanian reading of the family structure is promising, his similar 
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reading of the narrative structure is less so;  to read the coffin image as simply a 
depiction of “the structure of inner/outer or signified/signifier” within the novel 
(276) reduces what is, in point of fact, an iconic sign into a simple Saussurean 
binarism.  Unlike Saussure, Peirce’s triadic model of the sign allows for the 
possibility of a relational connection between an object and the signifier.  
Peirce’s often quoted definition of the sign is important to repeat here:
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity.  It 
addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an 
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign.  That sign 
which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign.  The sign 
stands for something, its object.  It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes 
called the ground of the representamen.  (“Logic as Semiotic: The 
Theory of Signs” 4)
For our purposes, the significance of this passage is that the “object” relation to 
the sign is considered a necessary (even fundamental) element in the signifying 
process.  To read Faulkner’s drawing of the coffin as testament either of his 
“uneasiness with printed language” or as a narrative symbol of the inability to 
reconcile words and meaning (S/s) is to overlook the fact that Faulkner is not 
lamenting the inadequacy of signification, he is asserting and insisting that the 
literary sign evidence the richness and complexity of triadicity.  The coffin 
drawing, in Peircean terms, is an icon (a “hypoicon,” the be exact, insofar as it is 
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a material reproduction of the Addie’s actual coffin).  An icon, as Peirce defines 
it, falls within the secondary class of signs; it is
a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it 
as a First.  That is, a quality that is has qua thing renders it fit to be 
a representamen.  Thus, anything is fit to be a Substitute for 
anything that it is like [. . .] a sign may be iconic, that is, may 
represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its 
mode of being.  (“Logic as Semiotic” 10)
Because Tull evokes the image as an immediate explanation of the shape of the 
coffin Cash has beveled, it may be labeled a “diagram”; it “represent[s], mainly 
dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their 
own parts” (“Logic as Semiotic” 10).  Elsewhere Peirce emphasizes the 
seductiveness of the icon:
I call a sign which stands for something merely because it 
resembles it, an icon.  Icons are so completely substituted for their 
objects as hardly to be distinguished from them [. . .].  A diagram, 
indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; 
but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that 
abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very 
thing.  So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when 
we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of 
the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure 
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dream,—not any particular existence, and yet not general.  At that 
moment we are contemplating an icon.  (Essential Peirce 226)
Degenerate or illusory as it may be, the coffin hypoicon-diagram is the 
concretization, the realization of the coffin which is the controlling sign in As I 
Lay Dying. 
It is important, in light of Peirce’s definition, to recall the context in which 
the icon appears.  We are, ostensibly, in Tull’s unmediated consciousness, yet 
he offers the diagram as an analogy: “Cash made it clock shape, like this” (AILD 
88); as Kauffman points out, the icon concretizes the gesture Cash made earlier 
in novel.  Responding to Addie’s dying call,
He looks up at the gaunt face framed by the window in the 
twilight.  It is the composite picture of all time since he was a 
child.  He drops the saw and lifts the board for her to see, 
watching the window in which the face has not moved.  He drags 
a second plank into position and slants the two of them into their 
final juxtaposition, gesturing toward the ones yet on the ground, 
shaping with his empty hand in pantomime the finished box.  For
a while still she looks down at him from the composite picture, 
neither with censure or approbation.  Then the face disappears.  
(AILD 48)
Addie dies when she is certain that the coffin will be finished.  Tull’s qualifying 
statement “like this” serves not only to establish the diagram as an iconic 
manifestation of Cash’s pantomime, it also calls attention to the analogous 
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nature of the icon and the object; the icon in the text is like Addie’s actual 
smooth wooden coffin (with the rough-edged holes drilled in by Vardaman) in 
much the same way that the “unconscious is structured like a language” in 
Lacan’s formulation (Four Fundamental Concepts 149): it works as a kind of 
condensation and displacement of the signifier “coffin” for the “actual” coffin.  
That this is indeed the case is evidenced by the original manuscript of As I Lay 
Dying.  As George Palmer Garrett notes in his article “Some Revisions of As I Lay 
Dying,” Faulkner’s often-quoted claim that the novel was conceived as a “tour 
de force” that required little revision seems to be substantiated by comparing 
the typescript with the final printed text; importantly, one of the few substantive 
changes Faulkner made was the deletion of the word “coffin” from the scene 
quoted above (Garrett 416).  “In the manuscript version,” Garrett observes, “the 
box which Cash is making for his mother, Addie Bundren, is called a coffin [. . 
.].  In the printed text “coffin” is deleted” (416).  Indeed, in the printed version, 
the word “coffin”—in a novel centered around one—is mentioned only eight 
times (22, 79 [2 instances], 187, 191, 219, 221, 222), and only twice before the 
icon appears in the text (significantly, the word is spoken by Cora and Tull in 
their respective sections—not by the Bundrens).  What the textual scholarship 
reveals is that Faulkner did not, as McCann assumes, use the coffin “as a 
physical structure” as a “substitution of ‘death’ for ‘coffin’” (279); the icon does 
not repress the word “death”; it replaces the signifier “coffin” for an “actual” (to 
the “middle part of our reasoning”) coffin.  Earlier in the novel, Jewel’s inability 
to say “coffin” appears in the text as two interesting typographical elisions:
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“It’s laying there, watching Cash whittle on that damn. . . . . . .”  
Jewel says.
He  says it harshly, savagely, but he does not  say the word [. . .].
“If everybody wasn’t burning hell to get her there,” Jewel says in 
that harsh, savage voice.  “With Cash all day long right under her 
window, hammering and sawing at that——” (AILD 19)
In what are clearly—on the level of characterization—repressive moments are, 
typographically, gaps or interruptions in the narrative which predicate the 
appearance of the icon.  The arbitrary signifier “coffin” is replaced by textual 
space, by diacritical icons, in the same way that Tull’s diagram will substitute the 
word for the object.  
To understand the role the coffin icon plays within the narrative design, 
we need to look again at Addie’s section.  If there is a critical consensus about 
Addie, it is that she feels herself to be excluded from the symbolic order of 
signification.  While it is true that Addie does find words to be inadequate, “that 
words are no good; that words dont ever fit even what they are trying to say at” 
(AILD 171), it is incorrect to say that she is feels marginalized or excluded by 
language.  For Addie, a word is “just a shape to fill a lack” (AILD 172); words are 
“like spiders dangling by their mouths from a beam, swinging and twisting and 
never touching” (AILD 173), and she reflects on the arbitrariness of names:
Sometimes I would like by him in the dark, hearing the land that 
was now of my blood and flesh, and I would think: Anse.  Why 
Anse.  Why are you Anse.  I would think about his name until 
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after a while I could see the word as a shape, a vessel, and I would 
watch him liquify and flow into it like cold molasses flowing out of 
the darkness into the vessel, until the jar stood full and motionless: 
a significant shape profoundly without life like an empty 
doorframe; and then I would find that I had forgotten the name of 
the jar.  I would think: The shape of my body where I used to be a 
virgin is in the shape of a               and I couldn’t think Anse, 
couldn’t remember Anse [. . .].  And when I would think Cash and 
Darl that way until their names would die and solidify into shape 
and then fade away, I would say All right.  It doesn’t matter.  It 
doesn’t matter what they call them.  (AILD 175)
What should be noted here is that Addie’s dilemma is not Saussurean; she is not 
struggling to match the signifier and signified—we should not forget that Addie 
is a teacher and clearly more articulate than her husband.  Rather, she is 
rejecting the abstraction of the arbitrary signifier and emphasizing instead the 
concrete referent.  By meditating on the letters of names and mutating these 
names into objects—molasses, spiders, a door frame, an empty jar—she is 
materializing the sign in a way that Sausurrean linguistics simply cannot 
address: for Saussure, “the mode of inscription is irrelevant, because it does not 
affect the system.  Whether I write in black or white, in incised characters or 
relief, with a pen or a chisel—none of that is of any importance for the meaning” 
(Course in General Linguistics 118).  Further, her substitution of things for words 
(the inversion of the signifying process)—her “undoing” of 
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language—replicates the formal or typographic insistence on the icon.  As 
Bleikasten points out,
While language is commonly assumed to be both referential and 
expressive, neither of these functions is acknowledged by Addie.  
Words, she contends, fail to make contact with the world around 
and within us.  And not only do they fall short of their presumed 
referents; the trouble with them is is not just that they do not lead 
anywhere but that they are perversely misleading [. . .].  To Addie 
words are in the last resort all negatives, denying the existence or, 
to put it another way around, asserting the nonexistence of what 
they are supposed to signify. (Ink of Melancholy 202)
Addie’s (and Faulkner’s) foregrounding of the materiality of signs effectuates a 
transposition: she asserts the “nonexistence” of what words signify by replacing 
them with iconic representations, with physical objects.  Doreen Fowler 
convincingly argues that Addie’s voice is not marginalized but contentious: 
“Addie Bundren,” she writes, “issues a challenge to paternal structures of 
meaning” (50).  Significantly, the paginal gap introduced by Addie—”The 
shape of my body where I used to be a virgin is in the shape of a              and I 
couldn’t think Anse” (AILD 175)—not only elides the signifier but erases it.  The 
lacuna is structurally linked to Jewel’s inability to say “coffin” and Tull’s “like 
this”; however, Addie does not repress the word—she literalizes it.  Her womb is 
a “vessel” as empty as Tull’s diagram and her virginity has been lost, is it 
“dead”; but Addie does not need to say “like this”—she does not substitute one 
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signifier for another, she does not give us another “shape to fill a lack”—instead 
she gives the concrete representation of a lack.  She iconicizes absence.
In Kristevan terms, Addie is in search of the “true-real”; the negation of 
the signified in favor of the materialized signifier.  Indeed, Addie’s narrated 
consciousness seems to be a case study in the “hallucinatory weft of hysteria”:
In hysterical discourse, truth, when not weighted down by the 
symptom, often assumes the obsessive, unsayable and 
emotionally charged weft of visual representation.  Floating in 
isolation, this  vision of the unnamed real rejects all nomination 
and any possible narrative [. . .].  This heterogeneous semiotic 
encounter (sound/vision, pre-object/sign) is a hallucination that
marks the insistence of the true-real, an archaic and salutary 
attempt to elaborate the irruption of the real that leaves a hole in 
the symbolical weft of hysterical discourse.  This hallucination 
recurs periodically, in order to indicate, like an icon, an 
unutterable jouissance that endangers the symbolic resources of 
the speaking being.  The hallucinatory icon, which becomes 
obsessive by virtue of its repetition, challenges what may be 
structured as a language [. . .].  (“The True-Real” 227, 230; 
emphasis added)
For the hysteric and the modern artist, the signifier merges with the referent in a 
“so-called natural language” (“The True-Real” 218) akin to what Kristeva has 
elsewhere called the “semiotic,” the maternal space that precedes the 
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establishment of the sign.  Addie’s sensitivity to “the voiceless speech” of the 
“dark land” and the surplus of references to “boiling blood,” milk, and tears are 
“metaphors of non-speech, of a ‘semiotics’ that linguistic communication does 
not account for [. . .].  They re-establish what is non-verbal and show up the 
receptacle of a signifying disposition that is closer to the so-called ‘primary-
processes’” (“Stabat Mater” 174).  Addie’s denigration of the symbolic, seen not 
only in her materialization of words, but also in her insistence on concrete 
“visual representation” (it should be remembered that the novel opens with her 
watching Cash assemble her coffin—she does not accept his “word” that he will 
finish it to her specifications) is consistent with the typographical project of the 
novel.  
Indeed, to read Addie’s section apart from the rest of the narrative is to 
overlook the connection between her insistence on the “true-real” and the 
Faulkner’s use of iconicity.  Critics like Karen R. Sass who claim that Addie’s 
section is an assertion of her own subjectivity, albeit one she cannot articulate 
“since love, motherhood, sin, pride, fear—discourse itself—all have been 
constructed in male terms that exclude her” (10) ignore the fact that language is 
problematized throughout the novel.  Cash is presented by Darl as being 
incapable of expressing his thoughts (“He looked at me, his eyes fumbling, the 
words fumbling at what he was trying to say” [AILD 132]), Jewel cannot utter the 
word “coffin,” and Addie herself admits that “I had been tricked by words older 
than Anse or love, and that the same word tricked Anse too” (AILD 172), in 
alignment with the postmodern understanding that all gendered subjects are 
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inmates in the “prison-house” of language.  If Addie’s desire to replace words 
with icons, to exist within  the “true-real,” is understood as symptomatic of the 
novel, the text comes into sharper focus.  Faulkner’s impressionistic (or, as 
Kauffman terms it, “two-dimensional” [39]) representation of scene and 
character (Darl describes the barn fire as a “Greek frieze,” [AILD 221],  Jewel has 
“pale eyes set into his wooden face” [AILD 5], Jewel and his horse are “like two 
figures carved for a tableau savage in the sun” [AILD 12], Anse’s grieving face 
looks “carved by a savage caricaturist a monstrous burlesque of all 
bereavement flowed” [AILD 78], and Addie, on her deathbed, appears to Cash 
as a “composite picture of all time since he was a child” [AILD 48]) are in fact 
iconic depictions.  Additionally, the other textual gaps—the mimetic spacing in 
Darl’s first section:
I go on to the house, followed by the  Chuck.      Chuck.    Chuck.   
of the adze. (AILD 5)
and the depiction of the cow in Vardaman’s final section:
I hear the cow a long time, clopping on the street.  Then she 
comes into the square.  She goes across the square, her head 
down  clopping      .
She lows.  There was nothing in the square before she lowed, but 
it wasn’t empty.  Now it is empty after she lowed.  She goes on,      
clopping            . (AILD 251)
both replicate Addie’s iconography of silence.  Faulkner does not try to repress 
the unsayable; he does not try to fill the silence with abstract signifiers; his novel 
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demonstrates and dramatizes Addie’s desire for the “true-real,” for the “natural 
language” of the icon.
The Sound and the Fury, although written before As I Lay Dying, 
complicates the notion of typographical iconicity.  In the first two sections of the 
novel, Faulkner presents the consciousnesses of two brothers: one, foreclosed 
from language entirely, the other, deteriorating into psychosis; in both cases, 
Faulkner develops unique typographical features which serve to mirror the 
crisis in signification each experiences.  In the last section, Faulkner includes 
another provocative textual icon—a drawn eye—which, like Addie’s coffin, 
condenses and concretizes the semiotic struggle that suffuses the narrative.
The novel begins within the consciousness of Benjy, a thirty-three-year-
old man (led by the Compson family servant’s son, Luster) who exhibits the self-
absorbed, incommunicable traits of autism, who describes what is later revealed 
to be golfers “hitting”:
Luster was hunting in the grass by the flower tree.  They took the 
flag out, and they were hitting [. . .].    
“Here, caddie.”  He hit.  They went away across the pasture.  I 
held to the fence and watched them going away. 
   “Listen at you, now.”  Luster said.  “Aint you something, thirty-
three years old, going on that way.  After I done went all the way 
to town to buy you a cake.  Hush up that moaning” [. . .].
We went along the fence and came to the garden fence, where 
our shadows were [. . .].  We came to the broken place and went 
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through it. “Wait a minute.”  Luster said.  “You snagged on that 
nail again.  Cant you never crawl through here without snagging 
on that nail.”
Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through.  Uncle Maury said 
to not let anybody see us, so we better stoop over, Caddy said.  
(SF 3-4 [sic])  
Hearing the summons for the “caddie,” Benjy is reminded of the loss of his 
sister, Candace, or, “Caddy.”  When Benjy gets caught up on a nail as he and 
Luster crawl under the fence, Benjy (and the reader) is immediately thrust back 
twenty-eight years to December 23, 1900, when Caddy “uncatches” him from 
the same nail on their way to deliver their Uncle’s letter to Mrs. Patterson (SF 3);  
Benjy cannot discern between signifieds and signifiers, between past and 
present:  he “floats” perpetually between the them.  The narrative itself 
demonstrates Benjy’s ambivalent signification process by presenting subjective 
consciousness with an objective tone: it is only through Luster’s commentary 
that we know Benjy is upset.  Bleikasten, in his book The Most Splendid Failure, 
suggests that
There is no central I through whose agency [Benjy’s] speech 
might be ordered and made meaningful; in like manner, there is 
no sense of identity to make his experience his [. . .].  Benjy’s 
monologue sends us back to the confusions of the pre-subjective, 
pre-logic, animistic world of infancy.  Since there is no distinction 
between I and non-I, there can be no boundary between inner 
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and outer space, and nothing to focalize what Benjy does, 
perceives, or suffers.  (71)
What is remarkable about Benjy’s section is that it is a textualization of the pre-
symbolic, “animistic” stage—it foregrounds the “the voiceless speech” not only 
of subjective consciousness, but also of the unrepresentable; “that is closer to 
the so-called ‘primary-processes’” (Kristeva, “Stabat Mater” 174): what Kristeva 
calls the “semiotic.”  In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva distinguishes 
her conceptualization of the semiotic from the general science of signs 
(although it is telling that she aligns her term with Peirce’s “semeiotic”), and 
instead defines it as “a modality of significance in which the linguistic sign is not 
yet articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between real 
and symbolic” (26-7).  The semiotic precedes the practice of naming, of 
designating something as a sign, a symbol that stands for or represents 
something else.  Because Benjy can speak only through moans and cries like 
an infant, his “speech” is semiotic; he is unable to distinguish between the “I 
and non-I,” and he therefore cannot comprehend the abstract, referential nature 
of language.  
As Deborah E. Barker and Ivo Kamps point out in their article “Much 
Ado About Nothing: Language and Desire in The Sound and the Fury,” 
“because Benjy cannot use language to control his world, naming Caddy does 
not create her through language; it only makes manifest her absence.  Only 
physical objects associated with Caddy can pacify him” (388); because Benjy 
cannot speak, because he has not mastered the concept that words serve as 
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substitutes for what they name, he is not able to master the rift between presence 
and absence that signification teaches.  Benjy is fixated in the pre-linguistic 
realm where he can only recall Caddy’s attempts to bring him to the point of 
signification; as when she tries to teach him the meaning of the word, “ice”: 
“Look.”  She broke the top of the water and held a piece of it against my face.  
“Ice.  That means how cold it is” (SF 13).  Of course, Caddy can hold any 
number of objects before Benjy—a slipper, a jimson weed, a rutabaga—and he 
would not be able to pair the abstraction with the object to which it refers.  
Nevertheless, his sister is Benjy’s only hope of learning language, of helping 
him close the curtain—represented by italics—that separates past from present, 
presence from absence; when she is gone, he can only “beller” and wait for her 
to appear.
It is important to note that Benjy’s foreclosure from abstract signification 
is replicated on the level of the text.  In a subtle legerdemain, Faulkner makes 
language alien for the reader as well; we must relearn how to “read” when we 
approach the novel for the first time.  In addition to the text’s defamiliarization of 
language,  The Sound and the Fury also elevates the signifier to the level of the 
signified, as it were.  The material words themselves are invested with 
significance beyond mere symbolic meaning; their “strangeness” (underscored 
by the unconventional punctuation and use of italics) is meant to approximate 
the realm anterior to abstraction—the world of “concrete operations”: the 
presymbolic semiotic.  As Noel Polk suggests in “Trying Not to Say: A Primer on 
Language in The Sound and the Fury,” Benjy’s “narrative” is not linguistic, but 
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“completely visual [. . .].  The written language of the Benjy section stands as a 
direct objective correlative to Benjy’s physical and visual sensations and may 
best be taken as the direct linguistic counterpart to a primitive painter’s 
technique” (145).  To put it in Peircean terms, his section is primarily iconic.  
Benjy exists in a realm of objects, not language.  Although his thoughts are 
presented in syntax (albeit rudimentary and ungrammatical), it is clear that this is 
a narrative approximation of  “a ‘semiotics’ that linguistic communication does 
not account for “ (Kristeva, “Stabat Mater” 174).  
The textuality—particularly Faulkner’s innovative use of italic type to 
denote shifts in time and consciousness—positions us within Benjy’s “semiotic” 
consciousness.  As Polk points out, Benjy’s section is “cinematic”; in the text, 
italics are used to
represent images buried in Benjy’s unconscious which work their 
way into the front of his conscious life [. . .].  It begins as a dim 
and fuzzy italic shape in his memory [. . .] then emerges 
completely into focus as a full-blown scenario in the next 
paragraph, in roman type, which throughout his section 
represents what is currently at the front of his mind.  (147)
The italicized word retains its denotative, symbolic weight (insofar as no 
intonational or emphatic dimension added) for the reader, yet the function of 
the word as an arbitrary sign is undermined in relation to its material 
significance.  Because the type exists as a chronological signifier, independent 
of the narrative language, the italicizing is indexical: just as smoke indicates fire, 
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italics indicate time shifts in The Sound and the Fury.  The importance of 
Faulkner’s indexical experiment is that words are made into visual signifiers; the 
symbolic relevance of language is concomitant with the materiality of the word.  
In Faulkner’s narrative forest, Saussure’s famous “Tree” is not composed of a 
concept and sound-image but of scaly-barked branchy skeletons—of “actual” 
(even if approximated and “degenerate”) trees—and they all smell like Caddy.  
To be more specific, the italics are not only symbolic (they are not simply 
“shapes” or “vessels” to carry meaning), they are 
iconic (in the same way that Addie’s coffin is iconic) and indexical.  In “Logic as 
Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,” C. S. Peirce defines the index as a 
 sign, or representation, which refers to its object not so much 
because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor because it is 
associated with general characteristics which that object happens 
to possess, as because it is in dynamical (including spatial) 
connection both with the individual object, on the one hand, and 
with the sense of memory of the person for whom it serves as a 
sign, on the other hand [. . .].  But it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to instance an absolutely pure index, or to find any 
sign absolutely devoid of the indexical quality.  Psychologically, 
the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity, and 
not upon association by resemblance or upon intellectual 
operations. (12-13)
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For Peirce, “anything which focusses the attention is an index.  Anything which 
startles us is an index” (13).  Indices do not work linguistically in the 
conventional sense—they are immediate, sensed: they shift our attention 
reflexively.  Now for the inexperienced reader of Faulkner, the italics may not be 
entirely indexical (if anything is, as Peirce himself notes); we need to learn the 
convention before we can slide easily and unthinkingly from past to present 
when italics are encountered; but within the world of the novel we must come 
to acknowledge that for Benjy, italics do in fact serve as thunderclaps, as a “rap 
on the door”: when he encounters the nail on the fence his is thrust back, 
instantly, indexically, to another temporal moment.  Arguably, all diacritical 
marks (indeed, all words) are, at least to some extent, indexical; Faulkner’s 
italics, however, are meant not merely to modulate meaning (by adding 
emphasis to a particular word, for example)—they are textual weathervanes of 
sorts which signal narrative transitions.
Interestingly enough, Faulkner’s innovative use of italic type was, as he 
saw it, an unsatisfactory bureaucratic compromise: his experiment to privilege 
the textual materiality of The Sound and the Fury was initially even more 
revolutionary; as he reminded his agent, Ben Wasson, in a letter in 1929, after 
Wasson had changed all of Faulkner’s italics to roman type:
I think italics are necessary to establish for the reader Benjy’s 
confusion; that unbroken-surfaced confusion of an idiot which is 
outwardly a dynamic and logical coherence [. . .].  I wish 
publishing was advanced enough to use colored ink for such, as I 
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argued with you [. . . ] in the speakeasy that day.  But the form in 
which you now have it is pretty tough.  It presents a most dull and 
poorly articulated picture to my eye [. . .] I think it is rotten, as it is.  
But if you wont have it so, I’ll just have to save the idea until 
publishing grows up to it [. . .].  (Selected Letters 44-45)
Faulkner, who was in the process of publishing a book he had thought too 
experimental to be publishable, did not feel that he was in a position to demand 
that his manuscript be printed, at great cost, in various colors.  Several years 
later, Random House proposed a special printing of The Sound and the Fury 
that never materialized; Faulkner wrote to Malcolm Cowley in 1945, inquiring 
about the manuscript:
About S & F.  Someone at Random House has my copy.  About 
10 years ago we had notion to reprint, using different color [sic] 
inks to clarify chronology, etc.  I underlined my copy in different 
color crayons [. . .] maybe they can dig it up.  (Selected Letters 
207)
Faulkner’s marked copy has never been recovered and there have been no 
attempts to produce an edition of the novel in anything but standard (black) ink.  
Bennett Cerf, the founder of Random House mentions the fiasco in his 
autobiography, At Random:
In 1934 we planned and actually announced a special limited 
edition of The Sound and the Fury in which the first section 
would be printed in different colors to indicate different time 
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levels.  A great deal of effort and negotiation went into the project, 
but it was finally abandoned when the printer let us down.  
Unfortunately, even the copy of the book that Faulkner marked 
with colored pencils has disappeared. (129)
In addition to revolutionizing printing, Faulkner’s colored sections would be the 
Peircean sign qua sign: equal parts symbol (“message”), index (chronological 
directive), and icon (pictorial representation or “image”).  By way of example 
one might think of the convention of printing the words of Christ in red in the 
New Testament (a practice introduced soon after Gutenberg); they are meant as 
directives (indices), but they are also iconic or representational (the blood of 
salvation).  Suggestively, Kristeva speaks of the ritual of transubstantiation (the 
substitution of bread for the body) as an “indelible thematization of the fold to 
be found between two spaces”; the merging of the “true-real”: the eruption of 
the semiotic into the symbolic (“The True-Real” 233).  Faulkner’s typographic 
experiment—had it been realized—would have enacted a “transubstantiation” 
of the linguistic sign even moreso than it already does.  Faulkner’s desire to 
make the text itself central—to foreground the visual, corporeal, material 
qualities of language over the abstract, referential, and symbolic is, for Kristeva, 
the articulation of the semiotic—the modality in which Benjy is trapped.
In “From One Identity to An Other,” Kristeva describes the codependent 
relationship between the semiotic and symbolic modalities:
At the same time instinctual and maternal, semiotic processes 
prepare the future speaker for entrance into meaning and 
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signification (the symbolic).  But the symbolic (i.e. language as 
nomination, sign, and syntax) constitutes itself only by breaking 
with this anteriority [. . .].  Language as symbolic function 
constitutes itself at the cost of repressing instinctual drive and 
continuous relation to the mother.  On the contrary, the unsettled 
and questionable subject of poetic language (for whom the word 
is never uniquely a sign) maintains itself at the cost of reactivating 
this repressed, instinctual element.  If it is true that the prohibition 
of incest constitutes, at the same time, language as 
communicative code and women as exchange objects in order 
for a society to be established, poetic language would be for its 
questionable subject [. . .] the equivalent of incest [emphasis in 
original].  (136)
The semiotic is at once the basis of the symbolic, patriarchal culture and the 
force that threatens its stability.  In language, the semiotic is the rhythm that 
supports the word, the music that carries the meaning.  As we have seen with 
Benjy, failure to repress (or be “repressed out of”) this presyntactic register 
results in “idiocy” or infantilism; but artists, modernists who explore the 
workings of signification can be released for a time from the constraints of the 
symbolic because they have a productive outlet, a “shelter” (Kristeva, 
“Oscillation” 165).  Without the pretense of art, a return to the semiotic (as 
defiant as incest) can only be experienced as schizophrenia, as psychosis.
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Quentin Compson represents a subject placed “on trial” by these 
opposing forces: struggling between his impulses for the maternal (represented 
for him, as for his brother, by Caddy) and the oppressive voices of authority.  In 
both text and context, his narrative is an investigation and, ultimately, an 
inversion of the relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic.
That Quentin’s section in the novel begins with his thinking about the 
abstract concept of time, and his father’s proclamation that “Christ was not 
crucified: he was worn away by a minute clicking of little wheels” situates 
Quentin firmly within the symbolic register (SF 77).  His initial concerns are with 
“transcendental significations.”  According to Lacan, identification with the 
Father coincides with the acquiescence to the “Law” that simultaneously 
prohibits the incestuous desire for the mother and encourages the acceptance 
of the social structure that the Father represents (Écrits 65-68).  To enter into the 
symbolic order depends upon the repression of desire.  Quentin’s dilemma is 
that he cannot accept the rigidity of the symbolic order, nor can he return to the 
dyadic, semiotic stage: instead he oscillates between the two.  
Quentin’s sustained meditation on the nature of time is marked by 
semiotic ruptures, indicated (indexed), as in Benjy’s section, by italics:
If it had been cloudy I could have looked at the window, thinking 
what he said about idle habits [. . .] The month of brides, the voice 
that breathed  She ran right out of the mirror, out of the banked 
scent.  Roses.  Roses.  Mr and Mrs Jason Richmond Compson 
announce the marriage of.  Roses.  Not virgins like dogweed, 
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milkweed.  I said I have committed incest, Father I said.  Roses.  
Cunning and serene.  (SF 77)
Importantly, Quentin’s first marked semiotic rupture is paired with his 
incestuous desire for Caddy, who, in the first section of the novel, requested the 
maternal responsibility of her neglected brothers.  Although Quentin ostensibly 
desires Caddy less for her sexuality than for the maternal, presymbolic 
relationship she intimates, that he imagines disclosing his fantasy to his father is 
evocative; transgression of the Law of the father carries with it the threat of 
castration—a possibility Quentin considers as a way to repudiate the precepts of 
the symbolic order—but one which his ineffectual father cannot offer.
Quentin’s dilemma is that he sees no way to reconcile the semiotic and 
symbolic realms: fixed in the thetic phase of individuation, he is in a constant 
state of flux, unable, like Benjy, to define himself through language.  Without 
the sanctuary of artistic practice, the semiotic can only lead to the asylum, or to 
death.  Indeed, this heterogeneity becomes increasingly threatening for him; 
when he confronts Caddy’s seducer, Dalton Ames, Quentin’s consciousness 
becomes detached: “I heard myself saying Ill give you until sundown to leave 
town [. . .] my mouth said it I didnt say it at all”  (SF 159-60 [sic]). 
In rupturing the boundaries between the I and the not-I, Quentin reveals his 
inability to individuate himself, to situate himself in the symbolic order, a 
problem that culminates in the subversion of Quentin’s consciousness:
Just by imagining the clump it seemed to me that I could hear the 
whispers secret surges smell the beating of hot blood under wild 
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unsecret flesh watching against red eyelids the swine untethered 
in pairs rushing coupled into the sea and he we must just stay 
awake and see evil done for a little while its not always and i it 
doesnt have to be even that long for a man of courage and he do 
you consider that courage and i yes sir dont you and he every 
man is the arbiter of his own virtues.  (SF 176 [sic])
In Quentin’s imagination, he enters into a dialectic between the symbolic order, 
represented, significantly, by his father’s voice, and the semiotic register that 
precedes identity and coherence: the semiotic, that which underlies symbolic 
discourse, becomes increasingly privileged in Quentin’s consciousness until 
his father’s sophistic replies are all but drowned out by uncontrolled semiotic 
rhythms.  According to Marsha Warren, his internal struggle is between 
“ordered thought and language (symbolic discourse)” and the “heterogeneous 
and the irrational (semiotic discourse)” (100).  Quentin’s debate with his 
father
takes the course of an uninterrupted flow of language between 
the disintegrating symbolic and the disintegrating 
subject/speaker.  Without capitalization or punctuation, the syntax 
is undelineated by stoppage or closure.  Father has become  he 
and Quentin/I has become i.  The slippage in subject and 
pronoun positions, too, suggests a kind of dissolving of 
subjectivity [. . .] there is no exchange, no agreement, only 
opposition, only conflict between the semiotic and the symbolic, 
220
which ultimately effects Quentin’s rejection of the Law/Truth of the 
Father.  (Warren 109)
Indeed, Quentin’s entire narrative is illustrative of this polemic between the two 
poles.  Unlike Benjy’s semiotic consciousness that necessitates clarification from 
sequentially more objective narrators, Quentin’s section moves from ordered 
prose into gradually more impulsive, inchoate rushes and rhythms.  The italics 
that signify semiotic ruptures are eventually disposed of, making the boundaries 
between modalities less defined; indeed, the text deconstructs itself as Quentin’s 
semiotic consciousness becomes privileged.  While Quentin dwells upon the 
night he proposed a suicide pact with Caddy, his narrative prose begins to 
resemble free verse:
then I was crying her hand touched me again and I was crying 
against her damp blouse then she lying on her back looking past 
my head into the sky I could see a rim of white under her irises I 
opened my knife
do you remember the day damuddy died when you sat 
down in the water in your drawers
yes
I held the point of the knife at her throat
it wont take but a second just a second then I can do 
mine I can do mine then
all right can you do yours by yourself
yes the blades long enough Benjys in bed by now
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yes
it wont take but a second Ill try not to hurt
all right
will you close your eyes
no like this youll have to push it harder
touch your hand to it.  (SF 151-52 [sic])
As Quentin’s loses control of his impulses, he loses control of his syntax; the 
further he regresses into the semiotic register, the more the symbolic function of 
the text degenerates: if he cannot commit incest with his sister/mother, he 
experiences “the equivalent of incest” through a distortion of language; 
however, the “proetry” here is not released as art; it is surfacing as psychosis—it 
emerges, not from the pen of an aspiring poet, but from the tortured 
consciousness of a schizophrenic—and the culmination of this dialectic is 
Quentin’s suicide.
What is remarkable about The Sound and the Fury is what it does: in 
privileging the aesthetic and the translinguistic over rudimentary, 
communicative discourse, the limits of language are tested and the 
marginalized semiotic is made tantamount with the symbolic; in the 
intentionally abstruse, rhythmic streams of Benjy and Quentin’s 
consciousnesses, the materiality, rather than the transparency of language is 
stressed.  Indeed, even the final, authoritative section written to order and clarify 
the preceding semiotic narratives, is marked by one of the most significant 
semiotic eruptions in the text; in describing an advertisement that Jason sees 
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after his fight with the old man in the rail car, Faulkner resorts to graphics: “[. . .] 
grass grew rigidly in a plot bordered with rigid flowers and a sign in electric 
lights: Keep your                 on Mottson, the gap filled by a human eye with an 
electric pupil” (SF 311).  Again, the primacy of language is undermined by the 
translinguistic semiotic; the very limits of signification are reached.  Candace 
Waid, in her article “The Signifying Eye: Faulkner’s Artists and the Engendering 
Art,” argues that the spherical eye is linked with castration and the “symbolic 
association between eyes and female genitals which is already present 
throughout The Sound and the Fury” (241); the most obvious explanation for 
the icon, in Waid’s reading, is the metonymic connection of eyes with “the 
minute fragile membrane of [Caddy’s] maidenhead” (qtd. in Waid 241).  While 
Waid’s argument is laudable for being one of the few to directly address the 
significance of the eye icon (or the “eyecon”), it does not sufficiently account for 
its typographic presence.
On one level, the eye (which, importantly, is looking to the left—towards 
the beginning of the narrative) condenses the inability of the Compson brothers 
to “look ahead,” to forget Caddy (“Candance” incidentally, means as Waid 
points out, “the one eyed warrior queen” [241]), to accept her absence.  As 
Bleikasten tells us, Caddy
is at once the focal and the vanishing point, the bewitching image 
around which everything revolves [. . .].  One might even argue 
that Caddy is little more than a blank counter, an empty signifier, a 
name in itself devoid of meaning and thus apt to receive any 
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meaning [. . .].  Caddy is a sign, with all the arbitrariness of a sign, 
and Faulkner’s keen awareness of the chancy and shifting 
relationships between word and thing, language and meaning,
is attested on the very first page of the novel by his deliberate 
punning on caddie and Caddy.  (Ink of Melancholy 49-50)  
If she is the “focal point,” the eye is directed toward her and, hence, is a 
representation of the desiring gaze of the other characters in the novel; but we 
might also go further; and If Caddy is an empty signifier that exposes the 
incongruity of the word and the referent, of the “shape” and the “lack,” the eye 
could be a visual signifier for Caddy herself.  Implicit in the directive to “keep 
your [eye] on Mottson” is that however much the town might be growing, “if 
you blink, you’ll miss it.”  In the figure of the eye which blinks, which opens and 
closes, is the dramatization of fort-da, presence and absence.  For Lacan, the 
eye “is only a metaphor of something that I would prefer to call the seer’s 
‘shoot’—something prior to his eye [. . .], the pre-existence of a gaze (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 72).  It is at once object and representamen, a “literal” 
(or iconic) eye and symbol of desire.    
 On another level, the eye also suggests Egyptian hieroglyphs (the eye of 
Horus) and, as such, represents a merging of the signified and signifier; a 
folding of the iconic (or the semiotic) into the symbolic (effectuated as well by 
the coffin diagram) which the narrative of The Sound and the Fury delineates.  
Surprisingly, Peirce denigrates the hieroglyph:
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In all primitive writing, such as the Egyptian hieroglyphics, there 
are icons of a non-logical kind, the ideographs.  In the earliest 
form of speech, there probably was a large element of mimicry.  
But in all languages known, such representations have been 
replaced by conventional auditory signs.  These, however, are 
such that they can only be explained by icons.  (“Logic as 
Semiotic” 11)
Faulkner himself, in his Paris Review interview with Jean Stein, aligns the 
hieroglyphic with the primitive:
I imagine as long as people will continue to read novels, people 
will continue to write them, or vice-versa; unless of course the 
pictorial magazines and comic strips finally atrophy man’s 
capacity to read, and literature really is on its way back to the 
picture writing in the Neanderthal cave.  (137)
However jocular Faulkner’s comment might have been, it is important to note 
that both he and Peirce classify the iconic as a more immediate, more mimetic, 
and more fundamental “discourse.”  It follows that the icons within Faulkner’s 
texts serve as reminders of this “archaeology of enunciation” (Kristeva, “The 
True-Real” 218) that precedes language.  In both As I Lay Dying and The Sound 
and the Fury, Faulkner interrogates the Saussurean notion of the arbitrariness of 
the sign, he restores the archaic semiotic to the level of the symbolic, and he 
opens our eyes to the transubstantive power of the printed sign.
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